THE SUCCESS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: WHEN HISTORY MATTERS. THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN GLOBAL CONTEXT* by Simoncini, Andrea
THE ITALIAN JOURNAL 
OF PUBLIC LAW
ISSN 2239-8279
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL. 8 ISSUE 1/2016 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
EDITORIAL 
ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Marta Cartabia.........................................................................................................................................1 
 
ARTICLES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ITS METHODS 
Gaetano Azzariti.......................................................................................................................................3 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN ITALY AND BEYOND:  
A COMPARATIVE (AND PRIVATE LAW) PERSPECTIVE 
Mauro Bussani.......................................................................................................................................12 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING OPEN.  
LESSONS FROM ABROAD FOR THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
Vittoria Barsotti......................................................................................................................................28 
 
OF BRIDGES AND WALLS: THE “ITALIAN STYLE” OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
Marta Cartabia.......................................................................................................................................37 
 
IS THERE AN "ITALIAN STYLE" IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION? 
Oreste Pollicino......................................................................................................................................56 
 
AN ITALIAN OR A EUROPEAN STYLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?  
SETTING THE AGENDA FOR COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON COURTS 
Patricia Popelier......................................................................................................................................72 
 
THE SUCCESS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: WHEN HISTORY MATTERS.  
THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Andrea Simoncini...................................................................................................................................79 
 
FROM MUTUAL RECOGNITION TO EU AUTHORIZATIONS:  
A DECLINE OF TRANSNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS? 
Luca De Lucia.........................................................................................................................................90 
 
THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SCHENGHEN AGREEMENT:  
IS THE ABOLITION OF INTERNAL BORDERS A REALISTIC GOAL? 
Marie Gautier.......................................................................................................................................115 
 
SHORT ARTICLES 
DIGITALISATION AND REFORMS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN ITALY 
Stefano Civitarese Matteucci................................................................................................................127 
 
PROFESSIONS IN ITALY: A GREY AREA  
Stefano D’Alfonso.................................................................................................................................164 
 
THE RISE OF GLOBAL STANDARDS. ICAO'S STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 
Francesco Giovanni Albisinni..............................................................................................................203 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views and opinions expressed in every article of the Journal are those of the 
authors and do not reflect the views of Italian Journal of Public Law, its Board of 
Editors, or any member of the Board. 
 
1 
 
EDITORIAL 
 
 
 
ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 
 
Marta Cartabia* 
 
 
1956-2016: the Italian Constitutional Court just turned 60, as 
her first decision was issued in June 1056.  
It was a momentous event for the Italian Republic. Not only 
did a new institution move her first step in the new constitutional 
framework, but also she spoke with authority. She affirmed her 
jurisdiction over the old legislation enacted before the Republican 
Constitution; she acted as a guardian of citizens’ freedom and 
stroke down a fascist provision very restrictive of freedom of 
speech. 
Since then, the Constitutional Court has gained a robust 
position in the domestic legal order and a distinguished 
recognition among her counterparts. The second part of the 20th 
century was the day of constitutional adjudication: all over 
Europe, and beyond, Constitutional courts were established in the 
new constitutional democracies. The Italian and the German one 
were the pioneers, together with the Austrian prototype; all of 
them became models for other younger experiences. 
Anniversaries are occasions to look back and reconsider the 
historical developments, the achievements, the weak points, the 
new perspectives. In the present issue of the IJPL a number of 
scholars discuss about the “Italian style in constitutional 
adjudication”, moving from the first book on the Italian 
Constitutional Court published for an English speaking audience, 
recently published for Oxford University Press (Vittoria Barsotti, 
Paolo Carozza, Marta Cartabia, Andrea Simoncini, Italian 
Constitutional Justice in a Global Context, OUP, 2016).  
 
 
*Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Milan “Bicocca”, Vice-President 
of the Italian Constitutional Court 
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They were invited to single out the “Italian voice” in the 
choir of the constitutional adjudicators - touching upon a broad 
range of topics, from fundamental rights and liberties, to the 
allocation of governmental powers and regionalism - and to 
discuss its distinctive features, among many actors. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ITS METHODS* 
 
Gaetano Azzariti** 
 
 
Abstract 
The article critically reviews the book “Italian Constitutional 
Justice in Global Context”, analysing the extensive use of the case 
approach made in the text and examining the creative nature of 
the Italian constitutional Court. The essay underlines in particular 
the “style” adopted by the Italian Court, which, according to the 
authors, is characterised by a principle of relationality with other 
institutional actors: Courts, judges, policies, and citizens. 
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1. Introduction 
Italian constitutional law and its constitutional 
jurisprudence are not entirely unknown outside of Italy. It would 
therefore be an exaggeration to say that this book, addressed to 
non-Italian scholars, fills a knowledge gap. However, it is also true 
that, at the supranational level, there is only an occasional and 
sporadic perception of the Italian system, largely the result of 
dialogue between courts. So I feel that the specific contribution of 
                                       
* This essay was delivered on February 15th, 2016 at the University of Notre 
Dame, Rome Global Gateway in Rome, at the Symposium “Italian 
Constitutional Justice in Global Context”.  
 
** Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Rome “La Sapienza”. 
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this text lies in the way it highlights the qualities of the overall 
model. The volume essentially provides a generally systematic 
overall view of the role of the Constitutional Court in Italy. It thus 
fosters a move away from the fragmented dialogue that has 
largely characterised the Court to a more open dialogue with the 
whole community of interpreters of law. This is a first significant 
element to be acknowledged with regard to this book.  
The volume provides an analysis of the Italian model 
bearing in mind the different systems and global contexts, in close 
- though sometimes implicit - dialogue with the experience of 
others. The Italian model emerges favourably from the 
comparison. 
The privileged yardstick is the US system, i.e., the oldest 
and most important constitutional justice on the planet, and he 
impression that emerges is very significant: despite their 
differences, comparison between constitutional justice systems 
provides useful insights, highlighting the shortcomings, but also 
the benefits, of their real life experiences.  
Before offering some more direct considerations on the 
content of the book, I would like to mention another of its strong 
points, perhaps an indirect, but nonetheless important one (even 
though I feel perhaps it is not one of the aims of the volume). In 
times of fragility and debate regarding the Italian constitutional 
system, in a period when the Italian constitutional system in 
general, and Italian constitutional justice in particular, are often at 
the forefront of controversy, a text of this kind shows its vitality, 
and in some way contributes, albeit indirectly, to the 
strengthening of the central role of constitutional justice and the 
constitutional system as a whole. 
Moving on to discuss the merits of the theses presented in 
the book, I would like to focus on three specific issues 
characterising this study addressed in the text. In particular, I look 
at a) the method used, b) the role of the courts within the system, 
and c) Italian style. 
At this point, I present my overall assessment, which is not 
so much of the book, as, generally speaking, the phase that the 
whole constitutional justice system is going through, and not just 
the Italian one. This is the guiding idea running through the 
considerations I am about to offer. 
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My personal belief is that national constitutional justice in 
the global context should find - or perhaps simply consolidate - an 
equilibrium that as yet does not exist. In this situation of 
permanent instability, the greatest risk is that of losing the most 
solid certainties of the national tradition and becoming 
overwhelmed by events that can rock the entire constitutional 
justice system, with unfavourable consequences. I aim to explain 
and justify my impression, considering the three points 
mentioned. 
 
 
2. The method 
The text makes extensive use of the case approach. With 
respect to our dogmatic and systematic tradition, this is certainly a 
quick move forward. I think this is in part dictated by the need for 
international comparison, as well as the influence that the case 
approach has on the international level. In part though, I think it is 
also the result of a particular sensitivity by the authors to a trend 
that is becoming more widespread and that sees the case approach 
gaining ground also in the Italian system of constitutional justice, 
often at the expense of dogmatics and, perhaps, also systematics. 
An example might clarify my point. We refer to the 
extended use, encouraged by the Italian Constitutional Court 
itself, of interpretation compliant with: compliant with the 
Constitution, compliant with the ECHR, compliant with EU 
regulations. This favours the spread of control over the 
constitutionality of laws (i.e., compliance with the ECHR or EU 
legislation), indirectly and informally placing specific limitations 
on interpretation by ordinary courts. Anyone wishing, however, 
to find unity in the system as a whole, must employ the case 
approach, having to examine each compliant interpretation by the 
different courts and then find - if there is one - a single fabric, a 
system, or dogmatics. The advantages of this perspective are 
obvious (basically: the spread and greater concreteness of the 
judgment on the constitutionality of the norms). It also brings with 
it some costs, however. Not so much the risk of losing the abstract 
character of a judgment or its centralised nature as that of the 
Constitutional Court losing its specific role as decision-maker of 
last resort, all the more so in a complex, global system where it 
seems that no one has the last word any longer, especially in a 
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peculiar order like the Italian one which does not envisage the 
doctrine of stare decisis. Basically, there is a risk that the system of 
constitutional jurisdiction will no longer have sole competence. 
Furthermore, this greater difficulty of finding unity in the 
constitutional system does not only depend on causes “internal” 
to the Italian domestic system or the specific techniques of 
interpretation adopted, but, also in more general terms, it is due to 
the overall process of gradual integration and interference among 
national and supranational courts. While hoping for greater 
dialogue between courts, there is also the risk of eclecticism and 
an excessive diversity of languages, and the impossibility of the 
unambiguous and reliable protection of fundamental rights. One 
could find numerous examples of different interpretations by both 
national and supranational courts, that, from a substantive 
standpoint, favour a very different range and protection of the 
same rights; safeguards that at times are at odds with each other. 
Suffice it to think of the significant case, whose oscillations are 
sometimes strongly marked by the principle of dignity: 
“Constitutional Metavalue”, made up of both domestic legislation 
and judge-made law, and that can be applied in very different 
ways. 
Thus, I think there is a need to seek a balance that has not 
yet been found. To do this, I wonder if today we should not be 
thinking about instruments which, alongside the inevitable use of 
the case approach, might stem any possible excessive eclecticism 
and diversity of languages, in order to avoid succumbing to the 
chaos of the opinions of Courts, including the authoritative ones 
of Supreme Courts. From this perspective, then, our dogmatic and 
systematic tradition might find renewed strength in a role where it 
could restore balance, reducing cases to reason. In this dogma-
centred effort, I believe that the national constitutional courts, and 
especially the Italian ones, can still play a decisive role, perhaps 
not becoming an “island of reason” - 1to borrow Franco 
Modugno’s famous phrase - but, at least, as a beacon indicating 
the route. 
 
 
                                       
1 F. Modugno, L’invalidità della legge. Teoria della Costituzione e parametro del 
giudizio costituzionale (1970). 
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3. The role of the Courts 
The creative nature of the Italian Constitutional Court, 
which participates in its own insertion within the system, emerges 
very clearly in this book. It is not a question of the total self-
determination of their role, but of a sort of co-determination of the 
Court and its judgments within the overall system of powers. 
Looking at a possible constitutional role partly established 
by the courts themselves from this perspective, the parallel drawn 
in one chapter of the book between the first judgment of the 
Italian Constitutional Court, i.e., no. 1 of 1956, and Marbury v. 
Madison2 is very significant. Moreover, the creative nature of the 
Constitutional Court or, more generally speaking, of “Supreme” 
Courts, must now be considered a universal given. Suffice it to 
recall the sensational case of the European Court that, in the 
absence of any explicit formal footing, at least until Maastricht, 
managed to establish a real system for the protection of 
fundamental human rights which was only later transposed, 
normalised, normatised, and perhaps expanded by the political 
and institutional system through the Charter of Nice. 
Speaking of the “imbalances” to be highlighted here, it 
seems to me that we run today the risk of excessive judicial 
creativity. I do not pose the question in the more usual terms of 
excessive judicial activism. Still less would I hope for a simple 
return to textualism, also because, ultimately, I do not think one 
can draw an immediate parallel between adherence to the text and 
the self-limitation of the judges of the Constitutional Courts in 
particular. Looking at the US experience, the late Justice Scalia 
showed that, behind the screen of original intent he always justified 
- often brilliantly - daring interpretations of the US Constitution 
which, however, did not always conform to the spirit of the time 
and whose rate of creativity cannot be said to be insignificant. 
The point I wish to raise, then, is another. It seems to me 
that an excess of creativity on the part of courts - and, in 
particular, Constitutional Courts - can sometimes be detrimental 
to the effectiveness and the very solidity of both the individual 
rulings and the rights they seek to protect. There is a real risk of 
                                       
2 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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undermining the rights to be guaranteed and, ultimately, of 
delegitimising the Constitutional Court itself. 
Also in this case I would like to recall only a couple of 
cases. They are quite well-known judgments. The first is the ruling 
on the jurisdictional dispute between State powers that 3solved a 
highly sensitive question, operating at the core of the form of 
government, formally and substantively endowing the Head of 
State alone with the power to pardon. It is not my intention to 
enter into the merits of the decision here. I shall merely make the 
following observation: the creative ratio decidendi by which the 
issue was solved did not prove able to sustain comparison with 
reality. The “solely humanitarian basis” that the Court identified 
to legitimise the presidential power to pardon proved, in fact to be 
absolutely unfounded. Suffice it to refer to the subsequent 
pardons granted to Colonel Joseph Romano and other CIA agents 
involved in the Abu Omar case - where no humanitarian grounds 
can be discerned, but only political and diplomatic ones - to see 
how the power of presidential pardon is bereft of any supporting 
foundation. It is the outcome of a creation with no concrete basis 
that has rendered indefinite and anonymous such a sensitive 
institution as presidential pardon. 
In this, as in other cases, one wonders how such a strong 
propensity for creativity on the part of the judges may be justified. 
I think the underlying reason lies in a radical political crisis that 
arises from an imbalance in the system and that ends up falling to 
the courts. We recall, and this is the second of the sentences I wish 
to refer to, the sentence of the Court on the electoral law4. Again - 
looking beyond the merits of the judgment - what else led to this 
decision if not the impotence or, perhaps, the arrogance of the 
political power, which proved unable to approve an electoral law 
despite three previous recommendations by the Court? This is 
what led the Constitutional Court itself to produce an electoral 
law compliant with the Constitution. This was not at all an 
obvious move; in fact until some time ago, it would have been 
unimaginable. It would never have been conceivable, in fact, that 
the most “political” of laws (the electoral law which establishes 
the basis of representation and is at the foundation of the very 
                                       
3 Judgment no. 200 of 2006. 
4 Judgment no. 1 of 2014. 
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legitimacy of representative democracy) could be created by the 
Constitutional Court instead of Parliament. 
Moreover, the judgment on the electoral law that led to 
such controversy cannot be considered an isolated event, nor is it a 
mere case for the books, nor yet is it due to any alleged 
hyperactivity on the part of the Italian Constitutional Court. It 
reflects a general political imbalance. Ultimately, it is down to the 
instability and the inability of politics to put in place the 
constitutionally necessary actions that explain so many other 
creative choices by judges (and not only in the Constitutional 
Courts). We need only think of another kind of case of particular 
relevance today that has produced a very large number of 
supplementing judgments produced in various ways due to the 
lack of regulation protecting the fundamental human rights of 
individuals concerning their sexual orientation. 
However, there is no denying that this imbalance, caused 
by political absence, has sometimes brought about an excess of 
judicial realism: an absolute pragmatism, with a tendency to self-
referentiality that I do not think can be considered a possible goal 
for the global systems of constitutional protection. I refer to those 
tendencies that induce courts to over-emphasise the role of the 
legal fact on a case-by-case basis (cf. the above-mentioned 
presidential pardon and electoral law). Also to the strong 
propensity shown by the Courts to respond more to a presumed 
natural law (the idea of justice) than to the actual text of the 
Constitution (secularised justice). Not without fault is the 
increasingly intense dialogue between the Courts, which 
sometimes appears to absorb, rather than be mediated by, the 
regulatory and political context, at home, in Europe or 
internationally. 
Each of the cases mentioned suffers from the effect of a lost 
balance. I see no other way to regain this balance than the return of 
politics to the Constitution, accompanied by the containment of 
the judiciary within the narrow scope of “negative creativity”, 
defined by strict compliance with the rules of legal interpretation 
and constitutional principles. 
 
 
4. The Italian Style 
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At this point, we come to the third and final topic that I 
wish to address. The last, pregnant, pages of the book are 
dedicated to Italian Style. The authors claim that this style is 
characterised by a principle of relationality with other actors: 
Courts, judges, policies, and citizens. I am unsure whether this 
may be interpreted as a way of seeking the lamented lost balance 
that we have mentioned here. But what I definitely want to 
remark is that this relationalilty (both “institutional” and 
“interpretative”) might perhaps be a goal to aim for, but it cannot 
be considered as a consolidated given within the Italian 
constitutional justice system in today’s context. 
Let us start with “institutional relationality”. There is no 
doubt that a great many virtuous changes can be attributed to the 
Italian Constitutional Court and its style. The Constitutional Court 
has often called on the other institutions - primarily Parliament - 
to adapt the political system and its norms to the Constitution. 
There have been countless advances related to this virtuous 
relationship, from the dismantling of Fascist legislation to that 
relating to family law. But it is also true that it is not always 
possible to discern any positive “relationality” actually pursued 
by the various institutions. The outcome of the rulings in 
legislation cannot always be said to be linear; indeed, it is 
sometimes non-existent. 
I would also like to emphasise another aspect in an attempt 
to show how and to what extent I feel “relationality” can, or must, 
operate. Sometimes relationality should not be understood as a 
fair effort to cooperate on the part of the Court with the other 
powers. When fundamental rights or supreme constitutional 
principles are at stake, it must be acknowledged that the Court 
operates “intransigently”. I think this should happen every time 
that, faced with a violation of supreme constitutional legality by a 
political majority, the counter-majority role of the Court has to be 
brought into play as a constitutional Court that asserts itself as an 
indefatigable guarantor of the Constitution and the rights of the 
individual against any majority temporarily in government. 
Clearly, this does not concern only relations with 
Parliament or the political majorities, but in all cases when the 
Court interacts with the other powers; including that of the 
judiciary. In this case too it can not be forgotten that the hoped for 
harmony is not always present. There have been not a few “wars 
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between the Courts”. A dose of conflict between different types of 
Courts is to be considered natural: there is always a crisis always 
lurking round the corner. So also in this case relationality must be 
understood as a goal to be pursued, and not a natural 
characteristic of Italian style.  
But perhaps the most sensitive point that the book raises 
concerns “interpretative relationality”, addressed in the closing 
pages. Different and competing methods of interpretation are 
presented in two parts of the book, be they originalist, teleological, 
related in varying degrees to the above, or the literal or systematic 
approach. At one point we read this sentence: “The constitutional 
court follows a comprehensive methodology, one that does not 
shy away from complexity5.” I wonder if this is an elegant way of 
exposing the abuse of eclecticism. What is certain is that in reading 
the case law of this Court, occasional excess can be observed: with 
slightly forced balancing acts, excessively abstract reasonableness, 
and artificially induced proportionality, it is doubtful whether a 
balance has really been achieved. My impression is that there is a 
lot of work to be done by both scholars and judges in the field of 
constitutional interpretation, while some of the canons used, such 
as reasonableness and proportionality, at times prove too elastic, 
far too elastic. In these cases, the Court tends to over-widen the 
margin necessary to achieve a constitutionally acceptable result, 
thus risking to venture too close in the direction of interpretative 
subjectivism. So, in addition to interpretive relationality it is 
necessary to exercise care in maintaining close relationality with 
the text of the Constitution. This too can be of help in finding that 
constitutional balance which as yet does not exist. 
                                       
5 V. Barsotti, P.G. Carozza, M. Cartabia & A. Simoncini, Italian Constitutional 
Justice in Global Context (2015) 238. 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN ITALY AND BEYOND:  
A COMPARATIVE (AND PRIVATE) LAW PERSPECTIVE* 
 
Mauro Bussani** 
 
Abstract 
This article takes a comparative law perspective to examine 
a series of issues that, through the lense of the recently published 
book ‘Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context’, appear to 
be closely interconnected. It starts with a survey of the overall 
global circulation of Italian legal models. Secondly, it focuses on 
the general features and inner limits of so-called global 
constitutionalism. Thirdly, it addresses the interactions at work in 
a civil jurisdiction between the Constitutional Court and the other 
domestic, European and Western legal formants. The final part of 
the paper chooses private law as a litmus test to review the 
practical dimension of the above-mentioned interactions. 
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1. A book of virtues  
‘Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context’ makes a 
strong contribution to disseminating knowledge about the Italian 
Constitutional Court within the marketplace of ideas – a 
marketplace that, by definition, transcends national borders and is 
largely globalised. 
 
 
* This essay was delivered on February 15th, 2016 at the University of Notre 
Dame, Rome Global Gateway in Rome, at the Symposium “Italian 
Constitutional Justice in Global Context”. The original text and colloquial tone 
of the lecture have been preserved. Footnotes have been added. 
 
* Professor of Comparative Law, University of Trieste. Adjunct Professor at the 
University of Macao, S.A.R. of the People's Republic of China. 
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This effort at dissemination is meritorious in itself – 
regardless of any virtues that the book may, and actually does, 
possess. It is meritorious because, despite the authentic or derived 
originality that Italian legal architectures and their scholarly 
foundations often possess1, Italian law is little known compared 
with the law of the Western jurisdictions which are (or are deemed 
to be) paradigmatic. Limited knowledge of Italian law abroad is 
an issue that deserves brief discussion here, also because one of 
the reasons why I was invited to speak today is, I suppose, that I 
have worked on a project examining this very issue, from which a 
book has recently been produced2. 
 
 
2. Italian law in the world 
The project aimed to turn the widespread and servile 
opinion that post-unification Italy3 has merely been a taker – 
rather than a maker – of legal rules, into a provocation, and into a 
series of questions, including, ‘Is legal Italy only an imitating 
country?’ and ‘Haven’t the Italian legal tradition and models in 
turn been known, admired, and imitated by others?’ 
A word of clarification: the underlying idea was not to 
solicit answers imbued with pride, or to take a nationalistic stance. 
The goal was rather to do an exercise in comparative law and to 
understand how and why Italian law has been able, or has failed, 
to make itself known beyond domestic circles. 
It goes without saying that the legal dimension I refer to is 
not only that of State legislation. A legal tradition is of course 
made up of a number of authoritative rules set out by legislators 
                                                           
1 See the contributions in S. Lanni, P. Sirena (eds.), Il modello giuridico – scientifico 
e legislativo – italiano fuori dell’Europa, Atti del II Congresso Nazionale della SIRD 
(2013). 
2 M. Bussani (ed.), Il diritto italiano in Europa (1865-2014). Scienza, giurisprudenza, 
legislazione, in Annuario di diritto comparato (2015). 
3 Before the political unification of the peninsula in 1861, history gave Italian 
law a primary and incessant role in producing a substantial part of the legal 
infrastructure of continental Europe: from Roman law to municipal statutes, 
from ius commune to iura mercatorum, from Muratori to Filangieri to Beccaria. 
See, for example., P. Cappellini, P. Costa, M. Fioravanti, B. Sordi (eds.), 
Enciclopedia italiana. Il contributo italiano alla storia del pensiero giuridico (2012) 
XXXIII. 
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and judges. But this is not the whole story. Any legal tradition, 
including the Italian one, is best understood as “a set of deeply 
rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, 
about the role of law in society and polity, about the proper 
organisation and functioning of a legal system, and about the way 
law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected and 
taught”4. From this cultural perspective, law emerges as a social 
infrastructure, relentlessly built and re-built by many different 
formants and actors, all with their own functions, aspirations, and 
roles. 
Seen from this perspective, the Italian legal tradition (like 
many others) cannot but prove to be the long-term product of a 
mixed past5. What we dub ‘Italian law’ is the mobile result of a 
many-faceted history of legal transplants and transmitting of 
ideas, original solutions, and reinterpretations of borrowed ones. 
It is a history shaped by different forces, moving at different 
speeds and in different directions. A history of coexistence and 
competition among a plurality of legal orders and local variations. 
A history, like other legal histories, full of departures and returns, 
of renaissances and changes, of confrontation and dialogue with 
otherness6. 
Unlike other Western legal sub-traditions, our post-
unification legal system has never hidden its mixity. Over time, 
Italian jurists have endured, questioned, and proclaimed the 
‘mixedness’ of their legal culture, and have always been able to 
convert it into a valid currency for their domestic intellectual 
exchanges. Thanks to a cultural modesty to which I shall come 
                                                           
4 J. Merryman, R. Perez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition (2007), 1-2 (who then 
add: “The legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture of which it is a 
partial expression. It puts the legal system into cultural perspective”).  
5 E. Örücü, General Introduction. Mixed Legal Systems at New Frontiers, in Ead. 
(ed.), Mixed Legal Systems at New Frontiers (2010), 1 (“a great variety of legal 
systems have developed from mixed sources and all modern systems of any 
sophistication or complexity are mixed to a certain extent”); Ead, What is a 
Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?, ibid., 53, 54 (“all legal systems are 
mixed, whether covertly or overtly”). 
6 M. Infantino, The Italian Legal Recipe: Basic Ingredients and the Bustle of Time, 6 J. 
Comp. L. 70-85 (2011). See also P. Cappellini, P. Costa, M. Fioravanti, B. Sordi, 
Introduzione, in Enciclopedia italiana, cit. at 3. 
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back later, Italian jurists have more sparingly used that currency 
for their exchanges with other national traditions. 
The frequency and quantity of these exchanges have, of 
course, differed through time and across places. Outside Europe, 
and particularly in Latin America, in the Horn and North of 
Africa, and (in the last thirty years) in China, the demands of 
Italian law – above all, although not exclusively, of scholarly law – 
have been intense, and most of the time fully met7. Throughout 
Europe, too, our proposals and debates have circulated widely in 
many fields – from Roman law to international law, from criminal 
procedure8 to research on the Common Core of European Private 
Law9 to constitutional justice itself10. 
What should be noted is that the above ‘proposals’ and 
‘debates’ were, and still are, almost exclusively put forward by 
scholars. In reality, it was the academic élites that took, and still 
take Italian codes, statutes and case law beyond our borders, 
acting as our ‘heralds of the Italian legal tradition11. It is scholars 
who make Italian-born ideas known elsewhere. Scholars explain 
Italian case law and legislation to those who have no access to 
                                                           
7 Some illustrations are offered in S. Lanni, P. Sirena (eds.), Il modello giuridico – 
scientifico e legislativo – italiano fuori dell’Europa, cit. at 1. 
8 See the contributions by M. Brutti, I romanisti italiani in Europa, 211-54; E. 
Cannizzaro, Il mutamento dei paradigmi della scienza giuridica internazionalista e la 
dottrina italiana, 77-98, and M. Chiavario, Il diritto processuale penale italiano e i 
suoi quattro codici: luci e ombre di una «presenza» in Europa, 149-96, in M. Bussani 
(ed.), Il diritto italiano in Europa, cit. at 2. 
9 The project was founded more than twenty years ago by Ugo Mattei and the 
author of this paper with the aim of unearthing what is common and what is 
different within and across European private laws. For more information about 
the methodology, contents and results of the project, see M. Bussani and U. 
Mattei, The Common Core Approach to the European Private Law, 3 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 339 (1997/98); M. Bussani, “The Common Core of 
European Private Law” Project Two Decades After: An Endless Beginning, European 
Lawyer Journal 12 (2016), forthcoming; see also F. Fiorentini, Un progetto 
scientifico che stimola e affascina l’Europa: «The Common Core of European Private 
Law», in M. Bussani (ed.), Il diritto italiano in Europa, cit. at 2, 275-306. 
10 See especially Martia Cartabia’s study on Italian incidental procedure as a 
model for European constitutional justice: M. Cartabia, La fortuna del giudizio di 
costituzionalità in via incidentale, in M. Bussani (ed.), Il diritto italiano in Europa, 
cit. at 2, 27-53. 
11 In these terms, but regarding commercial law studies, see P. Grossi, Scienza 
giuridica italiana. Un profilo storico 1860-1950 (2000), 187. 
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them. Scholars are read, (sometimes translated), often appreciated, 
and discussed in foreign fora. The list of Italian scholars who are 
highly thought of abroad is long – and includes the Italian authors 
of the book we are discussing here. 
That being said, we are also obliged to acknowledge the 
limits and fragilities currently besetting Italian legal culture and 
its outward projection. If “‘legal culture’ (in its narrowest 
meaning) can be defined as the legal narrative of a society told 
from the perspective of the legal professionals operating in that 
society”12, we are forced to conclude that a substantial portion of 
the Italian professional class is today constraining Italian legal 
culture between petty parochialism and pure fantasy. The 
parochialism is plain to see: it lies in the tardiness and 
superficiality with which many Italian legal professionals receive 
streams (not to say: fragments) of others’ debates and discuss 
them in the absence of any comparative contextualisation. Yet 
parochialism is often overwhelmed by fantasy. Fantasy takes hold 
of multitudes of domestic lawyers who naïvely believe that “legal 
experience cannot but be intrinsically local”13, and often are as 
assertive and self-congratulatory within their national borders as 
they are stuttering and unheard beyond them. 
To say the very least, this legal culture serves neither itself, 
nor the present or the future of the country of which it is the 
expression. Nor does it support the work of judges and lawyers, 
whose task it is to participate in the world of ideas not only as 
listeners, but also as active debaters and transmitters of vision, 
critiques, and solutions. 
Against this framework, the book under review presents 
itself as an austere challenge to local provincialism, and as a fertile 
promise of the dissemination of Italian views in the transnational 
marketplace of ideas. I will shortly highlight what I consider to be 
the volume’s most remarkable virtues. Before doing so, however, 
let me sketch some piecemeal comments on the text. 
                                                           
12 P. Cappellini, P. Costa, M. Fioravanti, B. Sordi, Introduzione, in Enciclopedia 
italiana, XXXI, cit. at 3, (“‘cultura giuridica’ (in senso stretto) è la 
rappresentazione more iuridico che un ceto professionale offre di una 
determinata società”). 
13 A. Gambaro, Il modello giuridico – scientifico e legislativo – italiano fuori 
dell’Europa. Riflessioni conclusive, in S. Lanni, P. Sirena (eds.), Il modello giuridico – 
scientifico e legislativo – italiano fuori dell’Europa, cit. at 1, 459, 460. 
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3. Constitutional justice between localism and globalism 
Since I do not intend to renege on my ‘dialoguing’ scholarly 
role, I have forced myself to find some criticisms regarding the 
volume. 
My first and most general observation is that the book 
implicitly embraces some of the mainstream narratives on 
constitutional adjudication. The authors probably had no 
alternative, given their commendable aim of speaking to, and 
being heard by the transnational public at large. What the authors 
could perhaps have done, however, would have been to set out 
some of these narratives in a more critical light. For instance, the 
authors could have better contextualised their historical account 
and critique of the limited independence of the judiciary in post-
unification Italy (p. 8). On the formal level, one might recall that 
for centuries in England, until the recent Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005, the Lord Chancellor was at the same time the head of the 
judiciary, a member of the executive, and the presiding officer of 
the House of Lords14. On the substantive level, one might observe 
that, in the legal tradition that the book most often takes as a 
benchmark, i.e., the United States, judges are selected through 
either competitive election or political appointment. Illustrations 
such as these would have helped to show that the fabric and 
backbone of judicial independence, beyond and before positive 
law, have never resided in institutional constraints or selection 
procedures only, but have always had to do with the internal and 
external perception (of the law and) of the judges’ role within the 
given legal tradition.  
In the same vein, the authors could have placed more 
emphasis on the historical precedents for the story they are 
narrating, a story wholly centred on the American model of 
judicial review. History shows us that the overlap between judicial 
and political power was a characteristic feature of the Middle 
Ages, in France as in England. This feature was taken to, and 
maintained in, the United States even after the formation phase of 
the Republic, when the judicial power to say what the law is was 
associated with the mixed judiciary-legislative power to tell the 
legislature what the law could not be. True, in eighteenth-century 
                                                           
14 See, for example, J. Bell, Judiciaries within Europe. A Comparative Review (2006) 
310, 320. 
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England, Blackstone emphatically rejected judicial authority to 
uphold established principles against legislation that violated 
them, no matter how gross that violation was. Yet, at the basis of 
the U.S. model of judicial review, there is the old English practice 
of controlling legislation through common law. That practice 
percolated from England to the United States, where scholarly and 
judicial engagement perpetuated and transformed it into the 
American doctrine of judicial review – a doctrine whose roots are 
deeply anchored in England’s legal past. 
For a long time, continental and Italian history – as the 
authors know much better than I – has been a different one. 
Continental judges, like their English colleagues, became lions 
under the throne, as Francis Bacon15 put it, or the ‘bouche de la 
loi’, to quote Montesquieu16. On the European continent, the 
pressure to resist legislative centralism by counter-majoritarian, or 
simply technocratic means of controlling parliamentary powers, 
has only emerged cumulatively as the result of multiple 
instances17. 
Our history was different, as I have just mentioned. But 
many of its current features are now common to Anglo-American 
ones. Think for instance of the reference that often recurs in the 
volume at hand (as well as in the specialised literature), to 
formulas such as that of ‘constitutional patriotism’ 
(Verfassungspatriotismus)18. What I want to stress here is that only 
Westerners could have conceived of a political organisation, such 
as the State, as being built upon ideals such as that of 
constitutional patriotism. Indeed, it is one thing to look at 
Constitutions as ‘narrating selves’ or identity narratives (and even 
from this perspective, questions about which Constitution, written 
by whom, interpreted by whom and for whom, read as a portrait 
of what – the present, the recent past, the future – would 
                                                           
15 Francis Bacon, Of Judicature, in Essays (1625). 
16 Esprit des Lois, Liv. XI. Chap. VI. 
17 M. Bussani, Il diritto dell’Occidente. Geopolitica delle regole globali (2010), esp. 
189-191. 
18 J. Habermas, Warum braucht Europa eine Verfassung?, in Die Zeit, 28 June 2001, 
n. 27, 7. 
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straightforwardly emerge19). It is quite another to believe that the 
text of a constitution can lay the foundations for a system’s 
legality, and the sense of unity and identity of people living in that 
system. Behind such a belief there is nothing more than strategic 
opportunism or a dangerous naiveté20. Suffice it to consider that, 
taken at face value, such a belief implies that neither a system’s 
legality, nor people’s sense of unity and identity, could exist 
                                                           
19 See, for example, C.R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do 
(2001), 3, 239; M.R. Ferrarese, Il diritto al presente. Globalizzazione e tempo delle 
istituzioni (2002) 97; see also A. Simoncini, Beyond Representative Democracy: The 
Challenge of Participatory Democracy and the Boundless Galaxy of Civil Society, in M. 
Cartabia, N. Lupo & A. Simoncini (eds.), Democracy and Subsidiarity in the EU. 
National Parliaments, Regions and Civil Society in the Decision-Making Process 
(2013) 45. In this light, an examination of U.S. constitutional discourse may be of 
particular interest. On the one hand, U.S. efforts to transplant their own 
Constitution are premised, in the domestic legal and political debate, upon the 
‘civilising’ mission Americans attribute to their own law. On the other hand, the 
same debate largely denies that comparison with other legal experiences should 
matter in domestic constitutional adjudication (and sometimes refers to 
constitutional comparative exercises as a ‘meretricious practice’: R. A. Posner, 
The Supreme Court 2004 Term. A Political Court, 119 Harvard L. Rev. 31, 98 
(2005)). See, for example., A. Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: 
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in 
A. Scalia et alii, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997) 3, 37.; 
R. Bork, Coercing Virtue: The Worlwide Rule of Judges, New York, Random House 
(2002), 135; A. Scalia, S. Breyer, Justice, U.S. S. Ct., Discussion at the American 
University Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005), 3 Int’l J. Const. L. 519 (2005). 
But for a fierce and accurate defense of the view that would oblige (at least) the 
Supreme Court to consider and understand foreign ideas and the international 
circulation of ideas, see S. Breyer, The Court and The World. American Law and the 
New Global Realities (2015).  
20 See for instance N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State, and 
Nation in the European Commonwealth (1999) 63; M.J. Horwitz, Constitutional 
Transplants, 10(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 535 (2009); D. Chirot, Does 
Democracy Work in Deeply Divided Societies?, in Z. Barany, R.G. Moser (eds.), Is 
democracy exportable? (2009) 85; D.H. Levine, Rule of Law, Power Distribution, and 
the Problem of Faction in Conflict Intervention, in M. Sellers, T. Tomaszewski 
(eds.), The Rule of Law in a Comparative Perspective (2010), 147. A good illustration 
of the opportunism/naiveté mentioned in the text comes from the U.S. 
Department of State, The Future of Iraq Project, a series of 13 volumes written 
between October 2001 and September 2003, and available under National 
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book n. 198, at: gwu.edu), chapter 4, 
Democratic Principles and Procedures, 49: “The first task of politics is to restore 
the faith of the people of Iraq in the idea of a founding document, a 
Constitution”. 
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without a constitution. However, everybody would agree that no 
constitution (and, more generally speaking, no statutory law) 
could create a legality, or a sense of unity and identity from the 
scratch, that is, without the support of widespread circles of 
cultural and social consensus production. 
In this perspective, the ‘global context’ – to which the book 
belongs and speaks – should be understood as a purely Western 
story. Current constitutional debates, and the notions and ideas 
they produce, are rarely supplied with data, elements and 
observations stemming from beyond the Western dimension – a 
dimension that, far from being merely geographical, overlaps with 
the area dominated by Western cultural influence21. In other 
words, what falls outside the Western radar screen is attention to 
the impact that our debates might have on non-Western 
experiences, whose cultural frameworks for discussing public 
reasons, for selecting who is to handle societal and legal conflicts, 
and for identifying who can claim what against whom, are 
variable, often distant, and sometimes dramatically different from 
Western ones22. 
Let us be clear: scholars do their work. They build 
perspectives, set horizons of meaning, and propose solutions. 
There would be nothing wrong if scholars, when making 
comparisons, especially ‘global’ ones, called the results of their 
research ‘studies on Western constitutional law’, or ‘studies on 
Western constitutional justice’. Yet this does not normally happen, 
                                                           
21 For some observations on the distinction between a ‘transcendental’ and 
‘comparative’ approach to the problems and priorities of global justice, and on 
the practical effects that can derive from such a distinction, see A. Sen, The Idea 
of Justice (2009), esp. 403. 
22 Suffice it to mention, on the one hand, that John Rawls – one of the most 
authoritative and respected voices of the debate on the notion of justice – 
centres his vision on the model of a ‘self-contained’ and ‘closed’ society 
(explaining such an abstract choice ‘because it enables us to focus on certain 
main questions free from distracting details’: Political Liberalism, Columbia 
U.P., 1993, rev. ed. 1996, 12), and, on the other hand, that the same author limits 
his analysis of international relations to relationships between ‘liberal and 
decent peoples’: The Law of Peoples, (1999) 3. Among the rich literature on these 
issues, see the critiques raised against Rawls’ views by G. Teubner, Self-
subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula of Law?, 72 Mod. L. Rev. 
1-23, esp. 3 (2009). 
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since in most cases their discourses show a vocation that is 
implicitly (yet undisputedly) universal. 
Allow me to better explain what I am referring to with a 
brief example taken from Islamic countries – that is, from a large 
part of the ‘legal global’ that is allegedly addressed by mainstream 
constitutional discourse. Firstly, comparison with Islamic 
countries makes clear the relative significance and limited 
relevance of our assumptions about the centrality of Western-style 
constitutional frameworks (as we know them). Both in the West 
and in the Islamic world, there is invariably a level of 
‘constitutional’ legality which is higher than the will of any single 
parliament or government. When these bodies, both in Islamic 
societies and in the West, issue any law, they do so in their 
capacity as organs bound by ‘superior’ laws, principles and values 
– the ones embedded, respectively, in our constitutions and in 
sharia. The crucial point is therefore the content and, even more 
so, the way the superior constitutional structure operates, which is 
the way(s) we in the West know, but which arises ‘there’  from the 
complex interaction between sharia and the State-posited law, the 
siyasa. This is why there is a lot more than just the formal 
existence of a ‘law of the land’ and/or the articulation and balance 
of powers it guarantees that makes our constitutions not just a 
‘sacred’ text, but an instrument for political battles transferred to 
legal grounds and then disputed or disputable before the (secular) 
Courts. 
Secondly, what should be stressed even more is the 
dialectic relationship existing – in the West as well as in Islamic 
countries – between civilisation and legal tradition: the ‘secular’ 
legal tradition is a fundamental pillar of our civilisation, as much 
as the ‘Koranic’ tradition is for the Islamic countries. In other 
words, within both traditions we can observe: a) a one-to-one 
correspondence between the values of civilisation and the values 
of the law, and b) the main role, in the development of those 
values, played by the jurist or legal practitioner – a layman in the 
West, a religious figure in the Islamic countries – as the maker and 
messenger of that complex of rules which make up the historical 
and current ground of the different societies23. 
                                                           
23 In a similar vein, see, for instance, A. Quraishi, Interpreting the Qur’an and the 
Constitution: Similarities in the Use of Text, Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and 
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This is just an example of the many possible crossover 
points of the discourse. Yet ‘global’ legal scholarship, even the 
most sophisticated, rarely considers these points of juncture 
worthy of analytical (not to mention: critical) attention. Was the 
task of the volume we are celebrating today to overturn such an 
attitude? I do not think so. I nevertheless think that the narratives 
on global contexts should give greater consideration to otherness 
and embrace broader horizons. 
 
 
4. A story of dialogues 
As I mentioned, the above considerations are simply 
fragmentary footnotes to the volume – raindrops falling into the 
sea of suggestions, visions, and information that flow from this 
book. 
Among the many virtues of the book under review – and in 
addition to what I said in section 1 and at the end of section 2 – 
two further features deserve mentioning. The first is immediately 
clear to any scholar of comparative law, and permeates every 
single chapter of the book. A virtue that emerges from the 
emphasis placed on the constant dialogue between the Italian 
Constitutional Court and other domestic, European and Western 
legal formants. 
Starting from the European and Western perspective, the 
authors rightly point out that interaction between the Italian 
Constitutional Court and other (constitutional and supranational) 
judicial authorities is, today, a fundamental necessity (see esp. 
pages 231-2). We live in a world where rules controlling a large 
number of fields, such as trade, banks, currencies, loans, 
environment, space and energy, air and maritime transportation, 
the management of marine resources, fisheries, agriculture, food, 
telecommunications, intellectual property – not to mention finance 
– are largely denationalised. All these rules are neither 
determined, nor exclusively influenced, by States. Rather, they are 
the by-product of centres of legal production located in regional 
and global arenas. These centres have a huge impact on domestic 
                                                                                                                                              
American Jurisprudence, 28 Cardozo L. R. 67 (2006); T. Kuran, The Rule of Law in 
Islamic Thought and Practice: A Historical Perspective, in J.J. Heckman, R.L. Nelson, 
L. Cabatingan (eds.), Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law (2010), 71. 
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legal systems. Such an impact is sometimes mediated by States, 
whose involvement may be necessary for the enforcement of rules. 
At other times the impact is direct, with no domestic 
intermediation24, and at still other times it is the result of the ever 
deeper collaboration between States and global judicial 
authorities25. 
Against this framework, cross-jurisdictional dialogue is not 
only necessary, but it is a key for surfacing and dismantling the 
guileful posturing of legal parochialism one can find everywhere. 
I would like to underline that the authors’ perusal of the nature, 
quality and quantity of the Court’s dialogues is as admirable and 
accurate as it is rare in current legal scholarship. 
 
                                                           
24 “[M]ost citizens greatly underestimate the extent to which most nations’ 
shipping laws are written at the IMO in London, air safety laws at the ICAO in 
Montreal, food standards at the FAO in Rome, intellectual property laws in 
Geneva at the WTO/WIPO, banking laws by the G10 in Basle, chemical 
regulations by the OECD in Paris, nuclear safety standards by IAEA in Vienna, 
telecommunication laws by the ITU in Geneva and motor vehicle standards by 
the ECE in Geneva”: K. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation 
(2000) 488. See also J.E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (2005) 
217, 608. 
25 S. Cassese, I tribunali di Babele. I giudici alla ricerca di un nuovo ordine globale 
(2009) passim and esp. 89; Id. (with E. D’Alterio), Introduction: The Development of 
Global Administrative Law, in Id. (ed.), Research Handbook of Global Administrative 
Law (2016) 1, esp. 7-9; E. Benvenisti and G.W. Downs, Court Cooperation, 
Executive Accountability and Global Governance, Tel Aviv University Law Faculty 
Papers, 2009, paper 108, 1, 6; E. Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic 
Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 241, 
247 (2008); G. della Cananea, Il diritto amministrativo globale e le sue Corti, in F. 
Mangarano and A. Romano Tassone (eds.), Dalla cittadinanza amministrativa alla 
cittadinanza globale (2005), 137; V. Barsotti, Tra il dialogo e la cooperazione. Il nuovo 
ruolo delle corti nell'ordine giuridico globale, in L. Antoniolli, G.A. Benacchio & R. 
Toniatti (eds.), Le nuove frontiere della comparazione. I Convegno Nazionale della 
SIRD (2012), 199-215.  For an analysis of the mixed fate encountered in domestic 
jurisdictions by the horizontal application of international treaties, that is, the 
ability of individuals to invoke a provision from a treaty against another 
individual, see, in general, D. Shelton, P. Carozza, Regional Protection of Human 
Rights (2013), 126-135; D. Sloss (ed.), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty 
Enforcement. A Comparative Study (2009); with a special focus on Europe, see A. 
Colombi Ciacchi, European Fundamental Rights, Private Law, and Judicial 
Governance, in H.-W. Micklitz (ed.), Constitutionalization of European Private Law 
(2014), 102; M. Cartabia, L’ora dei diritti fondamentali nell’Unione Europea, in Ead. 
(ed.), I diritti in azione (2007). 
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5. Looking through the Private Law Keyhole 
The second (and final) note concerns the domestic side of 
the picture and is presented from the private law perspective26. It 
aims to praise another virtue of this book, i.e. the accuracy and 
acuity with which the authors analyse the interchange between 
the Constitutional Court and local formants. 
Private lawyers have long noted that when the 
Constitutional Court is called to enter into private law domains, it 
always does so through a dialogue with the other interpretive 
formants: directly with judges, and, through them, with legal 
scholarship. What is worth observing is that, as far as private law 
is concerned, it is often judges of the lower courts who ask the 
Constitutional Court to review the constitutional legitimacy of a 
line of case law. The phenomenon is easy to explain. The 
discretion of trial judges is culturally (although not formally) 
bound by stare decisis27. These judges have very little occasions to 
criticise the decisions of their colleagues, especially those who sit 
at the upper levels of the hierarchy. Resorting to the 
Constitutional Court, by contrast, provides the judges of the lower 
courts with an instrument to express disapproval of other judges’ 
(including the Court of Cassation’s) positions, and to open or 
sharpen the debate on given issues, putting pressure on all legal 
formants to take a stance. Thus, the Constitutional Court is 
frequently called within the circle of production of private law 
rules to act as the ultimate arbiter of conflicts, at whose core is the 
constitutionality not of a legal provision, but of a judicial 
interpretation.  
                                                           
26 To be noted in passing (but the note may be useful to most constitutional 
lawyers) is the counter-power role private law has played in the history of both 
common and civil law. Private law has in fact long been the legal dimension in 
which the driving force of individual freedom has been fed and increasingly 
protected by rules developed by scholars and/or judges. This was done over 
time and before any code or constitution came into play to seal the 
achievements of private law practitioners – esp. the idea that individual 
sovereignty over personal, social, and economic relationships is as worthy of 
protection as rulers’ sovereignty over their country. See M. Bussani, Il diritto 
dell’Occidente. Geopolitica delle regole globali (2010), esp. 187-188; Id., Democracy 
and the Western Legal Tradition, in M. Bussani and U. Mattei (eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Comparative Law (2012), 384, 385-387.  
27 M. Cappelletti, Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Civil Law: A Fundamental 
Difference or No Difference At All?, in Festschrift für Konrad Zweigert (1981), 381. 
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What is also interesting to analyse is the way in which the 
Constitutional Court has managed its relationships with lower 
and upper level judges until now. Among the sizeable amount of 
possible instances, let me focus on some tort law developments. 
In this field it is easy to realise how often the Court 
emphasises the exclusive jurisdiction of trial judges in distributing 
the cost of the accident between the parties in the light of the 
overall circumstances of the case. The Constitutional Court has 
repeatedly stressed that the decision on how to allocate the burden 
of damage undergone can only be made “against the facts of the 
case”28, and that the general tort law clause of Art. 2043 of the 
Italian Civil Code29 “allows judges to adapt the liability rule to a 
specific conflict through the assessment of the importance of the 
victim’s interests vis-à-vis those of the the defendant in light of the 
evolving social conscience and of the legal system as a whole, as 
well as of the other instruments of protection available to 
plaintiffs”30.  
                                                           
28 Constitutional Court, 16 October 2000, n. 243, in Giust. civ., 2001, I, 306; see 
also Constitutional Court, 24 October 2001, n. 340, in Giur. It., 2001, c. 165, as 
well as Constitutional Court, 10 May 1999, n. 156, in Giust. civ., 1999, I, 1927.  
29 “Any malicious or negligent act that causes a wrongful injury to another 
obliges the person who has committed the act to pay damages”. 
30 The provision of Article 2043 of the Civil Code “consente al giudice 
l’adattamento di tale norma alle circostanze del caso attraverso la valutazione 
dei limiti di meritevolezza degli interessi pretesamente lesi, anche in relazione 
ad altri interessi antagonisti, secondo l’evolversi della coscienza sociale e del 
sistema giuridico generale nonché degli strumenti normalmente a disposizione 
dei soggetti titolari di tali interessi”: Constitutional Court, 10 May 1999, n. 156, 
in Giust. civ., 1999, I, 1927. Incidentally, it should be noted that the realism thus 
displayed by the Constitutional Court does not prevent it from performing a 
pedagogical role. In many opinions, besides clarifying the doubts that triggered 
the request for judicial review, the Court seizes the opportunity to remind the 
remittal judge and his colleagues about the fundamentals of liability: M. 
Bussani and M. Infantino, La Corte costituzionale, l’illecito e il governo della colpa, 
in M. Bussani (ed.), La responsabilità civile nella giurisprudenza della Corte 
costituzionale (2006) 34; similar observations can be read in F.D. Busnelli, Il danno 
biologico dal “diritto vivente” al “diritto vigente” (2001), 142, 146; G. Ponzanelli, 
Corte costituzionale e responsabilità civile: rilievi di un privatista, in Foro it., 1988, I, c. 
1057, 1059. For an illustration of the technique mentioned in the text, see: 
Constitutional Court, 14 July 1986, n. 184, in Giur. it., 1987, I, c. 392; and then 
Constitutional Court, 11 July 2003, n. 233, in Foro It., 2003, I, c. 2201; 
Constitutional Court, 27 October 1994, n. 372, in Giur. It., 1995, I, c. 406; 
Constitutional Court, 16 October 2000, n. 423, in Foro It., 2001, I, c. 4; 
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Further, even when the Constitutional Court’s opinions on 
tort law are welcomed by the debate due to their wealth of 
innovation, what the Court in fact does is to select and reshape the 
best constitutionally oriented arguments from among those 
produced and refined by scholars, and then percolated down, or 
up, through the judicial hierarchy31. Let me recall, for instance, the 
Constitutional Court’s approach to personal injury and ‘biological 
damage’ (‘danno biologico’)32. With regard to this issue, the 
Constitutional Court followed the path already opened by the 
Court of Cassation (that, in its turn, was driven by legal 
scholarship) in connecting the notion of ‘injustice’ under Art. 2043 
of the Italian Civil Code to the constitutional provision on the 
protection of health under Art. 32 of the Constitution33. But one 
may also think of the current framework of compensation for non-
patrimonial damage, which was made possible by an expansion of 
the area of recoverable injury advocated by scholarship, 
implemented by justices of peace, enforced by trial and appellate 
                                                                                                                                              
Constitutional Court, 18 April 1996, n. 118, in Giust. civ., 1996, I, 1879. An 
analysis of the structure of the Constitutional Court’s opinions in these cases is 
offered, among others, by E. Lamarque, La tutela dei diritti costituzionali in Italia 
tra Corte costituzionale e giudici comuni (2003-2008), in M. Cartabia, A. Simoncini 
(eds.), La sostenibilità della democrazia nel XXI secolo (2009), 277; G. Tucci, Danno 
non patrimoniale, valori costituzionali e diritto vivente, in Danno resp. 17 (2004), 701, 
703. 
31 Moreover, one should note that the Constitutional court displays a 
remarkable tendency to keep its activity separated from that of ordinary judges. 
This implies that, every time justices are required to assess the legitimacy of the 
interpretation given to black-letter rules by ordinary courts (especially by the 
Court of Cassation), they are inspired by a noteworthy self-restraint. 
Multiplication of summary judgments on inadmissibility and manifest 
groundlessness of the claim in this area is evidence of the Court’s cautiousness 
when reviewing ordinary judges’ work: M. Bussani, M. Infantino, La Corte 
costituzionale, 33; on the same lines, see also P. Cendon, P. Ziviz, Vincitori e vinti 
(...dopo la sentenza n. 233/2003) della Corte costituzionale, in Giur. it., 2003, c. 1776. 
32 Namely, the Italian method of assessing the non-economic consequences of 
personal injuries on the basis of pre-established models, translating into 
monetary terms the victim’s percentage of temporary or permanent disability.  
33 For a more detailed illustration of these developments, see M. Bussani, 
Introduzione, in M. Bussani (ed.), La responsabilità civile nella giurisprudenza della 
Corte costituzionale, VII, IX-X. 
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judges, and then finally legitimised by the Constitutional Court 
itself34.  
Naturally, the clock of history sometimes swings towards 
harmony between ordinary and constitutional judges, and 
sometimes moves towards disharmony. Yet both in times of 
harmony and disharmony, the Court always performs a difficult 
and praiseworthy balancing role in reading at the same time the 
formal constitutional text and its unwritten, ‘living’ contents35. 
This role obliges the Court to relentlessly take a position amidst 
interpretive disputes, and to measure itself against other (national 
and supranational) courts, as well as the great and powerful 
grande dame of civil law, i.e., the scientia iuris – understood as the 
sophisticated and (unavoidably) transnational upper side of legal 
scholarship.  
The contents, style and method displayed in the analysis of 
the role played by the Italian Constitutional Court has already 
earned this new and fascinating book a front row seat in the arena 
of transnational legal scholarship. I am certain that it will set the 
quality standard for future efforts to describe and understand (not 
only Italian) constitutional justice. 
 
 
                                                           
34 Cf. Constitutional Court, 11 July 2003, n. 233, in Foro It., 2003, c. 2201, and the 
two previous opinions of the Court of Cassation, 12 May 2003, nn. 7281, 7282, 
7283, published in Foro it., 2003, 2274; Resp. civ. prev., 2003, 676 and Giur. it., 
2004, 1130 respectively. 
35 M. Bussani, Introduzione, XI, cit. at 33. 
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1. Different kinds of relationality 
The Italian constitutional “style” - following the celebrated 
John Henry Merryman’s definition1 – has been labeled 
“cooperative” and the word “relationality” has been used to 
capture its essence2.  
                                                           
* This essay was delivered at the 2016 ICON-S Conference Borders, Otherness and 
Public Law – Berlin, June 17th-19th, 2016. The panel, composed also by M. 
Cartabia, O. Pollicino, P. Popelier and A. Simoncini, chaired by N. Lupo, 
discussed the main outcomes of the Volume Italian Constitutional Justice in 
Global Context co-authored by V. Barsotti, P. Carozza, M. Cartabia, and A. 
Simoncini. 
 
** Professor of Comparative Law, University of Florence. 
 
1 J.H. Merryman, The Italian Style: Doctrine, in 18 Stan. L. Rev., 39 (1965); Id. The 
Italian Style: Law, in 18 Stan. L. Rev., 396 (1966); Id., The Italian Style: 
Interpretation, in 18 Stan. L. Rev., 639 (1966). 
2 V. Barsotti, P. Carozza, M. Cartabia, A. Simoncini, Italian Consitutional Justice in 
Global Context (2016). 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL. 8  ISSUE 1/2016 
29 
 
Whether in its historical development, its internal workings 
and methods, its institutional relations with other political bodies 
or courts, or in its substantive jurisprudence on a number of issues 
of global concerns, the Italian Constitutional Court operates with a 
notable attentiveness to the relations between persons, 
institutions, powers, associations, and nations. Like any judge in 
well-functioning systems of justice generally, the Italian 
Constitutional Court is indeed independent from other branches 
of Government. However, it always acts as part of a complicated 
machine, within which many other institutional gears have their 
part as well. Although granted the final word by the Constitution, 
it does not speak the only word in constitutional matters. Instead, 
it is embedded in a fabric of relations that affect its agenda, its 
deliberative process, its method of interpretation, the typology of 
its decisions, and even its vision of the persons, society, and state 
subject to its judgments.  
Obviously, the Italian Constitutional Court is not always 
perfectly consistent and successful in maintaining its distinctive 
identity and is not alone within the European complex landscape 
in trying to enhance its cooperative and dialogical nature. 
Two different kinds of relationality have been described for 
the Italian Constitutional Court. Institutional relationality: the 
ability of the Court to establish sound and vital connections with 
other institutional actors, both political and judicial, national and 
supranational. Interpretive relationality: the capacity of reading 
the constitution as a whole, as a system, avoiding a fragmented 
interpretation and adopting an inclusive and holistic approach to 
legal reasoning3. 
It has also been evidenced a more specific “external 
institutional relationality”. This consists of the particular capacity 
of communicating with the European legal order both at the 
horizontal level (with other national courts) and at the vertical 
level (with the European Court of Justice and the European Court 
of Human Rights). “External institutional relationality” is an 
important feature belonging not only to the Italian experience but 
shared by many other European systems4. A new feature slowly 
                                                           
3 V. Barsotti, P. Carozza, M. Cartabia, A. Simoncini, Italian Consitutional Justice in 
Global Context, cit. at 2, 231-242.  
4 M. De Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe. A Comparative Analysis, 392-440 
(2013). 
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becoming, in various degrees, a common trait of the European 
model of constitutional adjudication, and which is crucial within 
the European networked system for the protection of rights5. 
Relationality, in its multiple facets, is the positive core of the 
Italian model of constitutional justice. However, looking at the 
Italian system from a comparative perspective, two issues will be 
addressed which perhaps belong to the “dark side” of the Italian 
relational style. The issues are loosely linked. Both touch upon 
procedure and how it connects to models of constitutional justice - 
and, in the very end, to the democratic accountability of courts6.  
 
 
2. Separate opinions 
Taking into consideration the rules of procedure and the 
ways in which the Italian Constitutional Court effectively works, a 
principle of collegiality comes in great evidence. In every step of 
the decision process, all the 15 judges – although coming from 
different backgrounds and having reached the Court trough 
different ways of appointment - work closely together and the 
final decision derives from the “the Court” in its entirety7. No 
concurring or separate opinions are allowed. A strict principle of 
collegiality distinguishes the Italian Constitutional Court not only 
from the supreme courts of common law countries but also from 
many of its European counterparts. 
The German Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof is one of the best 
known examples of a civil law country allowing constitutional 
judges to issue separate opinions (Sondervotum). While judges 
                                                           
5 V. Barsotti, Relationality. New Colors for the European Model of Constitutional 
Adjudication, (forthcoming). “External institutional relationality” can be 
considered a new common feature of the European model of constitutional 
adjudication to be added to those pointed out by V. Ferreres Comella, 
Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values (2009). See also T. Groppi, 
Introduzione: alla ricerca di un modello europeo di giustizia costituzionale, in T. 
Groppi, M. Olivetti La giustizia costituzionale in Europa, (2003). 
6 I like to thank Tania Groppi for having intelligently and constructively 
commented on the book Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context. Her 
remarks helped me to better consider some problematic aspects of the Italian 
relational style. See T. Groppi, Giustizia costituzionale “Italian Style”? Sì, grazie 
(ma con qualche correttivo), in 2 Dir. Pubbl. Comp. Eur. (2016). 
7 V. Barsotti, P. Carozza, M. Cartabia, A. Simoncini, Italian Consitutional Justice in 
Global Context, cit. at 2, 43-49. 
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sitting in ordinary courts are bound to respect the secrecy of 
deliberations and votes, since 1971 constitutional judges represent 
an exception to this rule.  
A slightly different case is that of Spain, which has allowed 
separate opinions for the Constitutional Court from the very 
beginning of its functioning, in 1979, and constitutional judges are 
used to write separately much more frequently than their German 
colleagues. Moreover, in Spain, ordinary Supreme Court’s judges 
can publish separate opinions also and this is quite unique in 
continental Europe. 
After the breakdown of the socialist regimes, most Central 
and Eastern European countries largely adopted a German model 
of constitutional adjudication including the possibility of 
publishing separate opinions. 
A comparative overview clearly shows that the vast majority 
of European Constitutional Courts, although following different 
practices, and the European Court of Human Rights permit judges 
to hand down multiple decisions8. As for the European Court of 
Justice, the issue is under serious discussion. This is the case 
notwithstanding the civil law tradition that decisions come from 
the entire court and represent a single will, therefore precluding 
the identification of individual judicial personalities. Since many 
European countries follow the common law style and allow 
constitutional judges to publish concurring and dissenting 
opinions, they have taken advantage of the migration of 
constitutional ideas9.  
                                                           
8 A very useful and instructive study, which takes into consideration both 
Supreme and Constitutional Courts, is published by the “Policy Department of 
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament”: 
Dissenting opinions in the supreme courts of Member States (2012). 
9 The traditional distinction between common law and civil law is becoming 
more and more blurred. The “converging trend” is common language among 
comparative scholars (although not universally agreed upon). This is 
particularly true when it comes to style of opinions. Taking into account both 
constitutional courts and ordinary courts, the divide between common law and 
civil law is far from sharp. A simple example. On one side, in Spain, a 
traditional civil law country, the practice of voto reservato is historically known 
and presently both ordinary judges and constitutional judges write separate 
opinions. On the other side, Ireland represents a rare exception since the 
constitution explicitly prohibits the Supreme Court the publication of separate 
opinions in most constitutional cases. A seminal article on style of opinions in 
comparative perspective and which describes the historical and procedural 
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This is not yet the case in Italy. After an intense debate that 
considered both the strengths and the weaknesses of separate 
opinions, as well as the historical, cultural and institutional 
reasons that explain the difference between common law and civil 
law judicial style, the principle of collegiality - and the related, but 
not necessarily inseparable, principle of secrecy of deliberation - 
still prevails10.  
The debate on separate opinions is commonplace in 
comparative law discourse and pros and cons are well known.  
Separate opinions favor courts’ accountability and the 
transparency and sharpness of their reasoning; a plurality of 
opinions candidly shows the complexity of constitutional 
interpretation; moreover, the dissenting opinion of today can 
become the majority of tomorrow and therefore separate opinions 
can contribute to the dynamism of case law. 
On the other hand, the principle of collegiality is a way of 
protecting the Court from the pressures and interferences of 
politics: allowing judges the opportunity to express their views 
freely, without having to justify their position outside the Court. 
This is particularly important in a system where constitutional 
judges have no life tenure but a fixed term of nine years, as in 
Italy. In addition, the prohibition on disclosing individual 
opinions favors judicial modesty and is thought to discourage 
from excessive emphasis on the judge’s person as an individual 
rather than in the institutional role of the judge. In the Italian case, 
it is also underlined the importance of crafting the Court’s 
decisions through compromise, which unfortunately does in some 
cases contribute to cryptic and opaque reasoning, but it is said to 
corresponds in part to the nature of the Constitution itself, which 
represents a compromise among many fundamental principles 
that all need to be balanced.  
                                                                                                                                              
roots of the common law –civil law distinction is G. Gorla, La struttura della 
decisione giudiziale in diritto italiano e nella “common law”: riflessi di tale struttura 
sull’interpretazione della sentenza, sui “Reports” e sul “Dissenting”, in Giur. It., 
Parte I, Sez. I, c. 1232 (1965).  
10 The Italian Constitutional Court itself has organized, from time to time, 
seminars for the discussion of separate opinions. See 
http:/www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegniseminari. See also S. 
Cassese, Lezione sulla cosiddetta opinione dissenziente, in 4 Quad. Cost., 973 (2009). 
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However, while views about separate opinions vary, there is 
a general agreement that these best serve their purpose if they are 
limited in number, circulate in advance, and are drafted in a 
respectful manner. 
In the end, Italy belongs to a small group of European 
countries (Italy, Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and 
Malta) not allowing separate opinions for constitutional court’s 
judges11. From a comparative perspective, something is missing. 
 
 
3. Amici curiae 
Something else is missing in the Italian model of 
constitutional adjudication. It is well known that the Italian 
system is a centralized one, and constitutional questions reach the 
Constitutional Court mainly through the referral of the ordinary 
judge that has been considered the “gatekeeper” of the 
Constitutional Court12. This is the incidental method of judicial 
review, which helped ordinary courts and the Constitutional 
Court to build a loyal cooperation; and which is an important part 
of the Italian relational style.  
In the constitutional proceedings, that is, in the process that 
unfolds before the Constitutional Court, once the case is referred 
to it, only the parties to the original case can present briefs and 
oral arguments. The absence of subjects advocating interests 
different or complementary to those of the parties to the case from 
which the constitutional issue originated is remarkable. 
The rules of procedure and the tradition have created an 
extremely “closed” system. The idea of amici curiae is foreign to 
the Italian Constitutional Court.  
Again, this feature of the Italian model is important from a 
comparative perspective - given the fact that a great number of 
courts performing constitutional adjudication are more open than 
the Italian one.  
Almost every common law jurisdiction in the world, in 
which generally a diffuse system of judicial review is at work, 
recognizes some form of amicus curiae participation. The most 
                                                           
11 K. Kelemen, Dissenting Opinions in Constitutional Courts, in 14 Germ. Law J., 
1345 (2013). 
12 P. Calamandrei, Il procedimento per la dichiarazione di illegittimità costituzionale, 
in Opere giuridiche, Vol. III, 372 (1965). 
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renowned and obvious example is that of the United States where 
significantly the role and number of amici briefs changed with the 
shift from what Abram Chayes called a private law model of 
litigation to a more public one13. Australia, Kenia and Hong Kong 
can also be mentioned. The Constitutional Court of South Africa is 
another important case. In many systems of Latin America friends 
of the courts (supreme and constitutional) are well known: 
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. 
In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights 
acknowledges the participation of interest groups to the judicial 
process. 
The German Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof permits 
“knowledgeable third persons” to submit written brief in 
proceedings before it. This mechanism appears to have been 
frequently used by unions, churches or other religious institutions, 
refugee organizations, representatives of the government or 
administration, and university professors. 
Amicus participation is allowed in some form, although not 
expressly codified in procedural rules, in the constitutional courts 
of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Latvia.  
In France, friends are welcome not only, since the 
constitutional reform of 2008, in the Conseil Constitutionnel, but 
also in the ordinary supreme courts. 
Presenting to the court all the different perspectives and 
interests involved in the litigation can be crucial, especially when 
it comes to fundamental rights that often must be balanced one 
with the other; or when it comes to cases that involve the public 
general interest, such as environmental issues.  
The comparative approach shows a widespread amici 
participation and its importance in litigation that involves hard 
choices between conflicting rights and values.14. However, the 
analysis also highlights some possible downsides of a very open 
system of constitutional adjudication. First, it can amplify the 
discretionary power of courts: What are, for instance, the criteria 
for the admission of amici briefs? Who are the persons, groups, 
                                                           
13 A. Chayes, The Role of The Judge in Public Law Litigation, in 89 Harv. L. Rev., 
1281 (1976). 
14 Unfortunately, comparative studies and research on amicus curiae are not as 
developed as those on the decision making process of Supreme and 
Constitutional Courts in general and on separate opinions in particular.  
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associations allowed to present amici briefs? Various procedural 
solutions can be adopted for such problems, but the issue is a 
delicate one. Second, and probably more important, in a global 
context of litigation, within a “global community of courts”15, 
powerful lobbies tend to be extremely active and the same groups 
and organizations (generally non-governmental organizations) 
present with force their interests to different courts belonging to 
different cultures. If a positive general effect of this phenomenon 
is a world where comparative law arguments are becoming 
“inevitable”16, the negative effect is that it can favor an excessive 
politicization of the system of adjudication, emphasize the trend 
towards “juristocracy”17, and promote a standardization of values 
with the prevalence of the most economically or culturally strong. 
 
 
4. The importance of being open 
Despite the awareness of some negative effects of separate 
opinions, and of the possible dangers of a system of constitutional 
adjudication which becomes very much open to external (global) 
influences, the comparative mirror reflects a couple of dark spots 
for the Italian relational style of constitutional adjudication. 
The countermajoritarian difficulty, although theorized and 
perceived in slightly different ways on the two sides of the 
Atlantic, is always around the corner18. Concerns about the 
accountability and transparency of legal institutions are common 
to many systems. Courts can overcome the countermajoritarian 
difficulty by implicitly engaging in societal debate and allowing 
political institutions to respond. They have the possibility of 
enhancing the legitimacy of constitutional decision-making as 
they provide opinions with reasoned based justifications. They are 
able to facilitate and encourage consensus, and provide a forum 
                                                           
15 A.M. Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, in 44 Harv. Int’l L. J., 191 (2003) 
and Id., A New World Order (2005). 
16 M. Tushent, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, in 49 Vand. J. Int’l 
L., 985 (2009). 
17 R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of New 
Constitutionalism (2007). 
18 A.M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch. The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 
14-33 (1962).  
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where differences can be smoothed and compromises reached19. 
An essential role of constitutional courts is that of enabling broad, 
deliberative exchanges for which they are an appropriate forum. 
Deliberative judicial lawmaking is a multifaceted phenomenon, 
making constitutional courts actors in society-wide deliberation; in 
this capacity, courts can also engage in institutional dialogue and 
reinforce political deliberation.20  
Opposed forces are at work in Europe. The constant search 
for cultural cohesion clashes with the strong desire of protecting 
constitutional identities. The ideal of an inclusive society is often 
at odds with a rapidly evolving multiculturalism. The tension 
between global and local is becoming dramatically evident. The 
process through which Constitutional Courts decide cases is an 
essential tool for dealing with conflicts connected to the new 
European scenario. European Constitutional Courts must take 
advantage of an open deliberative approach to decision making in 
order to find their way to tame the complexities of the new plural 
societies and to mediate between conflicting values.  
Separate opinions favor transparency, honesty and represent 
an important choice for candor. A more open court is a more 
legitimate court, and the participation of all the interests and 
values involved in the litigation favors public acceptability. Both 
instances, in the end, can improve mutual and responsible 
understanding between the Italian Constitutional Court and the 
people. Both instances can contribute strengthening the relational 
nature of the Italian Constitutional Court. 
 
                                                           
19 A. Mazmanyan, Majoritarianism, Deliberation and Accountability as Institutional 
Instincts of Constitutional Courts, in P. Popelier, A. Mazmanyan & W. 
Vandenbruwaene (Eds.) The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel 
Governance, 167 ff. (2013).  
20 P. Popelier, A. Mazmanyan & W. Vandenbruwaene, Constitutional Courts and 
Multilevel Governance in Europe. Editors’ Introduction, in P. Popelier, A. 
Mazmanyan & W. Vandenbruwaene (Eds.) The Role of Constitutional Courts in 
Multilevel Governance, cit. at 19, 11. 
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Abstract 
Taking into account the methodology adopted by the 
Italian constitutional Court in its legal reasoning, the essay puts 
forward a framework of its jurisprudence, showing the approach 
followed in constitutional adjudications. In order to retrace the 
trends of the Italian constitutional judge, the author follows two 
charts that, in 60-years history, inspired the intervention of the 
constitutional Court in Italy: an “institutional relationality” and an 
“interpretative relationality”. In this perspective, on the one hand, 
the article examines the relationship that the Italian Court 
establishes with the other branches of government at national 
level. On the other hand, the essay considers the effects of 
European integration and globalization on constitutional law in 
general, scrutinizing the interaction between the Italian 
constitutional Court, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and the European Court of Human Rights. 
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1. A challenging and successful story 
A fortunate coincidence brings us to Bled to celebrate the 
25th anniversary of the Slovenian Constitutional Court, while the 
Constitutional Court of Italy – which I am honoured to represent – 
has just turned 60. Indeed, its first decision was issued in April 
1956.   
The Italian Court is one of the earliest examples of the 
“European model of constitutional review of legislation” to 
develop in the aftermath of World War II together with the 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht. Both of these courts followed the 
pioneer of all European constitutional courts – the Austrian one – 
as revisited under the influence of the United States’ experience1. 
Anniversaries are invitations to learn from history. The 
question thus arises: what we can learn – if anything – from the 
Italian history of constitutional adjudication? In other words, what 
does the balance of these 60 years of history look like? 
I would say that – all things considered – the story of the 
Italian Court is one of success, although it has met its fair share of 
challenges. 
When the Italian Court was established, the legal and 
political environment was not at all favourable to the judicial 
review of legislation. For different reasons, the major political 
                                                 
1 On this point, M. Cappelletti, Il controllo giudiziario di costituzionalità delle leggi 
nel diritto comparato (1968); M. Cappelletti, W. Cohen, Comparative constitutional 
law: Cases and materials (1979). 
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parties in Parliament were hostile; the judiciary was suspicious; 
and the majority of legal scholars were wary. All things 
considered, the new institution was set up in an inhospitable 
environment.  
Nothing in the legal and political culture was ready to 
welcome the new special constitutional body, and yet the Italian 
legal system very much needed it. As most European countries 
recovering from the totalitarian era, Italy was under pressure to 
introduce a judicial review of legislation. During the twenty years 
of the Fascist regime, a huge number of shameful and atrocious 
crimes were committed through the law, rather than despite the 
law. Generally, the rule of law was formally respected, at least 
from the procedural point of view; however, from a substantive 
point of view, the legal provisions issued by the national 
Parliaments in those years were at odds with the most basic sense 
of justice. Suffice it to recall one example: the racial legislation 
issued by the Italian Parliament in the late 1930s, which openly 
and severely discriminated against and persecuted Jews and other 
groups on the ground of race. Having this background in mind, 
the national constitutions approved after the end of the war, 
starting with the German and the Italian ones, unsurprisingly 
introduced the judicial review of legislation, together with special 
procedures for constitutional amendments; furthermore, they 
were enriched with a generous catalogue of fundamental rights, 
for the protection of which a new special judge was established. 
For similar reasons, other European countries followed the same 
route once they were released from the bondage of dictatorship: 
this was the case with Spain and Portugal in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and, some years later, with all Central and Eastern European 
countries after the fall of Communism2.  
In Europe, all post-totalitarian constitutions gave space to 
constitutional adjudication and established special tribunals for 
the purpose. Constitutional courts were, and still are, regarded in 
Europe as watchdogs against all forms of “legal injustice”, as 
Gustav Radbruch stated in a famous book of 1946. And rightly so. 
                                                 
2 An excellent overview of the diffusion of constitutional adjudication in Europe 
and around the world is provided by T. Groppi, Introduzione: alla ricerca di un 
modello europeo di giustizia costituzionale, in T. Groppi, M. Olivetti (eds.), La 
giustizia costituzionale in Europa (2003). 
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Nonetheless, at the time, the Italian legal and political 
culture was still imbued with the key concepts and structures of 
nineteenth-century modern constitutionalism, which was based 
on the centrality of parliaments and of the principles of légalité, the 
volonté générale, the rule of law and the separation of powers. To 
reconstruct a democratic order after the shameful experience of 
the Fascist period, the founders of the new Republic naturally 
relied upon the existing traditional institutional architecture: 
however, the presence of a powerful judge vested with the 
competence of reviewing parliamentary legislation was somewhat 
inconsistent with that framework.  
The Italian constitutional mindset of the post-World War II 
period was a strange mix of British and French nineteenth-century 
legal tradition. On the one hand, according to the British legal 
tradition, the principle of the “sovereignty of Parliament” was 
undisputable: the legislature was the sole institution vested not 
only with law-making power but also with a “permanent 
constitution-making” power. On the other, unlike the British, but 
very close to the French tradition, the Italian judiciary was meant 
to be la bouche de la loi, and was composed of judges “subject to the 
law” (Article 101 of the Italian Constitution). The judiciary 
consisted of bureaucratic staff, and the judicial function was 
conceived as rather mechanical.  
Consider that one of the most popular and influential books 
was Le gouvernement des juges (“The government of judges”), 
written by E. Lambert. The book was published in 1921 and based 
on an account of the power held by the judiciary in the United 
States during the Lochner Era. The description of such an activist 
Supreme Court became a veritable spectre for the European 
statesmen of the time. 
In those years, the fundamental pillars of modern 
continental European constitutionalism were averse to the idea of 
judicial review of legislation. In Europe, distrust towards the 
judiciary, together with a great emphasis on “the law” and 
“parliaments”, was part and parcel of the major legal myths of the 
time3.  
The clearest sign of this distrust towards the new 
Constitutional Court was the delayed implementation of the 
                                                 
3 P. Grossi, Mitologie giuridiche della modernità (2007). 
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institution. Indeed, it was envisaged in the Constitution of 1948, 
but implemented only in 1956 – eight years later.  
Moreover, even after its implementation, the Supreme 
Court of Cassation, adopted a conservative approach in its case 
law4 that was likely to tame the role of the new Constitutional 
Court. I refer, in particular, to the “programmatic vs. preceptive 
norms” doctrine. 
The idea was that the Constitution consisted largely in 
principles and not in preceptive rules, and those principles – 
defined as programmatic norms – were not suitable to be applied by 
the courts, but rather required prior implementation by 
Parliament. As long as such parliamentary legislation was not 
adopted, the Constitution remained essentially ineffective. This 
doctrine would have placed the implementation of the 
Constitution by and large in the hands of the political bodies, 
removing it from those of the judiciary. Certainly, had this 
doctrine taken root, constitutional review would have been much 
less effective. 
However, despite the early distrust, the Italian 
Constitutional Court soon became one of the most influential 
authorities in the Italian institutional architecture, quickly gaining 
the utmost respect from all other branches of government. 
How did the new Constitutional Court respond to such an 
unfavourable context? How did the Constitutional Court interact 
with its opponents? What “strategy” did the Court adopt to 
overcome the pervasive resistance against it at the dawn of the 
Republic? 
Since its very origins, the Italian Court has adopted a 
twofold attitude. On the one hand, it has shown solid self-
awareness and high consideration for its own mission; on the 
other, it has maintained a very open and relational approach to 
other actors, both political and judicial. Later, the Court began to 
interact with its European counterparts following a similar 
approach. In the search for its own role in the national and 
European institutional order, the Italian court has proved to be a 
resolute guardian of the national constitutional identity and yet 
open to and cooperative with other counterparts.    
                                                 
4 E. Lamarque, Corte costituzionale e giudici nell’Italia repubblicana (2012). 
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In the following pages, I would like to insist on this second 
feature: recalling John Merryman, it can be said that the “Italian 
style” of constitutional adjudication lies in its “relational 
character”5. This “relational style” may become of some interest 
for all European courts in the current context, one in which they 
are called upon to operate in a space of constitutional 
interdependence and interaction. 
 
 
2. Relational capabilities as a relevant indicator for 
comparative studies 
It is somewhat unconventional to describe an institution 
according to its approach to other actors and its counterparts. 
Generally, institutions are qualified by their composition, their 
organization, the procedures they follow, their competences and 
the effects of their actions. Their relational approach to other 
bodies tends to escape the interest of traditional scholarship. 
As for constitutional courts, comparative legal scholars 
propose a classification6 that contrasts, for example, centralized 
and diffuse systems of judicial review of legislation, referring to 
the judicial body that is given the power of judicial review; 
abstract or concrete procedures, as regards access to the court; ad 
hoc or erga omnes effects, in relation to the effects of their decisions; 
or fundamental rights adjudicators or institutional dispute 
resolvers, in terms of the court’s “core business”.  
In accordance with these benchmarks, they have elaborated 
a “continental European model of constitutional adjudication”7, 
arising out of the convergence between the Kelsenian model and 
the concrete US system. The Italian court fits into this model 
perfectly.  
As any other constitutional court of the European family, 
the Italian Court is a special judge: it performs its function 
following judicial procedures, but the procedure to appoint its 
members is different from that adopted for other judges, and 
involves other political bodies. Moreover, it is also a specialized 
                                                 
5  This idea is developed in V. Barsotti, P.G. Carozza, M. Cartabia & A. 
Simoncini, Italian constitutional justice in global context (2015). 
6 M. De Visser, Constitutional review in Europe. A comparative analysis (2013).  
7  V. Ferreres-Comella, Constitutional Courts and democratic values. A European 
perspective (2009). 
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body, which deals only with constitutional adjudication. Unlike 
supreme courts, European constitutional courts are not part of the 
ordinary judicial branch and their jurisdiction is one of pure 
constitutional adjudication. Finally, constitutional courts are 
centralized bodies: judicial review of legislation falls within the 
exclusive province of the Constitutional Court. Had a US-style 
judicial review of legislation been introduced in Europe, where the 
principle of stare decisis does not endow judgments with the same 
binding force as it does in common law countries, then values 
such as legal certainty, the uniform application of the law, and 
even the equality of citizens would be threatened. For these 
reasons, ordinary judges were prevented from scrutinizing 
legislation – especially, to preserve the uniform application of the 
law – whenever a legislative provision conflicted with the 
Constitution. 
Although the traditional approach to comparative 
constitutional adjudication remains meaningful and undisputed, 
new indicators are becoming relevant and should be taken into 
consideration, to fully understand each individual constitutional 
experience. 
The current European context has undergone an important 
transformation, and new features have become relevant in 
assessing the true identity of national constitutional courts. Today, 
European constitutional adjudication occurs in complex and 
composite legal systems populated by multiple systems of 
protection of fundamental rights, in which various courts – with 
overlapping jurisdictions – compete with each other; and in which 
an increasing number of charters, constitutions and conventions 
have entered into force, each of which envisages new bodies for 
the protection of rights, such that quasi-judicial bodies and 
independent agencies operate alongside traditional courts and 
tribunals. The European constitutional landscape is densely 
populated indeed. 
Many cases and controversies are brought before different 
courts, and many of them require the concurrent implementation 
of national and transnational legal standards. 
If we consider the complexity of this context, a new 
taxonomy of constitutional courts may be elaborated on the basis 
of their general attitude towards other actors. Today, the courts’ 
relational qualities matter. Similar courts may behave in a 
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solipsistic or a cooperative manner, or may take a confrontational 
or a dialogical stance.   
In this respect, if there is a single phrase that can describe 
the Italian Constitutional Court, this is its “relational approach to 
constitutional adjudication”. Italian constitutional law is intensely 
relational – it speaks of cooperation, connection, interdependence, 
interactions, links, networks, and the like.  
Indeed, no single idea is capable of capturing the essence of 
an institution as rich in history, complexity, and even 
contradiction as the Italian Constitutional Court. However, many 
of the interesting aspects of the Court and its case law that stand 
out when viewed in comparison with other experiences may be 
summed up with the term “relationality”. At its best, the Court 
operates with notable attentiveness to the relations between 
persons, institutions, powers, associations and nations.  
This is not to imply that the Italian Court is always 
consistent and successful in maintaining this distinctive identity, 
nor that its relational approach is always an unambiguous asset. 
As has been remarked8, some aspects of the process and style of 
the Court’s opinions are not an outstanding example of openness 
and transparency.   
Nor it can be suggested that the Italian Court is absolutely 
singular in this effort at relationality: any successful constitutional 
tribunal must attend, to some degree, to the political realities of its 
position within the constitutional order, and the Italian court 
undoubtedly still has much to learn from other systems in this 
regard.  
Nevertheless, when reviewing the history of the institution, 
it is helpful to adopt a hermeneutic of positivity – to tease out, 
from a complex jumble of data, that which is of particular value, 
and to offer it as a narrative that calls forth the best version of the 
Court. Viewed in this perspective, the relational qualities of the 
Italian Court are valuable assets, worth articulating and sharing. 
 
 
3. Institutional and interpretative relationality 
                                                 
8  T. Groppi, Giustizia costituzionale “Italian Style”? Sì, grazie (ma con qualche 
correttivo), 2 Dir. Pubbl. Comp. Eur. 321 (2016). 
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What are the origins of the relational mindset of the Italian 
Constitutional Court? 
To a significant degree, this pervasive feature of the Italian 
Constitutional Court emerges from the very particular intra-
institutional relation-building capacity within the Court itself.  
Indeed, relationality is imprinted into the very structure of 
the Court. Let us consider the composition and fabric of the Court. 
Of its 15 judges, five are elected by the Parliament, five are 
appointed by the President of the Republic and five  are elected by 
the other branches of the judiciary: both ordinary and 
administrative bodies. Therefore, all the other branches of the 
State have a say in the appointment of the Constitutional Court’s 
15 members. Although the members of the Court are fully 
independent and do not answer to their “constituencies”, they 
proceed from different bodies. This fact matters. 
Moreover, although all judges are jurists, some of them 
come from the academy, as legal scholars; others from the bar; and 
yet others from the judiciary. 
The constitutional judges are diverse due to their different 
sources of appointment – some selected by the highest courts of 
the ordinary judiciary, others by Parliament, and others by the 
President – and due to their different backgrounds, with career 
judges working alongside university professors and practicing 
lawyers. They are united by a common legal education, but differ 
in terms of their previous professional trajectories and personal 
cultural formation. This pluralism has always been a great asset of 
the Court. 
This pluralistic composition matters if it is considered that 
the Court’s rules of procedure are dominated by a paramount 
principle: that of collegiality. Justices are prompted towards 
dialogue and agreement because of the principle of collegiality 
that governs the Court’s work. The Court’s internal organization 
and working procedures are designed to encourage the judges to 
work intensely with one another; they are obliged to dialogue 
with one another. This fosters reciprocal cross-fertilization among 
the Court’s members and their respective ideas, political and 
social backgrounds, cultures and mentalities; it also serves as the 
principal growth factor in the Court’s capacity for building 
relations. 
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Every single step in the decision-making process requires 
the participation of all 15 members. Some features of the 
decisional process are worth noting, to fully appreciate the strict 
collegiality that governs the Italian Constitutional Court.  
For example, unlike many other constitutional courts, the 
Italian Court never splits into chambers: every single case is 
discussed and decided by a plenary panel, even cases that may be 
minor or repetitive. No filter is applied to scrutinize the 
admissibility of an application, and every controversy enjoys the 
same procedural dignity. 
Another expression of the principle of strict collegiality is 
that the individual voices of the judges cannot be recognized. The 
Court always speaks with one voice, and separate opinions are not 
allowed. Although the issue has been discussed from time to time, 
to date the Court has rejected all proposals aiming to introduce the 
plurality of opinions. Every decision is the result of the 
deliberation of all 15 members of the Court; even those who do 
not agree have a say and can contribute to the drafting of the 
Court’s judgment. Without the possibility to publish a dissenting 
opinion, even those judges who were not part of the majority of 
the Court participate in writing the official judgment. The absence 
of separate opinions, and the requirement that the draft judgments 
be read together in chambers and collectively approved, fosters 
compromise and encourages the Justices to broadly incorporate 
the particular views of their individual colleagues into the final 
text. These methods favour efforts to reconcile and unify divergent 
views into a composite that cannot be reduced to the perspective 
of a single judge, politician or scholar. 
A third characteristic of the Italian Court is that the 
President of the Court does not play a predominant role over the 
entire body; rather, his position is commonly defined as one of 
primus inter pares – first among peers. Indeed, an unwritten rule 
has been followed to date, with only a few exceptions: the 
President is chosen by seniority. Consequently, almost all of the 
constitutional judges have had the chance to chair the Court, albeit 
for a very short term (even of a few weeks or a few months). Even 
the most significant powers of the President of the Court – that of 
nominating the juge rapporteur for each controversy and that of 
casting a double vote in case of parity – are subdued, in a sense, by 
the brevity of his mandate. The opinion expressed by the 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL. 8  ISSUE 1/2016 
 
47 
 
President of the Court does not control the opinion of the overall 
court at all: in this respect, his voice is no more relevant than that 
of the other members. 
The Court’s internal structural and procedural pluralism, 
and the principle of strict collegiality governing its operation, are 
reflected in its external activities. First, at least two dimensions of 
its relational approach to constitutional adjudication may be 
singled out: the institutional dimension and the interpretative 
dimension. 
 
3.1. Institutional relationality 
In the performance of its duties, the Italian Court – as any 
other constitutional court – must cooperate with other branches of 
government: the Parliament, the Government, the President of the 
Republic, the Regions, and other components of the Judiciary, at 
national and European levels. All the functions of the Italian 
Constitutional Court imply interaction with other bodies. These 
interactions may be adversarial or synergic. The distinctive trait of 
the Italian experience, however, is the latter. Occasional conflicts 
do not contradict the general trend, consisting of dialogue, 
collaboration, cooperation, accommodation, compromise, and the 
like. 
As a paradigmatic example, the relations of the 
Constitutional Court with other branches of the national and 
European judiciary are worth examining in further detail. Such 
branches are, on the one hand, in “competition” with the 
Constitutional Court; on the other, however, they are necessary 
partners. 
 
3.1.1. The Constitutional Court and ordinary courts 
Cooperative relations with other national judicial bodies 
have been crucial for the proper operation of constitutional 
adjudication in Italy. The incidental method of review, which 
remains the main pathway of access to the Constitutional Court, 
entrusts ordinary judges with the role of gatekeepers of the 
Constitutional Court, as defined by Piero Calamandrei9, as it is 
precisely ordinary judges who decide which cases will be 
                                                 
9 P. Calamandrei, Il procedimento per la dichiarazione di illegittimità costituzionale, 
(1965). 
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admitted for constitutional review and which will not. This 
mechanism is based on the cooperation of ordinary judges. If 
ordinary courts do not activate the procedure, the Constitutional 
Court cannot play its part. 
The incidental procedure is structured as follows10: when a 
judge, in the course of a judicial proceeding concerning any kind 
of case – criminal, property, tort, administrative – is called upon to 
apply a legal provision the constitutionality of which is 
questionable or suspect, he is required to suspend the procedure 
and refer the case to the Constitutional Court, so that the 
legislation may be reviewed. Once the Court has issued a binding 
decision on the point, the ordinary judge can resume the case and 
decide it in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s judgment. 
Ordinary judges cannot review legislation themselves; 
however, they are involved in the constitutional review of 
legislation because they are the gatekeepers to the Constitutional 
Court. It is up to them to send a question of constitutionality to the 
Court. Loyal and active cooperation is thus necessary between 
ordinary judges and the Constitutional Court in its position as 
special judge for the judicial review of legislation. 
As seen above, when discussing the early history of the 
Constitutional Court, smooth relations with the ordinary judiciary 
were not to be taken for granted: the case of the “programmatic vs. 
preceptive norms” doctrine is self-explanatory. 
An important contribution to fostering respectful and 
synergic relations with national ordinary courts was given by the 
“living law doctrine” and by the method of interpretation “in 
conformity with the Constitution”. 
According to the former, the Constitutional Court tends to 
review the challenged legislation as it is interpreted by ordinary 
courts, without imposing its own interpretation. When the case 
law of ordinary courts, and especially that of the Supreme Court 
of Cassation, uniformly adopts a given interpretation of a legal 
provision, the Constitutional Court accepts that interpretation as 
“living law”(diritto vivente). Consequently, the Constitutional 
Court decides the issue upon the assumption that the 
interpretation at issue is the correct one. Thus, when the Court 
finds the provision unconstitutional, it declares it null and void on 
                                                 
10 See Article 23 of Law n. 87 of 1953. 
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its face, rather than adjusting the problem at the interpretative 
level. 
On the other hand, since the mid-1990s, the Constitutional 
Court has invited ordinary courts to read statutory texts in such a 
way that they concord with the principles enshrined in the 
Constitution. Ordinary judges, following the case law of the 
Constitutional Court, have adopted the so-called interpretazione 
conforme a Costituzione (“interpretation in accordance with the 
Constitution”): that is, they themselves construct meanings of 
statutes that are compatible with the Constitution and that do not 
violate it. Judges may sometimes even force the literal meaning of 
the text, to “save” the statute and therefore avoid referring the 
case to the Constitutional Court. 
Through these doctrines, the Constitutional Court has 
displayed a great deal of trust in the ordinary judiciary, 
preserving the primary competence of the latter as the interpreter 
of legislation. As for the interpretative powers, these doctrines 
distinguish the domain of the ordinary judiciary – vested with the 
power to interpret parliamentary legislation – from the domain of 
the Constitutional Court – which is vested with the power of 
interpreting the Constitution and reviewing legislation according 
to it. 
This distinction demonstrates respect for ordinary judges, 
and contributed a great deal to build good relations with them. 
Most of the Constitutional Court’s decisions presuppose a healthy 
cooperation with the ordinary judiciary, including both lower 
courts and the highest courts (the Supreme Court of Cassation and 
the State Council). Without this inter-judicial relationality, the 
doors of the Constitutional Court would have remained closed, 
and the pronouncements of the Constitutional Court ineffective. 
 
3.1.2. The Constitutional Court and European Courts 
A similarly active and loyal cooperation is required for 
smooth relations with what shall hereinafter be referred to as the 
European Courts: the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  
As a matter of principle, in a centralized system as is the 
Italian one, the Constitutional Court is endowed with the 
exclusive and final power to review legislation. As a matter of fact, 
however, the Italian Constitutional Court is networked with other 
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judicial bodies: the ordinary judiciary – as seen above – and the 
two European Courts, the role of which is growing in significance.   
Certainly, the missions of the national constitutional courts 
and those of the European Courts do not overlap, and neither of 
them has jurisdiction over constitutional judicial review of 
national legislation, which falls within the exclusive domain of the 
national constitutional courts. Nevertheless, the three legal orders 
– EU, ECHR, and national legal orders – have developed into a 
“composite” constitutional system and a number of interactions 
occur among their respective judicial bodies, especially when they 
act as human rights adjudicators. Each of them cannot do without 
the others. 
Within the European context, the Italian Constitutional 
Court has dramatically changed its attitude over time, moving 
from a strict “constitutional patriotism” towards an incremental 
openness to the European environment. While, at the beginning of 
the European adventure, the Italian Court considered its 
supranational and foreign counterparts as aliens, a period of 
informal reciprocal influence then followed, during which the 
Italian Constitutional Court – while avoiding all formal reference 
to the case law of the two European Courts – was actually well 
aware of the case law developed in Luxembourg and in 
Strasbourg. Today, the European case law is an ordinary 
constituent of the legal authorities on the basis of which 
constitutional adjudication is conducted and justified. 
The current framework of the relationship with the CJEU 
was established in 198411, although direct dialogue by means of 
preliminary ruling was inaugurated only in 2008 and confirmed in 
201312; as for the relationship with the ECtHR, the turning point is 
represented by the “twin” judgments issued in 200713.  However, 
long before opening up to direct dialogue with the European 
Courts, the Italian Constitutional Court maintained an implicit 
and silent, although influential, attention to their decisions. A 
similarly implicit and silent, but influential, consideration is paid 
by the Constitutional Court to foreign law and comparative 
                                                 
11 Constitutional Court, Judgment n. 170 of 1984. 
12 Constitutional Court, Judgment n. 103 of 2008 and n. 207 of 2013. On this 
point, see the rich debate published by the Special Issue of the German Law 
Journal, n. 6 of 2015. 
13 Constitutional Court, Judgments nn. 348 and 349 of 2007. 
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sources: whereas, in recent years, the Italian Constitutional Court 
has occasionally openly referred to the case law of other 
constitutional courts, the influence of the latter is actually much 
deeper than may be apparent on the surface.  
In conclusion, Italian constitutional justice has 
incrementally entered into an active relationship with European, 
international, and comparative law, and especially with the judge-
made law of the two European supranational Courts, in particular 
in human rights cases. While, in some areas, the impact of these 
external sources has induced the Constitutional Court to revise its 
previous case law and to develop new principles and standards, in 
other cases the Italian Constitutional Court intentionally takes a 
different position from European or foreign courts, especially 
when the core values of constitutional identity are at stake. In 
short, now the Court does engage in open and direct relations 
with external judicial bodies. However, those relations are not 
oriented towards an unreasoned importation of judicial solutions 
from the outside; rather, it is a two-way relation between peers, a 
dialogue that triggers constructive convergence but also leaves 
room for difference and distinctiveness14. 
As a result, from the institutional point of view, the Italian 
Court is now a protagonist of a composite system of judicial 
review, which envisages the Constitutional Court at its centre, and 
includes other actors too – ordinary judges and European courts. 
The Italian Court is well aware of this fact and does its utmost to 
maintain good “neighbourly” relations with all of them. 
 
3.2. Interpretative relationality 
The relational institutional context within which the 
Constitutional Court operates resonates in its doctrines. The 
ability of the Italian Constitutional Court to establish sound and 
vital two-way relations with other institutional actors – both 
political and judicial, national and supranational – is in significant 
ways mirrored in the methods of constitutional interpretation that 
distinguish the Italian Constitutional Court, which could be 
defined as methods of “interpretative relationality”. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Constitutional Court, Judgments n. 264 of 2012 and n. 49 of 2015. 
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3.2.1. An integrated legal reasoning 
In its legal reasoning, the Constitutional Court follows a 
comprehensive methodology, one that does not shy away from 
complexity. Indeed, a simultaneous multiplicity of approaches to 
constitutional interpretation can often be found in the decisions of 
the Italian Constitutional Court. Moreover, and even more 
significantly, the Court interprets the Constitution as a whole, as a 
system, avoiding the fragmented interpretation of a single 
provision removed from its contextual relationship with the other 
principles, rules and rights enshrined in the Constitution. The 
Court’s methods of interpretation and of legal reasoning are 
broadly inclusive, go beyond the single textual provision at stake, 
and draw inspiration from the spirit of the Constitution. 
From the methodological point of view, the Italian Court 
uses a holistic, syncretic, inclusive and integrated form of legal 
reasoning, one based on a composite combination of different 
approaches to constitutional interpretation. 
Textual, teleological, historical, and systemic constructions 
of the Constitution are often jointly used in the Court’s reasoning. 
To be clearer: 
• the text does matter, but the Court is not trapped in a 
narrow form of textualism; it does not stick strictly to the written 
word of the Constitution or to literal interpretation of its 
provisions; 
• the original intent may also be important, but has never 
been used as a conclusive argument; 
• foreign law is taken into account, but does not control the 
Court’s decision; 
• changes in public opinion and in the legal and social 
context are taken into account – as “the living constitution” – 
although the Court does not hand over its interpretative power to 
popular sentiment; 
• the Court does not disdain teleological interpretation, but 
also attaches great importance to its own precedents and to the 
coherence of its case law. 
In other words: the Constitution is considered as a whole, 
as an integrated system, avoiding fragmented interpretation or the 
isolation of a single provision from other parts of the text. 
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3.2.2. Balancing human rights  
This final remark brings us to another distinctive feature of 
Italian constitutional doctrine in the field of human rights. 
The Constitution and the Constitutional Court endorse a 
relational understanding of individual rights, one that 
corresponds to the peculiar understanding of fundamental rights 
endorsed by the Italian Constitutional itself. Indeed, Article 2 of 
the Constitution establishes that rights belong to each person, 
considered as an individual and as a member of the social groups 
within which his or her life develops and flourishes: 
“The Republic recognizes and guarantees the inviolable 
rights of man, both as an individual and in the social groups 
where his personality is expressed, and requires fulfilment of the 
inderogable duties of political, economic and social solidarity”. 
Moreover, the individual rights listed in the Constitution 
are divided into four groups, which are titled as follows15: 
a. civil relations  
b. ethical and social relations 
c. economic relations 
d. political relations 
Although fundamental rights are recognized to each 
individual, they concern the relational aspects of social life.  
When brought to the bar, indeed, most cases involve a 
number of competing fundamental rights; this requires the Court 
to properly balance them all.  
The Court insists on the fact that no individual right is 
absolute; all rights protected by the Constitution are to be 
balanced with other rights and relevant public interests. Therefore, 
a holistic, rather than piecemeal, interpretation of the Constitution 
is most appropriate in the field of fundamental rights. That is, 
rather than regarding the Constitution as an assemblage of 
fragmented and unconnected propositions, all the rights and 
values proclaimed within it are considered to be components of a 
unified mosaic, such that each element reveals its full meaning 
only in the context of a broader design.  
The three doctrines that provide structure to the Court’s 
constitutional reasoning are balancing, reasonableness and 
proportionality. 
                                                 
15 Emphasis added. 
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A clear example of this approach to the protection of 
inviolable rights may be seen in Judgment n. 85 of 2013, which 
dealt with a complex case concerning the ILVA steel mills. The 
case involved the right to health and to a safe environment on the 
one hand, and the right to work (of a great number of people) and 
the right to free economic activity on the other. In its judgment, 
the Court clearly stated that:  
“All fundamental rights protected by the Constitution are 
mutually related to one another and it is thus not possible to 
identify any one of them in isolation as prevailing absolutely over 
the others. Protection must at all times be “systematic and not 
fragmented into a series of rules that are uncoordinated and 
potentially conflict with one another” (Judgment 264/2012). If this 
were not the case, the result would be an unlimited expansion of 
one of the rights, which would “tyrannise” other legal interests 
recognised and protected under constitutional law, which 
constitute as a whole an expression of human dignity.” 
A careful reading of this passage shows that the Italian 
Court considers balancing rights to mean that: (a) no 
constitutional right has an absolute value, nor does it enjoy 
absolute predominance over the others – if it were otherwise, it 
would become a “tyrant” right; (b) the Constitution does not 
establish an abstract ranking of rights; (c) the balancing exercise 
requires flexible and unfixed relations between different rights, 
depending on the concrete case at hand; (d) balancing rights 
requires engaging in reasonableness and proportionality tests, and 
never allows the complete sacrifice of one of the values at stake. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
Institutional relationality, interpretative relationality: a 60-
year history of the Italian Constitutional Court has shown how 
fruitful this approach to constitutional adjudication can be.  
This is not a minor legacy to constitutional adjudication in 
the new millennium. 
European integration and globalization have affected 
constitutional law and constitutional adjudication to such an 
extent that national constitutional courts are now inevitably linked 
in a “network”. They interact with other bodies – whether they 
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wish to do so or not – within the national legal system as well as 
outside of it, with their foreign or supranational counterparts.  
In such a context, where the diversity of interrelated 
cultures can easily turn into conflict and distrust, good mutual 
relationships are vital for the flourishing of constitutional 
adjudication and to better serve the legal protection of human 
dignity.  
It helps to build bridges, rather than walls. 
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1. Introduction  
In this article the question whether there is an “Italian 
style” in constitutional adjudication will be explored. It ought to 
be stated at the outset that whether the answer is right or wrong, it 
depends on what exactly the question means (or suggests) to 
imply.  
If the question aims at suggesting that the ambition to 
establish a variety of relationships with other actors (from an 
institutional and interpretative point of view) is an exclusive 
feature of the Italian Constitutional Court (hereinafter, “ICC”), 
then the answer is certainly a negative one. As Patricia Popelier 
claimed, it can be argued that a European common style in 
constitutional adjudication has emerged and is now well 
established.  
If, by contrast, the idea of an Italian style in constitutional 
adjudication is not meant to suggest that there is an Italian 
peculiarity, but, rather, that some distinctive traits emerge from its 
first 60 years of jurisprudence ICC case law, than the answer can 
be a positive one. This seems to be also the perspective followed 
by the authors of the book that is under review. “We do not want 
by any mean” - they make clear - “to suggest that the ICC is 
absolutely singular in this effort at rationality”1.  
But first the meaning and significance of the term “Italian 
style”, so far as it is relevant to the role of the ICC in its controls, 
will be considered. The discussion will then broaden to the 
“external” and “internal” challenges and this will lead to a better 
consideration of the conjecture set out initially. 
 
 
2. The “Italian style” according to Merryman 
As it is well known, the idea that points out the existence of 
special features in the Italian style has been introduced for the first 
time, more than fifty years ago by John Henry Marryman, through 
three seminal articles regarding, respectively, doctrine, law and 
interpretation as developed in the Italian legal context2.  
                                            
1 V. Barsotti, P. Carozza, M. Cartabia, A. Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice 
in Global Context (2016), 235.   
2 J.H. Merryman, The Italian Style, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 39, 396, 583 (1965-66). 
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It is helpful to begin with a couple of quotation which give 
a clear idea of the bridge existing between Merryman inspiring 
words and the Authors’ intuition to focus on an Italian style in 
constitutional adjudication. First, he observed that “the norms, 
institution and process of Italian law become truly Italians only 
when they are seen through Italian eyes”. Against this 
background, it is easy to observe that the book under discussion is 
the first attempt, in the Italian scholarly debate, to shed some light 
on the distinguishing features of the Italian constitutional 
adjudication for a broader audience. Not only is the book written 
in English, but it also uses a distinctive approach. Instead of 
following the approach that is traditional in Italian commentaries 
and treatises, this book is based on both a deductive approach and 
a wide use of cases (precisely for this reason, it would be very 
helpful and useful to arrange an Italian version of the book). 
Secondly, in an almost prophetic way, Merryman observed 
that: “The future would seem to hold an expanded role and 
greater prestige for Italian judges. In part this will come through 
deflation of the bloated conception of the legislator that has 
loomed over continental legal though since 1804. In part will flow 
from a reconsideration of nature and rigidity of the separation of 
powers”. 
Merryman’s call for a reconsideration (if not crisis) of the 
traditional way to conceive the separation of powers is 
particularly helpful here. It highlights what is the main reason that 
lies behind the rise of the relationality factor, which the Authors 
have the great merit to recognize as the main ingredient of the 
“Italian style” of constitutional adjudication. A judicial style based 
on a relational cooperative and adaptive approach which the ICC 
was in a way forced to develop in order to face several challenges 
over the last 60 years.  
Such challenges favored the rise and the growth, in the ICC 
case law, of a judicial style that is, in a way, “by design” aimed at 
fostering the relational dimension and at allowing the e ICC to 
adapt (and to adjust) its strategy depending on the evolution of 
the relevant context. Thanks to a sort of “internal unchosen 
training”, the ICC has been able to find itself well trained and 
more prepared than other European courts to play a key role in 
the current period of cooperative constitutionalism in Europe.  
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL. 8  ISSUE 1/2016 
 
59 
 
Before considering some cases in which the ICC has shown 
the aforesaid attitude to change its skin without changing its 
identity, it is helpful to shortly set the relevant European 
background in which the Italian style is rooted and the language 
of the ICC is spoken. Few quotations can shed some light on the 
essence and uniqueness of the European constitutionalism in the 
last decades. This first is drawn from Mauro Cappelletti (1986), 
according to whom “unlike the American Supreme Court and the 
European constitutional courts, the ECJ has almost no powers that 
are not ultimately derived from its own prestige, [and the] 
intellectual and moral force of its opinions”. The courtesy 
pedagogy is a key element in the Court of Justice reasoning3. The 
second quotation is drawn from Giuseppe Federico Mancini, for a 
long time Advocate-general at the ECJ. In 1989 he observed that 
“the Luxembourg Judges have been able to develop a judicial style 
which explains how it declares the law”4. Finally, in 2000 Joseph 
Weiler argued that the constitutional ingredient which shapes the 
European legal order’s uniqueness is a distinctive element; that is, 
that “constitutional actors in the Member States accept the 
European Constitutional discipline not because as a matter of legal 
doctrine […] They accept it as an autonomous voluntary act 
endlessly renewed by each instance of subordination”5. This 
implies that unlike constitutional courts, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union can rely only on a “voluntary obedience” by the 
political and judicial actors of Member States whereas the formers 
can always use the weapons of the obligation to obey.  
Despite the different perspectives followed by the three 
points of view just mentioned, they seem to share the same 
common denominator: that is, the tension and the alleged 
antinomy between the authoritativeness of the European courts on 
the one hand, and the authority of constitutional courts. In other 
and clearer words, I am arguing that in the current stage of 
cooperative constitutionalism, the equation “authoritativeness: 
                                            
3 See M. Cappelletti, D. Golay, Judicial Branch in the Federal and Transnational 
Union, in M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), Integration Trough 
Law, (1986), 333, note 281. 
4 G.F. Mancini, Attivismo e autocontrollo nella giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia, 
30 Riv. Dir. Eur. 233 (1990). 
5 See J.H.H. Weiler, Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe's Sonderweg, 10 
Harvard Jean Monnet Paper 13 (2000). 
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European courts = authority: constitutional courts” is likely to be 
wrong, or at least misleading. Indeed, more than ever, for the 
constitutional courts it is always more crucial the moral and 
persuasive force of their opinions, beyond their original power to 
rely on (in Weiler’s words) an obligation to obey.  It is more in the 
dimension of authoritativeness than on that of authority that 
constitutional courts must use their best cards. This is true, in 
particular, for those constitutional courts that aim to play a front 
runner role in the (not so) new stage of global constitutionalism.  
The binding effects of constitutional courts’ judgments are 
to an extent natural and almost inevitable. However, what it 
striking - and this Book confirms it - is that the ICC is in a 
privileged position to play its role in the global arena precisely 
because of the “unchosen domestic training” mentioned before. 
Both external and internal challenges forced the e ICC to go 
beyond the formalistic self-reassurance related to the binding 
nature of its judgments and to develop a pedagogic, cooperative 
and relational style or, to borrow again Cappelletti’s words, to 
elaborate a courtesy pedagogy. 
 
 
3. “External” challenges  
In practice, the elaboration of the Court’s relational 
approach is the product of several causes. There are, first,  
“hostile” external factors. There are, second, internal challenges; 
that is, the cases in which an initially unsuccessful judicial 
approach has required an ex post creative judicial “adjustment”. 
With regard to the external hostile factors, reference must 
be made to the first and maybe hardest one that the ICC had to 
face in 1956, when it finally started to operate. To give an idea of 
the institutional environment in which the ICC operated, nothing 
is more significant than the words of Court’s first President, 
Enrico de Nicola: “when we arrived we had no chairs, there was a 
single member of staff and we had to get a glass of water by 
ourselves”6.   
In this background, which is described by the book under 
review7, three main challenges (or hostile elements) contrasted the 
                                            
6 V. Barsotti et al., Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context, cit. at 1, 27. 
7 Ibid., 33.    
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ICC’s attempt to legitimize itself as new actor in the Italian 
constitutional arena. First of all, there had been a full decade of 
diffuse constitutional review, by administrative and ordinary 
courts. Secondly, there was a significant asymmetry between the 
legislator and the ICC. While the former was considered as a sort 
of omnipotent authority, the latter’s lack of legitimation was 
manifest in the debate which characterized the Constituent 
Assembly. Some political forces openly opposed to the creation of 
a constitutional court - it was seen as usurping the roles of 
politicians in an undemocratic way. Finally, the judiciary was 
dominated by conservatism: an attitude of cultural inertia and lack 
of openness toward new methods. 
That being the scenario, perhaps it would not have been too 
provocative to raise in 1956 a question (borrowing the title of an 
article by a judge of the European Court of Human Rights written 
in 1964): has the ICC a future?8 
It is not too far from the true to affirm that it has been the 
same ICC in the first judgment (no. 1/1956) to make the decisive 
step to secure its own future by overstepping the aforementioned 
obstacles. And it did so in its own way (an Italian way). 
A twofold element characterized the approach of the ICC. 
On the one hand, it engaged immediately in an elaborated, public 
reasoned discussion about the normative value of the Italian 
constitutional order. It is not by chance that it in the book under 
review the first judgment (no. 1/56) of the ICC is compared to 
Marbury v. Madison9. Similarly to the landmark US Supreme Court 
decision has pointed out10, the ICC clarified that Constitution is 
                                            
8 H. Rolin, Has the European Court of Human Rights a Future?, 11 Howard L.J. 442 
(1965). At the time Judge Rolin expressed this preoccupation, the European 
Court of Human Rights had ruled on only two cases in six years. The European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) started to operate in 1958. Its first case, a 
judgment was adopted in 1960, whereas in 1961 it ruled on the merits of a 
controversy. In 1962, in the second of the cases assigned them, ECtHR judges 
could only ascertain its irrelevance because in the meantime the Belgian 
government adopted measures to restore the claimant’s position. Other two 
years were to pass before the Court was assigned a third case. The judgment for 
this case was only decided in 1967. With only three cases in eight years, there 
was reason to be worried. 
9 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
10 “The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other 
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the highest law of the land which must be taken seriously, even 
with regard to those provisions that were wrongly regarded - by 
some ordinary judges - as being only programmatic and, 
therefore, deprived of immediate effects. On the other hand, by 
showing at the same time a flexible, adaptive, relational approach 
in which there was no sign of constitutional arrogance, but rather 
an expression of cooperative constitutionalism.  
This cooperative approach was addressed, first and 
foremost, to the judiciary. For the new court, it was simply vital to 
convince “common” (ordinary and administrative) judges raise 
questions of constitutionality before the ICC. And, since such 
judges were suspicious and reluctant to play the new “game”, the 
ICC did its best to involve them in a conversation, or dialogue. 
Secondly, the ICC elaborated a successful approach vis à vis the 
legislator. Its approach was a mixture of deference towards 
Parliament - a short term strategy, seen retrospectively - and of 
emphasis on the need to implement constitutional provisions 
through legislative action11. An important element of the Court’s 
strategy was its choice to focus on legislation enacted before the 
entry into force of the Constitution (1948), that is to say the rules 
enacted under Fascism (1922-1943). This avoided or at least 
attenuated potential conflicts with the Parliament of the day. 
 
 
4. Internal challenges 
In this section I continue my consideration of the 
relationships between the ICC and other “players”, focusing on 
the legal relevance and significance of the European Convention 
of Human Rights (hereinafter, ECHR). This will show the 
evolution of the relationships between the ICC and the European 
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, “ECtHR”).  
The role of the ECHR has been significantly affected by the 
reform of the Italian Constitution that took place in 2001. 
Although such reform was meant to deal exclusively with the 
relationship between the State and Regions, it had an important 
impact on the status of both EU and international law. Article 117 
                                                                                                           
acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it”. 5 U.S. 137 (1803), 
177. 
11 V. Barsotti et al., Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context, cit. at 1, 34. 
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(1) of the Constitution now provides that “legislative powers shall 
be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the 
Constitution and with the constraints deriving from the EU legal 
order and international obligations”. 
A literal interpretation might suggest that the constitutional 
status of EU law has been compared to that of international law, 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, “ECHR” or 
“Convention”) included. However, the courts have not embraced 
this interpretation. Immediately after the entry into force of the 
new constitutional provision, a new brave judicial approach12 by 
ordinary judges held that the well-known paragraph 16 of the 
landmark decision of the Court of Justice in Simmenthal13 applied 
to the ECHR. 
Only six years after 2001 did the ICC find the possibility to 
elaborate and present its vision on the constitutional provision. It 
did so by way of its judgments no. 348 and no. 349 of 2007. The 
Court’s vision is characterized by three main elements. First, EU 
law enjoys a particular legal status, to the extent to that its 
primacy is recognized with the only exception of the doctrine of 
“controlimiti”; that is, the supreme constitutional principles. By 
contrast, according to the ICC, Article 117 (1) provides the ECHR 
with a higher status than domestic ordinary legislation. Secondly, 
and consequently, the ECHR itself has to respect the Constitution 
in its entirety, and not just its fundamental principles which define 
the scope of the applying in respect to EU law. Thirdly and finally, 
the ICC held that, if ordinary judges find that domestic law 
infringes the ECHR, they must stay the case and refer a question 
of constitutionality to the ICC, thus preventing judicial activism. 
This is the reason why the assessment carried out by the 
ICC is based on a two stages approach. The first stage has the 
                                            
12 The Court of Genoa, for instance, in order to solve a conflict between ordinary 
national laws and ECHR principles, started to apply the same solution 
according to which, since the historic decision of the Constitutional Court in 
Granital in 1984, ordinary judges have applied the priority of EC law in cases of 
conflict between national law and EC law. It has been followed in this position 
by other courts of first and second instance.  
13 See par. 21, Court of Justice, Case C-106/77, Simmenthal, according to which: 
“Every national Court must in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community 
law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and 
must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict 
with Community law, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule”. 
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purpose to verify the existence of a contrast between the relevant 
ECHR provisions and the Italian Constitution. Only if the contrast 
is excluded, the ICC will move to the second stage of its 
evaluation, ascertaining the possible incompatibility of the 
domestic legislation with the ECHR. In the case the contrast is 
found to occur, domestic legislation is struck down because of the 
violation of Article 117 (1) of the Italian Constitution. 
Interestingly enough for the focus of the present paper, in 
its judgments no. 348 and no. 349 of 2007 the ICC added, that the 
exact meaning of the ECHR can be determined only as it is 
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. In fact, 
according to the ICC, the content of the Convention is essentially 
that “which may be inferred from the case law developed by the 
Court over the time". This was the first time, after the entry in 
force of Article 117 (1), in which the ICC laid down an 
unconditioned obligation (for itself as well as for all Italian judges) 
to interpret to the Convention in accordance with the meaning 
given by the ECtHR in its case law.  
In the light of these circumstances, it can be suggested that 
the ICC sought to achieve a sort of compensation. On the one 
hand, it excluded that the new constitutional provision - article 
117 (1) - which mentioned both EU law and international 
obligations soon after the Constitution could be interpreted 
literally, that is, in the sense that the Convention had the same 
legal status of EU law. On the other hand, the ICC acknowledged 
that the ECHR had a special legal status, above legislation.  
Whatever the actual reasons behind this step, the 
constitutional judges realized almost immediately that such 
interpretative constraint, enforced in a radical and absolute way, 
gave them too little margin de manouvre with regard to the  ECtHR 
case law. Such first judicial move, as it has been anticipated, 
needed then to be revisited, without a radical and too explicit 
revirement which would have affected the relationship with the 
ECtHR.  
The Court had to make use of its adaptive, flexible and 
relational style. In so doing, it used several judicial techniques, 
with the goal or at least the effect of attenuating the unconditional 
obligation to be bound to ECHR interpretation by the ECtHR 
reading, without never, at least explicitly, abnegating it.  
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The first judicial technique takes the view that the case law 
of the Court of Strasbourg would be binding for the ICC only in its 
substance (or in its essence). Strangely enough, this judicial 
technique emerged for the first time in the same ruling in which 
the constitutional judges have drawn the most radical implications 
from the said self-imposed obligation to be bound by the ECtHR 
interpretation of the Convention. More precisely, in its decision 
no. 311 of 2009, the ICC, affirmed that “this Court cannot 
substitute its own interpretation of a provision of the ECHR for 
that of the Strasbourg Court, thereby exceeding the bounds of its 
own powers, and violating a precise commitment made by the 
Italian state through signature and ratification of the Convention 
without any derogations”. In other words, a departure from the 
interpretation of the ECHR given by the Strasbourg Court would 
produce an infringement of the obligation resulting from 
international law. However, the ICC added, that “it goes without 
saying that the assessment of the European case law established 
regarding the relevant Convention provision must be carried out 
in a manner that respects the essence (or the substance) of case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights”14. It is here that the 
emphasis put on substance produces its effects.  
This approach is not immune from problems. It is not clear 
which would be the basis for such limitation: why should only the 
essence of the case law of the ECtHR be binding when, on the 
contrary, the case law of the ECJ is binding in all its elements? In 
order to explain this difference, it is not sufficient to point out the 
different status enjoyed by EU law and the ECHR, respectively, 
with the result that only the fundamental principles of the 
Constitution are deemed to be an obstacle to the national 
enforcement of EU law. Nor is the basis for drawing the 
distinction what is essential and what is not essential, in the 
ECtHR case law easy to understand. 
No clear answers to such questions emerge from the case 
law of the ICC. In 2011, instead, it used another judicial technique 
with a view to departing from the (self-imposed) obligation to 
consider entirely binding the case law of Strasbourg Court. More 
precisely, in its decision no. 236/2011, the ICC considered a 
challenge to a national legislation which provided that a reduction 
                                            
14 See par. 6, Constitutional Court, judgment 16 November 2009, no. 311. 
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in time-barring limits for certain offences would not apply 
retroactively to the benefit of the accused to proceedings which 
were already pending before courts of appeal or before the Court 
of Cassation. The ICC held the question was unfounded, drawing 
heavily in its judgment from the case law of the ECtHR, but in a 
quite original way. It admitted that, had it affirmed that the 
principle of the retroactivity of more favorable criminal legislation 
(as asserted by the ECtHR) were to be held to be more rigid than 
that already recognized in the case law of the said Court (in the 
sense that such principle could not be subject to exceptions or 
restrictions justified by special circumstances), this would have 
been constituted a departure from the case law of ECtHR.  
However, using the distinguishing technique, the ICC noted that 
“no such novel characteristic is apparent from the judgment of the 
European Court of 17 September 2009 (Scoppola v. Italy). There is 
nothing in the Court’s judgment which can preclude the 
possibility that, in special circumstances, the principle of 
retroactivity in mitius may be subject to exceptions or restrictions. 
This is an aspect which the Court did not consider, and which it 
had no reason to consider, given the characteristics of the case 
upon which it was deciding”15. In other words, according the 
second judicial technique under investigation, the ICC 
emphasized the difference between the case at stake and the 
relevant case law of the ECtHR, by reading in this case law 
something more (or less) than its actual and “true” meaning.  
In its third judicial technique the ICC emphasized the 
difference between the fragmented evaluation carried out by the 
ECtHR and the comprehensive one at the heart of the ICC 
reasoning. More precisely in the decision no. 264/2012 the ICC 
affirmed that the balancing exercise carried out by the ECtHR 
would be “broken down into a series of provisions that are 
uncoordinated and potentially in conflict with one another”16. By 
contrast, the assessment which characterizes the activity of the 
ICC is said to be “systematic” and “coordinated”, because 
includes a check and balance attitude among the different values 
at the heart of a constitutional legal order. This implies, in other 
words, that the same case, in Strasbourg and in Rome, could be 
                                            
15 See par. 13, Constitutional Court, judgment 19 July 2011, no. 236. 
16 See par. 4.1, Constitutional Court, judgment 19 November 2012, no. 264. 
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decided in a different way because of the different context and the 
different nature of the judicial assessment.  
This is what happened in the decision no. 264/2012. The 
ICC was requested to judge the constitutionality of legislation 
modifying the arrangements applicable to the calculation of 
pensions for workers who have spent all or part of their working 
life in Switzerland. Whereas under the previous interpretation of 
Italian legislation, payment of contributions in Switzerland 
established entitlement to a pension in Italy on the basis of Italian 
contributions at equivalent salary, irrespective of the fact that the 
contribution levels in Switzerland were significantly lower, 
following an enactment providing for an “authentic 
interpretation”, an Italian pension was to be calculated on the 
basis of the actual level of Swiss contributions, thus resulting in 
lower pensions. The Court’s consideration of such issue was 
openly carried out in the light of the ECHR case law, with specific 
reference to the Maggio case17. The European Court had held that it 
was “not persuaded” of the fact that the general interest reason 
was compelling enough to overcome the dangers inherent in the 
use of retrospective legislation. It had thus concluded that Italy 
had infringed the applicants’ rights under Article 6, paragraph 1, 
of the ECHR by intervening in a decisive manner to ensure that 
the outcome of proceedings to which it was a party were 
favourable to it. 
Despite the relevant case law of ECtHR was clearly 
suggesting to conclude for the annulment of the Italian legislation, 
the ICC concluded that compelling general interests could justify 
the recourse to retrospective legislation. According to the ICC, 
“the effects of the said provision are felt within the context of a 
pension system which seeks to strike a balance between the 
available resources and benefits paid, in accordance also with the 
requirement laid down by Article 81 (4) of the Constitution, and 
the need to ensure that the overall system is rational (judgment 
no. 172 of 2008), thus preventing changes to financial payments to 
the detriment of some contributors and to the benefit of others”18. 
It is not difficult to identify the application, in a concrete case, of 
                                            
17 Eur. Ct. H. R., judgment of 31 May 2011, Maggio and others v Italy (applications 
nn. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08 and 56001/08). 
18 See par. 5.3, Constitutional Court, judgment 19 November 2012, no. 264. 
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the dichotomy “individual justice” versus “constitutional justice” 
which the ICC has theoretically developed in the decision 
311/201119. 
The three judicial techniques outlined in this section, in line 
with the relational matrix of the ICC style which has been 
presented at the beginning of the paper, have tried to avoid a 
direct clash between the ICC and the ECtHR and, even before it, a 
direct and explicit revirement of what has been formally  declared 
in the “twins” decisions of 2007 with regard to the self-imposed 
obligation to be bound by the ECtHR interpretation of the 
Convention. 
By contrast, with a fourth one judicial technique, the ICC, 
focusing on a more substantial criteria in order to gain a broader 
margin of manouvre with respect to the case law of the ECtHR, has 
been able to achieve the second goal, i.e. to avoid an explicit 
revirement of the principle adopted in 2007, but not for sure the 
first one, i.e. to prevent  a direct contrast with the ECtHR. More 
precisely, in its judgment no. 49/2015, the Court was requested to 
consider two referral orders questioning the constitutionality of 
legislation which purportedly prohibited the confiscation of 
property following the commission of a development offence in 
the event that, notwithstanding that a finding of criminal 
responsibility had been made, no conviction was imposed on 
account of the time barring of the offence. The referring courts 
stated that, whilst the traditional interpretation of the legislation 
would have allowed confiscation, the judgment by the European 
                                            
19 It should be added that the ICC, one year later (judgment no. 170/2013) has 
partially revisited its radical contrast with the Strasbourg court in relation to the 
admissibility of  the retrospective legislation. In this case the Court heard a 
referral from a bankruptcy judge questioning legislation which enabled certain 
amounts due to the state in respect of tax to be granted priority ranking in 
bankruptcy proceedings, notwithstanding their otherwise unsecured status, 
and stipulated that such arrangements were to apply with retroactive effect to 
bankruptcy proceedings that had already been initiated when the legislation 
came into force. The ICC held, referring also to the ECHR, that whilst 
retroactive legislation in the area of private law was permitted as a matter of 
constitutional law, it must be justified by “compelling reasons of general 
interest”, which this time, according to the same Court, were not present in the 
case.  
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Court of Human Rights in Varvara v Italy20 now precluded such an 
outcome. The ICC ruled the questions inadmissible, holding that 
the referring courts had ascribed an excessive scope and binding 
force to the Varvara judgment, and that the judgment in the 
Varvara case left room for interpretation in a manner consistent 
with the well-established Italian law permitting expropriation. 
The underlying rationale is a distinction between settled cased law 
and isolated judgments of the ECtHR: national judges cannot 
disregard the former, by are not bound by the latter. 
 The idea to make reference to the vague21 and changing 
notion of ECtHR “consolidated case law” as main criteria to 
identify the thin red line between the binding and not binding 
effects of the judgments delivered by the ECtHR does not seem 
coherent with the cooperative relational approach that has 
characterized so far the relationship between ICC and Court 
sitting in Strasbourg. In particular, the assumption that  
“consolidated law it is only that one resulting from the case law of 
the European Court on which the national courts are required to 
base their interpretation, whilst there is no obligation to do so in 
cases involving rulings that do not express a position that has not 
become final” raises some doubts. It is not clear how it is possible 
to consider “final” the position of a judicial body competent to 
interpret a constitutional “work in progress” like the Convention 
which, according to the same ECtHR, amounts to a “living 
                                            
20 Eur. Ct. H. R., judgment of 29 October 2013, Varvara v Italy, application no. 
17475/09. 
21 According to the ICC, “It is not always immediately clear whether a certain 
interpretation of the provisions of the ECHR has become sufficiently 
consolidated at Strasbourg, especially in cases involving rulings intended to 
resolve cases that turn on highly specific facts, which have moreover been 
adopted with reference to the impact of the ECHR on legal systems different 
from that of Italy. In spite of this, there are without doubt signs that are capable 
of directing the national courts during their examination: the creativity of the 
principle asserted compared to the traditional approach of European case law; 
the potential for points of distinction or even contrast from other rulings of the 
Strasbourg Court; the existence of dissenting opinions, especially if fuelled by 
robust arguments; the fact that the decision made originates from an ordinary 
division and has not been endorsed by the Grand Chamber; the fact that, in the 
case before it, the European court has not been able to assess the particular 
characteristics of the national legal system, and has extended to it criteria for 
assessment devised with reference to other member states which, in terms of 
those characteristics, by contrast prove to be little suited to Italy”. 
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instrument”22 that must be interpreted according to present-day 
conditions. Moreover, current circumstances are by definition 
different from those of yesterday and those of tomorrow. 
Accordingly, a position of ECtHR could never be labeled as final. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
Looking at the relevant scenarios in which the ICC has been 
able to train its persuasive skills in order to foster trust and 
voluntary obedience in its different interlocutors, it can be said 
that very often (though not always) the ICC has found the best key 
in order to establish a dialogical relationship with its counterparts. 
Nonetheless, in the next weeks this approach will be 
seriously challenged: the ICC will have to decide how to deal with 
the “time bomb” related to the constitutional fate of ECJ Taricco 
judgment (23). As it is well known, the CJEU ruled that operation 
of the limitation periods in Italian law infringed Article 325 TFEU. 
A limitation period was not objectionable as such, but national law 
made it effectively impossible to prosecute offences because the 
way in which it calculated breaks in the prosecution. Also, the 
national law infringed the principle of equality set out in Article 
325, since other national laws on similar types of economic crime 
did not contain the same problematic rules on calculation of 
breaks. 
For the CJEU, national courts must not apply the relevant 
national law. This obligation is based on Article 325 TFEU, which 
sets out precise and unconditional rules on effective and equal 
protection of the EU financial interests. Such prohibition to apply 
the domestic provisions regarding limitation periods for criminal 
offences (that would result in the application of a longer limitation 
period) is, however, likely to be detrimental to the interests and 
rights of the defendant. Consequently, it could be in contrast with 
the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law, as three national 
judges suggested, raising a question of constitutionality in front of 
ICC. At the heart of the such question there is an underlying 
assumption confirmed by a well-established case law of the ICC 
                                            
22 The idea that the ECHR is a living instrument has figured in Strasbourg’s case 
law since its very early days. The European Court first acknowledged it in the 
judgment of Tyrer v United Kingdom, delivered in 1978. 
23 Court of Justice, Case C-105/14, Ivo Taricco and others.   
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on the substantive nature of the statute of limitation. The 
assumption is that, by refusing to apply the period of prescription 
provided national legislation, the criminal judge would breach 
Article 25 (2) of the Constitution (nulla poena sine lege). This is a 
fundamental principle of the constitutional order, a principle 
which would thus have the status of a limit (“counter-limit”) to 
the primacy of EU law. 
This is not the right place to enter into a more detailed 
analysis and to guess which could be the option that will be 
followed by the ICC, among the quite wide range of possibilities 
from the inadmissibility of the question to the enforcement of 
counterlimits. However, among the others, the ICC has the chance 
to apply, once again, the option that would be more consistent 
with the relational attitude that has been a driving force of its case 
law so far.  Even at first glance, the judgment handed down by the 
CJEU raises several issues. In particular, it fails to strike a fair 
balance between the interests at stake. First, it fails to consider 
adequately Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU, which excludes from the scope of application of the principle 
of legality any interference with the statute of limitation 
detrimental to the defendant. Second, it overestimates the 
financial interests of the European Union, a kind of interests that 
the Court of Justice ranks at the same level as other fundamental 
rights.  
In the light of these issues, a solution is however left to the 
ICC. It could refer once again a preliminary question to the CJEU, 
with a view to obtaining clarifications on the outcome of the 
Taricco judgment in light of the relevant constitutional framework. 
This option, of course, could also be taken by the referring courts, 
though none of them did so. Precisely for this reason, the ICC 
could use this option. On the other hand, there are no obstacles 
preventing the ICC to look for a liaison with the CJEU. In front of 
an actual and clear risk of collision, where the clash with the EU 
legal order is most likely to occur, the model of cooperative 
dialogue and the relational attitude of the ICC could pave the way 
to reconcile the view of European and national judges. 
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1. Introduction 
With the rise of constitutional review world-wide, came 
scholarly attention to the position of constitutional courts in the 
institutional set-up. In Europe the institutional set-up is 
complicated by the presence of two supra-national courts, the 
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights. In attempts to analyze the complex relations that follow 
from the institutional context, scholars have focused in particular 
on the relations between courts under the denominator of ‘judicial 
dialogue’ or ‘constitutional conversations’1. Nonetheless, the 
relationship of the Constitutional Court with other actors is 
precisely the angle under which the authors of the book Italian 
Constitutional Justice in Global Context claim the Italian’s court 
uniqueness2.  
 
 
2. An ‘Italian style’ of constitutional adjudication 
The authors identify an ‘Italian style’ of constitutional 
adjudication defined as ‘relationality’. They distinguish its 
‘institutional’ and its ‘interpretative relationality’. The first is the 
‘ability to establish sound and vital two-ways relations with other 
institutional actors, both political and judicial, national and 
supranational’3. The authors explain how the Italian 
Constitutional Court, in difficult circumstances, managed to build 
smooth relations with Parliament, but how it also enters into 
dialogue with other national courts and with European and 
foreign courts. The latter refers to its method of constitutional 
adjudication. It is ‘the ability to combine and balance all the 
different sources of constitutional regulation of rights and 
powers’4, with focus on balancing, reasonableness and 
                                                           
1 E.g. M. Claes, M. de Visser, P. Popelier & C. Van de Heyning (eds), 
Constitutional Conversations in Europe (2012); A. Rosas, The European Court of 
Justice in Context: Forms and Patterns of Judicial Dialogue, 1 Eur. J. Legal St. 121-
136 (2007).  
2 V. Barsotti, P.G. Carozza, M. Cartabia & A. Simoncini A, Italian Constitutional 
Justice in Global Context (2016). 
3 Ibidem, p. 238. 
4 I quote from A. Simoncini, The Success of a Constitutional Experiment: When 
History Matters. The Italian Constitutional Court in Global Context in this issue as it 
is not clearly defined in the book. 
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proportionality and a systematic, holistic method of 
interpretation.5  
While the authors maintain that all this makes for a typical 
‘Italian’ style, at the same time, they admit that the Italian Court is 
not ‘absolutely singular in this effort at relationality; any 
successful constitutional tribunal needs to attend to some degree 
to the political realities of its place in the constitutional order’.6 
Scholars have provided many examples of such institutional 
relationality. Vanberg research on the German Constitutional 
Court made clear that constitutional courts, when making 
judgments, take into account the ‘tolerance threshold of governing 
majorities’ and the broader political environment so as to secure 
implementation of their judgments.7  
 
 
3. Constitutional adjudication in other European 
jurisdictions. 
Similar findings can be found in other jurisdictions. For 
example in Belgium the Constitutional Court was established in 
the 1980s as a ‘Court of Arbitration’, with limited access and the 
sole power to solve conflicts of competences between central and 
subnational authorities in a context of a fragmenting 
federalization process. However, with its prudent performances it 
was able to gain Parliament’s confidence which was crucial for its 
development into a full-fledged Constitutional Court.8 At the 
same time it entered into a dialogue with domestic and European 
courts. Relations with the Supreme Court are sometimes strained, 
but various efforts, including a symposium co-organized by the 
courts’ Presidents, were made to ease the tensions.9 As to the 
European courts: the Belgian Constitutional Court sends the most 
preliminary references to the European Court of Justice compared 
                                                           
5 V. Barsotti, P.G. Carozza, M. Cartabia & A. Simoncini A, Italian Constitutional 
Justice in Global Context, cit. at 2, 238. 
6 Ibidem, p. 235. 
7 G. Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (2005). 
8 See in more detail P. Popelier, K. Lemmens, The Constitution of Belgium. A 
Constitutional Analysis, 197-198 (2015). 
9 J. Velaers, The Protection of Fundamental Rights by the Belgian Constitutional Court 
and the Melki-Abdeli Judgment of the European Court of Justice in M. Claes M. et al. 
(eds), Constitutional Conversations, cit. at 1, 325-326.  
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to other courts,10 and the European Convention of Human Rights 
including the Strasbourg case law is read in the constitutional 
clauses on fundamental rights.11 The same applies with regard to 
the idea of ‘interpretative relationality’. The Belgian Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence is characterized by its efforts to find 
compromises, to uphold legislation through constitutional 
interpretation, to afford the lawmaker time for adjustments and 
give instructions for those adjustments, and by its broad 
consideration of political bottlenecks, balances and 
compromises.12  
What is true for the Belgian Constitutional Court, 
undoubtedly applies to certain other courts as well. For example, 
with regard to the relationship with other domestic courts, 
Garlicky came to the following conclusions based upon a 
comparative analysis: (1) ‘tensions among the courts constitutes a 
necessary component of every system of centralized review’; (2) 
this seems to be a ‘more general structural problem’ apart from 
context (such as the transition from authoritarian history), and (3) 
constitutional courts are often the weaker participants in this 
process and therefore turn to ‘dialogue and persuasion’ as a more 
effective method than open conflicts and confrontations.13  
Even supranational courts such as the European Court of 
Human Rights show a ‘relational’ attitude. Keeping good relations 
with the Contracting States is crucial for the Court’s viability, and 
particularly delicate, given the diversity of the Contracting States 
in terms of political and legal culture and history. To this end, the 
Strasbourg Court seeks a difficult balance between deference and 
fundamental rights control. Despite the storm of criticism the 
Court had to go through in recent years and with a few 
exceptions, it seems to have succeeded in building good relations. 
Even where political communication is critical, most countries in 
practice are compliant when it comes to the execution of the 
                                                           
10 See the statistics for 1952-2015 in Court of Justice, Annual Report 2015. Judicial 
Activity, Luxembourg 2016, 97-99. 
11 On the references to Strasbourg case law as a judicial strategy, see P. Popelier 
Belgium: Faithful, Obedient, and Just a Little Irritated, in P. Popelier, S. Lambrecht 
& K. Lemmens (eds), Criticism of the European Court of Human Rights. Shifting the 
Convention System: Counter-Dynamics at the National and EU Level, 123-127 (2016). 
12 See P. Popelier P, K. Lemmens, The Constitution of Belgium, cit. at 8, 203-212. 
13 L. Garlicki, Constitutional Courts versus Supreme Courts, 5 I*CON 63-68 (2007). 
 
POPELIER - AN ITALIAN OR A EUROPEAN STYLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW? 
76 
 
ECtHR’s judgments.14 To this purpose, the Court is prudent where 
matters touch upon a Contracting Party’s ‘constitutional identity’ 
or national feeling.15 For example,  the first Lautsi judgment, where 
the Court stated that the compulsory display of a crucifix in 
classrooms violated the Convention, was met with much 
resistance and public indignation.16 The Grand Chamber, having 
become aware how sensitive the matter was in Italian society, 
changed position and decided that the authorities had ‘acted 
within the limits of the margin of appreciation’.17 Judicial 
techniques to uphold the balance, are the proportionality test, the 
notions of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation, and 
procedural rationality review. The latter allows the Court to keep 
control where it is unable to execute a substantive examination, 
for example when a broad margin of appreciation applies. In that 
case it can examine whether the national decision making process 
contained guarantees to secure a balanced decision.18 When the 
Court, in Animals Defenders International, used this type of review 
to uphold a broad restriction of freedom of public interest speech, 
which falls within a narrow margin of appreciation, this raised the 
suspicion that the Strasbourg Court, confronted with growing 
hostility in the UK, tried to appease the United Kingdom.19 
                                                           
14 P. Popelier, S. Lambrecht & K. Lemmens, Introduction: Purpose and Structure, 
Categorisation of States and Hypotheses, in P. Popelier, S. Lambrecht & K. 
Lemmens (eds) Criticism of the European Court of Human Rights, cit. at 11, 9. 
15 F. De Londras, D. Kanstantsin, Managing Judicial Innovation in the European 
Court of Human Rights, 15 Hum. Rts. L. Rev., 537 (2015). 
16 Lautsi v Italy [App No 30814/06] Decision of 3 November 2009. See G. 
Martinico, Italy: Between Constitutional Openness and Resistance, in Popelier, 
Lambrecht & Lemmens (eds), Criticism of the European Court of Human Rights, cit. 
at 11, 178. 
17 Lautsi v. Italy [App No 30814/06] Grand Chamber Decision of 18 March 2011, 
para 78. 
18 E.g. Hatton v. the United Kingdom, Decision of 2 October 2001, [App. No. 
36022/97] and Grand Chamber decision of 8 July 2003, [2003] ECHR VIII. 
19 T. Lewis, Reasserting the Primacy of Broadcast Political Speech after Animals 
Defenders International? – Rogaland Pensioners Party v Norway, 1 J. Media Law, 
474 (2009); F. De Londras, D. Kanstantsin, Managing Judicial Innovation in the 
European Court of Human Rights, cit. at 15, 538; P. Popelier, C. Van De Heyning, 
Subsidiarity Post-Brighton: Procedural Rationality as Answer?, Leiden J. Int’l Law 
(2016) (forthcoming). For other examples: H. Fenwick, An Appeasement Approach 
in the European Court of Human Rights?, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/04/05/helen-fenwick-an-appeasement-
approach-in-the-european-court-of-human-rights/ (last accessed: 14/09/2016). 
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Obviously, each court shows specific features as to attitude 
and judicial techniques, subject to institutional design, political 
context and societal cleavages. The question, however, is what is 
so specific in the Italian operationalization of ‘relationality’ to 
distinguish it from that of other courts and whether it is 
scientifically useful to present it as a singular type of judicial 
review rather than a particular case within a broader category of 
‘styles’ or ‘methods’ of constitutional review. The first turns the 
Italian Constitutional Court into a court sui generis, which is a 
nuisance for academic purposes – ‘le supreme refuge des jurists dans 
l’embarras’20 -  as it hinders the development of a broader theory, 
the possibility of comparative study, and the gaining of insights 
into the functioning of courts in general.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
It can be hypothesized that the book on Italian Constitutional 
Justice does not so much describe a typical ‘Italian’ style of 
constitutional adjudication, but a continental European one.  
The hypothesis, in the first place, does not include the 
constitutional adjudication of all courts on the European 
continent, but only centralized constitutional courts.  There are 
two reason to expect that a central court’s style of adjudication 
differs from supreme courts’ methods. One reason is that the 
constitutional mandate of constitutional courts is more 
pronounced, more specialized and more visible than that of other 
courts, especially if the court has the power to annul 
parliamentary acts after a procedure of abstract review. The 
second reason lies in their specific composition. After a 
comparative overview of European courts, de Visser established 
that the procedure for selection and appointment of constitutional 
judges as well as their qualifications point to the desire to endow 
the court with a specific form of legitimacy, considering the 
political impact that undeniably follows from the power to 
censure parliamentary acts.21  
 
                                                           
20 M. Mouskhély, La Théorie du Fédéralisme, in La Technique et les principes du droit 
public. Etudes en l’honneur de Georges Scille, 400 (1950). 
21 M. De Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe. A Comparative Analysis, 223 
(2014). 
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Secondly, the hypothesis does not cover all constitutional 
courts, but is limited to constitutional courts within the European 
Union. We can expect that embedment within the European legal 
space facilitates the development of a specific type of 
constitutional adjudication. Judicial dialogue develops between 
the domestic courts and the European Court of Justice, between 
the domestic courts and the European Court of Justice, between 
both European courts, and between national courts, for example in 
the development of strategies to protect constitutional values 
against EU supremacy. This has intensified dialogue and 
networks, resulting in a two-way relation, with on the one hand 
the internationalization of fundamental rights and principles to 
what the authors of the book call a ‘European common law’,22 and 
on the other the constitutionalisation of European fundamental 
rights.  
All this sets the agenda for future research. More case-
studies like the one in the book on Constitutional Justice in Global 
Context is needed in order to establish whether there is a 
‘European’ style of constitutional adjudication and what exactly it 
involves. This should amount into a broad comparative study 
where indicators and criteria that characterize this specific style 
are examined for each country. On the basis thereof we should be 
able to define and explain commonalities but also to comprehend 
national adjudication and discover what is actually country-
specific and what not find; to establish what are the contextual, 
institutional, organizational and functional aspects that shape, 
encourage or discourage this European style; and to find whether 
this specific method of judicial review is able to overcome the 
counter-majoritarian obstacle so often debated in (mostly Anglo-
Saxon) scholarship.  This, however, requires a broad comparative 
research network, with local experts writing reports on the basis of 
uniform questionnaires, and the building of databases of 
judgments coded in similar ways, so as to test hypotheses and 
distinguish defining aspects and explanatory factors in a 
statistically significant way.23  
                                                           
22 V. Barsotti et al., Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context, cit. at 2, 230. 
23 Such database was built at the University of Antwerp for the Belgian 
Constitutional Court, for a project funded by the FWO (Flemish Scientific 
Fund), supervised by Popelier and Beyers, and executed by Josephine De 
Jaegere. 
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1. The “relational” Court: an answer to the “fact of 
constitutional pluralism” 
Echoing a famous Rawlsian expression, the world today is 
characterized by what we might call the “fact of [constitutional] 
pluralism”1.  
Over the last decades we have seen the growth and increasing 
interaction of various national, international and supranational legal 
systems; all endowed with constitutional characteristics 2  and 
guaranteed by Supreme/Constitutional Courts. 
This very “fact” represents the main interpretive conundrum 
for contemporary constitutionalism: is that plurality a dodecaphonic 
ensemble or a polyphonic choir? And, in this perspective, which are 
the distinctive voices and contributions of each element of this plural 
organism? 
The book Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context3 clearly 
fits into that research stream, as it tries  to single out the features  that 
typify  the Italian Constitutional Court in this global conversation. 
The central claim of the book is that the peculiar feature of the 
Italian Court, what the authors call the “Italian style” in 
constitutional adjudication4, is its "relationality".  
The expression, taken from the sociological research lexicon5, 
means, in an institutional dimension 6 , the capacity of the Italian 
                                                 
1 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded edition (2005), 441 ss. 
2  J.H.H. Weiler, The transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 8, Symposium: 
International Law (1991). 
3 V. Barsotti, P.G. Carozza, M. Cartabia, A. Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice in 
Global Context (2016). 
4 Ibidem, 234; the expression was coined by John Henry Merryman. 
5 On “relational” sociology, among the others, see: M. Emirbayer, Manifesto for a 
Relational Sociology, Am. J. Sociology 103 (1997); A. Mische, Relational sociology, 
culture, and agency, in The Sage Handbook of Social Network Analysis (2011); P. Donati, 
Birth and development of the relational theory of society: a journey looking for a deep 
“relational 
sociology”,http://www.relationalstudies.net/uploads/2/3/1/5/2315313/donati_bi
rth_and_development_of_the_relational_theory_of_society.pdf 
6 V. Barsotti, P.G. Carozza, M. Cartabia, A. Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice, 
cit. at 3, 235. 
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Constitutional Court to build cooperative relations with the other 
actors of the constitutional system and, in an interpretive dimension7, 
its ability to combine and balance all the different sources of 
constitutional regulation of rights and powers.  
The idea behind this is that, neither constitutional courts nor 
constitutional rights are “absolute” - in the Latin meaning of the 
word “ab-solutus” - that is “un-bounded” or “un-related” -; their 
power (as Courts), like their effectiveness (as rights) are always 
“relational”, that is, proportional to the recognition offered by the 
other constitutional actors.  
We could say that, although the Italian constitutional model 
belongs to a strong form of judicial review (entrusting the 
Constitutional Court with the power to declare the legislation “null 
and void”), it prefers to use this last-word power softly, thus acting 
like a weak form of judicial review (leaving a wide range of action not 
only to the Parliament, but also to the Judiciary power at large). 
This circumstance produces a sort of “variable geometry 
model” in which either the interpretive or the institutional “relational” 
dimension may vary according to the issues involved. 
 
 
 2. The origin of the “Italian Style”: how to survive in a 
hostile context. The historical perspective 
Where does this “Italian Style” come from?  
The hypothesis advanced in the volume is that it derives from 
a sort of adaptive capacity to survive in a complex and hostile 
constitutional context which has been developed by the 
Constitutional Court during sixty years of Republicanism8. 
                                                 
7 V. Barsotti, P.G. Carozza, M. Cartabia, A. Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice, 
cit. at 3, 238. 
8 The popular referendum to choose between Monarchy and Republic was held on 
June 2nd, 1946. On the same day, a Constitutional Assembly was elected to write the 
new Constitution. The Constitutional Court started its activity in 1956. 
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I will not here address the question of this complexity as it is 
quite intuitive how today constitutional adjudication at national level 
has become an increasingly complex function. 
Courts (either constitutional or lower judges) are no longer the 
lonely guardians of nations; the constitutional landscape, in the 
meanwhile, has become densely populated. Different constitutional 
charters, different constitutional courts, new rights and also new 
violations; it is not surprising that complexity is among the most used 
words in contemporary legal literature. Rather, I would suggest some 
remarks on the question of hostility, taking the cue from the analysis 
offered by the volume. 
Indeed, the story and the present practice of the Italian 
Constitutional Court is an extremely useful lesson for reconsidering   
the old and new enemies (and conversely the old and new friends) of 
constitutional justice and the key-factors of a successful constitutional 
review system.  
To that purpose we must follow one important dimension of 
the book’s inquiry: the historical perspective. 
Generally speaking, a great deal of the “Italian style” is due to 
history.  The problem is that the knowledge of Italian history - legal 
history included - often stops at the Roman Empire, the Middle Ages 
or the Renaissance, while in our case the “key” period is 
contemporary history.  
As we know, the Italian Constitution was written immediately 
after World War II and, at that moment, the legal and cultural context 
was deeply hostile to a system of judicial review of legislation. 
The success story of the Italian Constitutional Court, which, in 
a relatively short period of time, has become a strong, stable and 
respected new constitutional actor, is really surprising if we look back 
to the historical trajectory and consider Italian culture immediately 
following Fascism, when the Court was founded. 
It is a fact that although the new Italian Constitution entered 
into force on January 1948, we had to wait until 1956 – eight years 
after - to see the effective start of the new Court.  
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The reasons of that “long gestation” – as it is defined in the 
book9 - were many. 
On the one hand, the complexity of the task for the new 
Parliament to outline a proper institutional “dress” for this entirely 
new Constitutional body10.  
On the other hand, the political deadlock between the two 
main opposing parties (Christian-Democrats and Communist Party) 
in reaching a compromise on the nomination of 5 (out of 15) 
Constitutional Justices11. 
But the most important reason for this long delay in the 
activation of the new Court, was the difficulty in legal and political 
circles of understanding the true nature of this new Institution. 
An insightful example of that reluctance of the constitutional 
system to understand and accept the Constitutional Court is the 
story, mentioned in the volume, known as the “War of the Thrones”: 
the first two Presidents of the Constitutional Court - until the end of 
1960’s - refused to participate in any official ceremonies of the 
Republic, - so, symbolically, a very strong protest - because the 
official protocol did not provide a proper seat for the President of the 
Court.  
As the Constitutional Court was an entirely new institution, 
the Ceremonials Officers of State decided to put the President of the 
Court in fifth place (after the President of the Republic, the President 
of Senate, the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime 
Minister). This was unacceptable for the Court. 
Until the Ceremonial Protocol was amended and the president 
of the Court was placed- after the President and the Parliament, but - 
before the Executive, the Constitutional Court did not participate in 
any official event.  
The Court, therefore, began its activity in a remarkably hostile 
situation or - what is even worse - in a profoundly un-aware context.  
                                                 
9 V. Barsotti, P.G. Carozza, M. Cartabia, A. Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice, 
cit. at 3, 19. 
10 Ibidem, 21. 
11 Ibidem, 23. 
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As an entirely new constitutional actor, it had to physically 
“conquer” its place in a constitutional map that did not deem it 
worthy of consideration. 
To understand the reasons for this difficulty we have to move 
backwards again, because the 1948 Republican Constitution is not the 
first “constitution” of Italy; the first one was “conceded” by the King 
of Italy Carlo Alberto exactly one century before: the so-called Statuto 
Albertino. 
If we consider that older constitutional regime, we can easily 
understand the resistance to the new Court.  
The two main features of the pre-fascist constitutional mindset 
were a strange mix of British and French legal tradition. On the one 
hand, according to the British legal tradition, the principle of the 
“sovereignty of the Parliament” was undisputable: the legislature 
was the unique institution vested not only with the law-making 
power but also with a “permanent constitution-making” power12.  
On the other, unlike the British, but very close to the French 
tradition, the Kingdom of Italy was characterized by an extremely 
weak judiciary, made up of King-appointed bureaucrats, without any 
tradition of independence13. 
This is one of the reasons why, during the XIX Century, 
despite theoretically being in a condition very similar to the US – 
because the Statuto also proclaimed itself as a “perpetual, irrevocable 
and supreme law of the land” - we did not have our “Marbury vs. 
Madison” and the constitutional system remained “flexible”. 
That was the reason why, after the War, almost nobody among 
the constitutional actors was able to recognize the role and the 
function of the new Court. The Parliament was still linked to its 
“omnipotence”; so it waited 8 years to approve all the implementing 
legislation and to elect 5 out the 15 judges, practically blocking for 
almost a decade the effective implementation of the constitutional 
review in Italy. 
                                                 
12 G. Arangio-Ruiz, Istituzioni di diritto costituzionale italiano (1913) 466. 
13 M. Bignami, Costituzione flessibile, Costituzione rigida e controllo di costituzionalità in 
Italia (1848-1956), (1997), 19. 
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 3. The judicial hostility: “programmatic vs. preceptive” 
doctrine 
Furthermore, the Judiciary power was extremely lukewarm 
regarding the new Constitution, and this was an even bigger 
problem, because the Italian model of the incidental access14 to the 
Constitutional justice relies greatly on a positive and effective 
cooperation with the lower courts to bring cases before the 
Constitutional Court. Without relations with other ordinary judges, 
the Italian Constitutional Court cannot do its job. 
However, the large majority of the judges on the bench in the 
1950s –at the beginning of the new Constitutional era - had studied 
and been formed during the Fascist period or even earlier, therefore 
they had been educated under the “parliamentary omnipotence” 
doctrine.  
It was not easy for them to realize the new role of a rigid 
constitution, which is a super-law endowed with a superior 
hierarchical rank within the legal system. 
As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court of Cassation adopted a 
very conservative jurisprudence, known as the “programmatic vs. 
preceptive” doctrine. 
The conceptual background was that the new Constitution was 
largely made up of very broad “principles” (equality, freedom, 
regionalism, separation of powers) and not by strict “preceptive 
rules”; and those principles were defined as programmatic norms.  
Those kinds of norms were, per se, not justiciable, because they 
were too broad.  
In order to become effective parameters for the Court’s review, 
they needed an implementing legislation from the Parliament. As 
long as such legislation was not approved, the Constitution remained 
essentially ineffective and incapable of affecting the validity of the 
previous legislation. 
                                                 
14 V. Barsotti, P.G. Carozza, M. Cartabia, A. Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice, 
cit. at 3, 54. 
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The reaction of the Court in this context and the way it 
interacted with its enemies is a clear example of what we call 
“relationality”.  
On the one hand, in order to have sound relations with others, 
you must have a clear notion of your identity and this the Court 
clearly did. 
With its very first decision, n. 1 of 1956 - defined by the 
authors as the “Italian Marbury vs Madison” - the Court explicitly 
rejected the “programmatic” doctrine of the Cassation, affirming 
clearly both the preceptive value of the entire Constitutional text and 
its own authority to use that text to invalidate previous and 
subsequent  legislation. 
With this seminal decision the Italian Constitutional Court 
broke explicitly with the old fascist and pre-fascist Italian legal 
tradition which was, still rooted in the political and judicial 
institutions. 
But, on the other hand, this self-consciousness of the new 
Court coupled with positive action to have this constitutional identity 
accepted in the legal context, including both the institutional system 
and civil society.  
To that end the Court over the 60 years of its existence has 
constantly sought and still seeks institutional relations, mainly with 
the Parliament, and interpretive relations, mainly with the Judiciary. 
 
 
4. A “relational” style: on the Parliament side 
Every Constitutional Court, reviewing acts of legislation, is per 
se an antagonist of the Parliament. Nevertheless, the Italian Court 
developed a great number of doctrines to enhance cooperative 
relations with the Legislature: some of these doctrines are very well-
known to comparative constitutional law, like the self-restraint from 
“political questions”, but in the history of the Italian Court probably 
the most distinctive element is the diversification of decisional 
instruments.  
Consider, for example, the invention of the “interpretive 
judgments”, through which the Court, separating the interpretations 
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from the texts, strikes down an interpretation, while keeping the 
parliamentary “text” alive.  
The volume describes many other relevant decisional tools 
derived from this original idea15.  
This creativity of the Constitutional Court in finding new 
sentencing techniques aims - to the greatest possible extent - not to 
displace the Parliament in its law-making power.  
Moreover, this creativity does not belong only to the past 
history of the Court but it is still producing very many innovations.  
An example is the recent 2015 decision on the so called Robin 
Tax16 - where the Court for the first time ruled on the time-span 
effects of its own decision, deciding it will not affect the pending case. 
One of the reasons for this momentous innovation was to “enable the 
legislator to act promptly”. A further example is the growing number 
of decisions - even on politically hot issues17 - in which the Court 
explicitly asks the national parliament to find a reasonable solution. 
 
 
5. (cont’d): on the Judiciary side 
But also on the Judiciary side - despite some very problematic 
periods in which the dialogue seemed to be almost lost - the Court 
has always sought and still seeks a collaborative relation.  
If lower courts do not activate the constitutional procedure, the 
Court performs its function.  
This is the reason why in the very beginning the Court 
enormously enlarged the prerequisites to obtain access to its 
jurisprudence and then, when it started to be overwhelmed, it 
changed orientation.  
Generally speaking, the Constitutional Court shows a great 
deal of trust in the interpretive function of the ordinary judiciary, for 
                                                 
15 V. Barsotti, P.G. Carozza, M. Cartabia, A. Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice, 
cit. at 3, 82 ss. 
16 Dec. n. 10/2015. 
17 Like those on frozen embryos (Dec. n. 84/2016) or on the requirements to build 
mosques (Dec. n. 63/2016) both available in English on the Court’s website. 
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example, through the doctrine of the “living law” (that is, 
interpreting a legislative text according to the common confirmed 
interpretation of ordinary courts) and also by promoting creative 
methods of constitutionally compatible interpretation by lower 
courts.  
Finally, as regards the relations with other European 
constitutional judges, the Italian Court followed a very unique path, 
trying to join neither the “pro-European” nor “anti-European” 
aprioristic camp. Instead it engaged in a dialogue with the European 
Court of Justice through the preliminary ruling procedure and 
accepted the Strasbourg Court’s interpretations, but always keeping 
its role and trying to interpret this dialogue as we say in the book as a 
“two-way relation among peers”. 
The case of the Italian Constitutional court shows a strong 
path-dependency; its “relationality” stems from its adaptive capacity 
developed not simply to use its constitutional power, but also to let 
the other constitutional actors understand and accept it.  
The lesson we may learn from the Italian experience is that 
Constitutional Courts like Constitutional systems, need not only to be 
respected, but also understood and, given the growing complexity of 
their task, they increasingly need to be helped in their function. 
Constitutional norms (especially constitutional rights) are not 
simply legal rules to be applied, they are principles requiring a 
common understanding, a multilevel implementation and, moreover, 
a cooperative normative effort 18  of different institutional actors 
(international organizations, state, regions; public powers and civil 
society; national and supranational courts).  
This “organic”19 nature of contemporary constitutionalism is 
particularly evident if you read the text of the Italian Constitution 
and of a great number of all the European post-World-War II 
constitutions. 
                                                 
18 “Law as a normative cooperative effort” see I. Trujillo, F. Viola, What Human Rights 
Are Not (Or Not Only). A Negative Path to Human Rights Practice (2016). 
19 “Organic” as related to an “organism”, that is a systemic whole made up of 
interrelating parts. 
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This very nature explains why “relationality” – intended as an 
institutional and interpretive connecting capacity - can be considered 
the Italian Constitutional court’s distinctive feature and the reason for 
its success. 
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Abstract 
The paper has two goals. First it seeks to examine the main 
features of transnational administrative decisions in the EU legal 
system (i.e. acts of one Member State which, according to a 
European secondary legal norm, produce juridical effects in one or 
more of the other Member States). Second it discusses the 
tendency towards centralisation and re-nationalisation in the most 
recent legislation and the consequences of the abandonment of the 
model of transnational administrative decisions in some important 
economic areas. Finally, some brief conclusions on the perspective 
of horizontal administrative cooperation will be drawn. 
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1. Introduction 
In the European legal order the principle of mutual 
recognition has always been one of the key instruments for the 
creation of the single market1, as it is now for the construction of 
an “area of freedom, security and justice” (“free movement of 
judicial decisions”)2. Limiting the analysis to the single market, 
our starting point must be that of the famous Cassis de Dijon 
decision3 in which the Court of Justice stated that “Any product 
imported from another Member State must in principle be 
admitted to the territory of the importing Member State if it has 
been lawfully produced, that is, conforms to rules and processes 
of manufacture that are customarily and traditionally accepted in 
the exporting country, and is marketed in the territory of the 
latter”4. According to the European Court, however, exceptions to 
this are cases in which administrative controls – which must be 
appropriate and not excessive – are necessary on the part of the 
destination State in order to protect essential needs (public health, 
consumer and environmental protection, correctness in 
                                                          
1 There is a vast amount of material on this theme: see for all C. Janssens, The 
Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Law (2012); M. Möstl, Preconditions and 
Limits of Mutual Recognition, in Comm. Mkt. L. Rev., 405–436 (2010); The Law of 
the Single European Market, C. Barnard, J. Scott (Eds), (2002); G. Rossolillo, Mutuo 
riconoscimento e tecniche conflittuali (2002); V. Hatzopoulos, Le principe 
communautaire d’équivalence et de reconnaisance mutuelle dans la libre prestation de 
services (1999); P. Maduro, We the Court (1998). 
2 See among others K. Lenaers, The principle of mutual recognition in the area of 
freedom, security and justice, in Dir. Un. Eur., 525 ff. (2015); C. Janssens, The 
Principle of Mutual Recognition, cit. at 1; M. Möstl, Preconditions, cit. at 1. 
3  Court of Justice, cause 120/78 of 20 February 1979, Rewe v 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, C:1979:42. 
4 Communication from the Commission concerning the consequences of the 
judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in case 120/78 
('Cassis de Dijon'), OJ C 256, 03/10/1980, 2-3. 
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commercial transactions, etc.). On this basis the principle has been 
gradually extended to cover also the other freedoms to circulate 
recognised in the Treaty5.  
In essence, the principle of mutual recognition is aimed at 
reaching a deep integration of the market, whilst at the same time 
respecting the diversities within the Member States6. However, the 
mutual recognition founded only on the Treaty (and therefore on 
the repeated intervention of the Court o Justice) could potentially 
have led to “a colossal market failure”, as it was based in most 
cases on legal action taken by private citizens who found their 
fundamental freedoms to be limited7. In substance, “one cannot 
plan, produce and market product lines hoping that eventually a 
court decision will vindicate a claim of mutual recognition or 
functional parallelism”8. For this reason, as is well known, a rich 
and complex legislation followed, aimed at facilitating the free 
circulation of goods, services, capital and people in the single 
market (for e.g. harmonisation, technical harmonisation, 
standardisation and normalisation policies)9. 
In this context, in some cases secondary laws regulated 
precisely the division of tasks between the various administrations 
of the common market, providing for authorisations issued by the 
Commission (or other EU bodies) or by national administrative 
bodies. In the latter case the national measures can produce legal 
effects within the territory of the other Member States or across 
the entire EU: These are transnational administrative acts10. 
                                                          
5 On this topic, see C. Janssens, The Principle of Mutual Recognition, cit. at 1, 14-
23. 
6 E.g. J. Pelkmans, Mutual Recognition: Economic and Regulatory Logic in Goods and 
Services, Bruges European Economic Research Papers 24, 1(2012). 
7 E.g. N. Bernard, Flexibility in the European Single Market, in The Law of the Single 
European Market, cit. at 1, 101 ff., spec. 110. 
8 J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of the Common Market Place: The Free Movement of 
Goods, in P. Craig, G. De Burca (Eds) The Evolution of EU Law, 368 (1999). 
9 See for all, P. Craig, The Evolution of the Single Market, in The Law of the Single 
European Market, cit. at 1, 1-40.  
10  Some clarification is necessary on this point. According to doctrine, 
transnational administrative acts can have different forms: M. Ruffert, The 
transnational Administrative Act, in O.J. Jansen, B. Schöndorf-Haubold (Eds) The 
European Composite Administration, 277 ff (2011). The first form is the 
administrative act which produces “effect-related transnationality”; in this case 
an “administrative act is enacted in a state with regard to the addressee resident 
there, and which develops a legal effect beyond the borders of this state” (281). 
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Transnational administrative acts - used by the EU legislator 
also in cases unconnected with market integration 11  – have 
attracted the attention of many scholars, who have examined 
many of their characteristics and highlighted the numerous legal 
problems related to their use 12 . Nevertheless some recent 
                                                                                                                                              
In the second form “the transnational character results from the fact that the 
issuing authority and the addressee of the administrative act are located in 
different sates” (“addressee-related transnationality”: 287 ff.). In the third form 
“a foreign authority itself crosses the state border in order to issue an 
administrative act abroad” (“authority-related transnationality: 290 f.). See also 
M. Ruffert, Rechtsquellen und Rechtsschichten des Verwaltungsrecht, in W. 
Hoffmann-Riem, E. Schmidt-Aßmann, A. Voßkuhle (Eds) Grundlagen des 
Verwaltungsrechts, 2° ed., vol. I, 1234 f (2012). In this article the term 
transnational act/effect will be used mainly according to the first meaning i.e. 
“effect-related transnationality”. 
11  See e.g. A.M. Keessen, European Administrative Decisions, 
Groningen/Amsterdam, 2009, spec. 58 ff and 117 ff.; M. Gautier, Acte 
administratif transnational et droit communautaire, in G.-B.Auby, Dutheil de la 
Rochère (Eds) Droit Administratif Européen, Bruxelles, 1303 ff, (2014). 
12  See for e.g. J.J. Pernas García, The EU’s Role in the Progress Towards the 
Recognition and Execution of Foreign Administrative Acts: The Principle of Mutual 
Recognition and the Transnational Nature of Certain Administrative Acts, in J. 
Rodrigo-Arana Muñoz (Ed) Recognition of Foreign Administrative Acts, Cham, 
Heidelberg et al., 15-31 (2016); A.S. Gerontas, Deterritorialization in 
Administrative Law: Exploring Transnational Administrative Decisions, in Col. J. 
Eur. L., 423 ff., (2013); T. Kemper, Der transnationale Verwaltungsakt im 
Kulturgüterschutzrecht, in Natur und Recht, 751 ff. (2012); H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. 
Rowe, A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union, 645-648 
(2011) (who talked about “transterritorial application of national decisions”); C. 
Ohler, Europäisches und nationales Verwaltungsrecht, in Terhechte (Ed) 
Verwaltungsrecht der Europäischen Union, 345 ff. (2011); H. Wenader, Recognition 
of Foreign Administrative Decisions, in Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches 
Recht und Völkerrecht, 755 ff. (2011); L. De Lucia, Amministrazione 
transnazionale e ordinamento europeo (2009); A.M. Keessen, European 
Administrative Decisions, cit. at 11; N. Bassi, Mutuo riconoscimento e tutela 
giurisdizionale (2008); M. Gautier, Acte administratif transnational et droit 
communautaire, cit., 1303 ff. (Ead, Une autre traversée du Rhin. A propos de l’acte 
administratif transnational, in AJDA, 2015, p.1139-1143); G. Sydow, 
Verwaltungskooperation in der Europäischen Union (2004); J. Becker, Der 
transantionale Verwaltungsakt’, in Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, 856 ff. (2001); M. 
Ruffert, Der transnationale Verwaltungsakt, in Die Verwaltung, 453 ff. (2001); S. 
Galera Rodrigo, La aplicacìon administrativa del derecho comunitario, 108 ff. (1998); 
V. Neßler, Der transantionale Verwaltungsakt – Zur Dogmatik eines neuen 
Rechtsinstituts, in Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, 864 ff. (1995); E. 
Schmidt-Aßmann, Deutsches und Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht in Deutsches 
Verwaltungsblatt, 924 f. and 935 f. (1993). For a more general perspective, see G. 
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developments can present the opportunity for further reflection 
on the possible future of the transnational act within the EU legal 
system. This article aims to contribute to the research on this 
theme. In particular, after having briefly illustrated four types of 
national acts with cross-border effects (par. 2) and having shed 
light of some elements they have in common (par. 3), a recent 
legislative tendency (and to a lesser extent jurisprudential) which 
seems to be moving towards a re-dimensioning of these decisional 
models will be examined (par. 4). After that an attempt will be 
made to explain the reasons behind this orientation of European 
legislation (par. 5) and to reach some (provisory) conclusions on 
this matter (par. 6). 
 
 
2. Market unity and State competences in the legal 
discipline of transnational administrative acts 
Through the legal discipline of transnational administrative 
acts, the EU legislator in general balances two values: the unity of 
the single market (or rather the effective exercise of the 
fundamental freedoms) and the protection of the competences and 
important interests of the Member States (towards not only the 
European Union, but also the other Member States) 13 . This 
balancing is not done in a uniform way, but varies depending on 
the type of transnational act. The analysis below highlights the 
principal traits of four common types of transnational act in EU 
legislation14. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
della Cananea, From the Recognition of Foreign Acts to Trans-national 
Administrative Procedures, in Recognition of Foreign Administrative Acts, cit. at 12, 
219 ff.; M. Ruffert, Recognition of Foreign Legislative and Administrative Acts, in 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law: 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL. 
13 E.g. G. Sydow, Verwaltungskooperation, cit. at 12, 48 ff. 
14  See L. De Lucia, Administrative Pluralism, Horizontal Cooperation and 
Transnational Administrative Acts, in Rev. Eur. Adm. L., 2012/2, 17-45. For 
partially similar classifications see: A.M. Keessen, European Administrative 
Decisions, cit. at 11; H.C. Röhl, Procedures in the European Composite 
Administration, in J. Barnes (Ed) Transforming Administrative Procedure, Seville, 92 
ff. (2008); G. Sydow, Verwaltungskooperation, cit. at 12, 126 ff.; S. Galera Rodrigo, 
La aplicacìon administrativa, cit. at 12, 108 ff. 
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2.1. Authorisations with automatic transnational effects 
The first are authorisations that automatically produce 
transnational effects. These administrative measures allow the 
beneficiary to exercise a fundamental freedom beyond their home 
country territory without the host administrations having to give 
their own consent15. This model – that has its origins in the rulings 
of the Court of Justice on mutual recognition 16  – generally 
presupposes a high level of harmonisation between national legal 
orders. For example, in this group we find: the authorisation for 
the sale of mineral waters17; the licence for the provision of air 
transport services for passengers, post and/or goods18; and the 
authorisation for the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
direct insurance or reinsurance19. 
The criteria for the division of administrative tasks are 
centred here on the home administration, which exercises its 
powers autonomously. This means that greater importance is 
placed on the unitary principle, which leads to a particular bias 
towards the exercise of fundamental freedoms. As a consequence, 
the transnational effect is in this case particularly incisive in the 
host country, which must accept the host authorisation, allowing 
the private party to carry out their activities. Nevertheless, host 
countries are not completely powerless to react; indeed the 
majority of the EU secondary norms allow them to respond in 
                                                          
15 For reference to “perfect mutual recognition”, see M. Tison, Unraveling the 
General Good Exception. The case of Financial Services, in M. Adenas, W.H. Roth 
(Eds) Services and Free Movement in EU Law, 321 ff. (2002); see also E. Schmidt-
Aßmann, Verwaltungskooperation und Verwaltungskooperationsrecht in der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft, in Europarecht, 300 (1996) (“echte 
Transnationalität“); whilst for “passive mutual recognition”, see K.A. 
Armstrong, Mutual Recognition, in The Law of the Single European Market, cit. at 1, 
240 ff. 
16 E.g. Court of Justice, C-390/99 Judgment of the Court of 22 January 2002, 
Canal Satélite Digital SL v Adminstración General del Estado, and Distribuidora de 
Televisión Digital SA (DTS), C:2002:34; M. Möstl, Preconditions, cit. 
17 Directive No 2009/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
18 June 2009 on the exploitation and marketing of natural mineral waters. 
18  Articles 3 ff. of the Regulation (EC) No. 1008/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the 
operation of air services in the Community. 
19 Art. 14 of the Directive No 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business 
of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II). 
DE LUCIA - FROM MUTUAL RECOGNITION TO AUTHORIZATION 
 
 96
situations where important collective interests are endangered 
(e.g. health and environment) through the suspension of activities 
in its their territory authorised by the transnational act (so-called 
‘safeguard measures’)20. These measures are however, preceded or 
followed by agreements or contacts with the home administration 
in order to reach a mutual understanding for the solution of the 
critical issue. 
 
2.2. Joint decisions 
The joint decision is a national authorisation which is the 
result of a composite procedure in which all the State 
administrations involved (and at times also the Commission) 
participate with a co-decisional role. Examples which can be 
mentioned here are the authorisation of the placing on the market 
of genetically modified organisms not contained in food 
substances21 and that for inter-community transport of waste for 
disposal22. 
Despite differing in certain ways, these EU norms provide 
for cooperation mechanisms within the procedure conducted by a 
single State. Following the examination of the request and of the 
documents presented by the applicant at a national level, a 
multilateral phase then takes place in which the administrations 
affected are called (at times through silent assent) to express their 
agreement on the issuing of a favourable decision. Only in the 
absence of opposition from the other administrations can the 
competent office grant the authorisation. Directive 2001/18 
stipulates that where there is an objection from one of the Member 
States (or the Commission), the matter must be returned to the 
Commission (see below). 
This model represents a further form of balancing between 
the principle of the protection of the State competences and that of 
unity and is justified by the overwhelming importance of the 
public interests affected by those legal regulations which require 
                                                          
20 E.g. Art. 155, Dir. No 2009/138/EC; Art. 11, Dir. No 2009/54/EC. 
21 Articles 18 ff. of the Directive No 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the 
environment of genetically modified organisms (consolidated version). 
22 Articles 4 and 7 ff. of the Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments of waste 
(consolidated version). 
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the prior involvement of the public bodies concerned in the 
decision process. In substance, the proceeding is aimed at “(…) 
compensating administrative polycentrism with the unity of the 
decision”23. 
Also in these legal norms any of the States affected can 
initiate a revision procedure (also in conjunction with a safeguard 
measure) for the protection of health and environment “indicating 
whether and how the conditions of the consent should be 
amended or the consent should be terminated…” (Article 20, Dir. 
2001/18). It is important to emphasise that here the State offices 
cannot unilaterally take a final decision on the matter but can only 
start a second level procedure which has to be conducted jointly 
with the other Member States (and at times the Commission). 
 
2.3. Authorisations subject to recognition 
In general, this decisional model – whose fundamental 
structure is based on the rulings of the Court of Justice on mutual 
recognition 24  – is made up of two or more interconnected 
authorisations issued in the legal system of each Member State. 
The first measure has legal effects only in the home country, 
whereas the second allows effects to be produced also in the host 
country. For this reason, at times this is referred to as 
authorisations in sequence25. The recognition of some professional 
qualifications26 is in this group. 
The transnational effect acts here within the recognition 
procedure that is carried out by the second State. In fact the host 
administration is limited to looking at the results of the 
examination (e.g. technical or chemical tests) on which the first act 
                                                          
23 S. Cassese, L’arena pubblica. Nuovi paradigmi per lo Stato, in Id. La crisi dello 
Stato, 86 ff. (2003). 
24  E.g. Court of Justice, C-272/80 of 17 December 1981, Frans-Nederlandse 
Maatschappij voor biologische Producten, C:1981:312: host authorities “are not 
entitled unnecessarily to require technical or chemical analyses or laboratory 
tests where those analyses and tests have already been carried out in another 
Member State and their results are available to those authorities, or may at their 
request be placed at their disposal” (par. 14). See also Court of Justice, C-25/88 
of 11 May 1989, Wurmser and Others, C:1989:187, par. 18-19. 
25 E.g. E. Schmidt-Aßmann, Verwaltungskooperation, cit. at 15, 285. 
26 Directive No 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 
September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications (consolidated 
version). 
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was based and, without repeating the tests, can only determine 
the effects in its legal system27. Hence the home administration 
substitutes that of the host country by carrying out the majority of 
the necessary analyses28. This model is therefore a response to the 
need to put greater weight on the role of the host administrations, 
which in the majority of cases must ensure that the first act is 
adapted to their own legal system. In this way room is given to 
national diversity29. 
Nevertheless, in some cases (for e.g. the recognition of the 
authorisation for the commercialisation of pharmaceutical 30  or 
biocidal products31 on the market) the EU legislator provides for 
variations to this model. In these cases it is established that a 
Member State cannot unilaterally refuse to recognise an 
authorisation issued by another State: if there is no agreement, a 
negotiation phase is foreseen within specific coordination groups32 
and, if the negotiation fails, the decision is left to the Commission 
which must act according to comitology rules (examination 
procedures), after having listened to the opinions of technical 
bodies. These legal regulations therefore limit to a certain extent 
the autonomy of the national administrations and hence the 
possibilities for differentiation. 
  
2.4. Mutual recognition in parallel 
Finally, mention should be made here to parallel 
authorisations 33  which represent a further variation of the act 
subject to recognition. Also in these cases, checks and controls are 
carried out by one individual national administration and, on the 
                                                          
27 E.g. Court of Justice, C-452/06 of 16 October 2008, Synthon, C:2008:565. 
28 G. Biscottini, Diritto amministrativo internazionale, 117 (1964); Id, L’efficacité des 
actes administratifs étrangers, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de droit 
international de La Haye, 639 ff. (1961). 
29 See e.g. K.A. Armstrong, Mutual Recognition, in The Law of the Single European 
Market, cit. at 1, 242, who talked about the “… domestification of the foreign 
regulatory process ...”. 
30 Articles 28 ff. of the Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use (consolidated version). 
31 Articles 32 ff. of the Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the 
market and use of biocidal products (consolidated version). 
32 Art. 35, Reg. No 528/2012; Art. 27, Dir. 2001/83/EC. 
33 See E. Schmidt-Aßmann, Verwaltungskooperation, cit. at 15, 286. 
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basis of this, other national authorities issue a single authorisation 
whose effectiveness is limited to their own territory. This model - 
used for example for some authorisations for the placing on the 
market of pharmaceuticals for human34 or veterinarian use35 or of 
biocidals 36  - includes functional and structural elements partly 
from the model of authorisations subject to recognition, and partly 
from that of common decisions. Indeed, despite the need for 
consent to be expressed by every national administration on the 
results of the inquiry carried out by another Member State (as is 
the case of administrative acts subject to recognition), mutual 
recognition in parallel favours - also through proceedings aimed 
at solving eventual administrative disagreements - the 
preventative aligning of the content of each authorisation. From a 
functional point of view, this is an element that characterizes the 
common decision. 
 
 
3. Common features in the types of authorisation described 
It is well known that every form of execution (whether 
centralised or decentralised) of European law is founded on 
complex cooperation mechanisms between national and European 
administrations in order to ensure coordinated, efficient and as far 
as possible homogeneous actions, as well as reciprocal control 
amongst the various public bodies involved37 . The forms and 
                                                          
34 Articles 28 ff., Dir. 2001/83/EC. 
35 Articles 32 ff. of the Directive 2001/82/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to veterinary 
medicinal products (consolidated version). 
36 Articles 34 of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012. 
37 For all, see L. De Lucia, Strumenti di cooperaizone per l’esecuzione del diritto 
europeo, in Id., B. Marchetti (Eds) L’amministrazione europea e le sue regole, 171 ff. 
(2015); E. Schmidt-Aßmann, Verfassungsprinzipien für den Europäischen 
Verwaltungsverbund, in, Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts, cit. at 15, vol. I, 261 ff.; 
H.H. Trute, Die Demokratische Legimation der Verwaltung, ivi, 341 ff. spec. 427 ff.; 
W. Kahl, Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund: Strukturen – Typen – Phänomene, in 
Der Staat, 353-387 (2011); E. Chiti, The administrative implementation of European 
Union law: a taxonomy and its implications, in H.C.H. Hofmann, A.H. Türk (Eds) 
Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law, Cheltenham et al., 9 ff. (2009); E. 
Schmidt-Aßmann, Einleitung, in Id., B. Schöndorf-Haubold (Eds) Der 
Europäische Verwaltungsverbund, 1 ff. (2005); G. Sydow, Vollzug des europäischen 
Unionsrechts im Wege der Kooperation nationaler und europäischer Behörden, in DöV, 
66 ff. (2006). 
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means of cooperation vary however in every normative field - we 
can therefore speak about different sectorial administrative 
unions. Indeed, in each sectorial union four elements are 
combined in different ways: decisional autonomy/interconnection 
of decisional powers, national competence/European 
competence 38 . The combination of these elements changes 
however in relation to the specific administrative activities that are 
carried out in each sectorial union. 
 With limited reference to transnational authorisations it can 
be observed that administrative cooperation performs also the 
function of assuring alternative (or better compensative) forms of 
involvement in the decisional process of the host authority (and at 
times of the European administration) 39 . In these institutional 
contexts, the public bodies concerned (even if different from that 
which issued the act) can in fact intervene at various points in the 
life of the transnational act in order to protect important collective 
interests (e.g. safeguard measures). Consequently, under the force 
of the transnational measure the fundamental freedoms can be 
exercised in the European Union and this is made possible 
through the coordination of the administrative functions of the 
origin and host authorities. On the other hand, within the sectorial 
unions, the national administrations can compare positions in 
relation to problems that could be caused by the act. 
Despite the fact that each typology of transnational act 
consists of different forms of division of tasks between national 
administrations, they have three elements in common. 
  
3.1. The inter-administrative tie 
In all cases, the transnational effect aims at guaranteeing the 
effective division of tasks between a plurality of national 
authorities. In particular, the host administration cannot 
(unilaterally) question the validity or appropriateness of the 
measure of other States and must from time to time link this to 
legal consequences as established by European laws 40 . This 
                                                          
38 See in general M. Ruffert, Von der Europäisierung des Verwaltungsrechts zum 
Europäischen Verwaltungsverbund, in Die Öffentliche Verwaltung, 761 ff. (2007). 
39 E.g. G. Sydow, Verwaltungskooperation, cit. at 12, 49 ff. 
40 For a similar view see M. Ruffert, Der transnationale Verwaltungsakt, cit. at 12, 
473 ff. 
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outcome, which can be called an ‘inter-administrative tie’ 41 , 
operates in different ways in the models described above. Its 
scope is wider with regard to authorisation with automatic 
transnational effects (i.e. when the country of origin has extensive 
decisional autonomy). Its scope is more limited, on the other hand, 
when a interconnection of decisional powers is provided for, i.e. 
with regard to joint decisions and in authorisation subject to 
recognition (including mutual recognition in parallel). In essence, 
there is an inverse relationship between the scope of the inter-
administrative tie and the protection of the interests of the host 
country. 
From a structural point of view, moreover, in the 
authorisation with automatic transnational effects and in the joint 
decision, the cross-border effect has two elements: the first of 
which is substantive, under which the private party can exercise a 
fundamental freedom; and the other organisational (the inter-
administrative tie itself) which is binding on the other authorities, 
preventing them from carrying out autonomous checks on the 
validity of the measure issued by other States; the tie here has an 
instrumental function with regards to the substantive effect. In 
acts subject to recognition, the tie has a procedural nature and 
consists of the fact that the destination administration cannot 
contest (autonomously) the examination that the country of origin 
has carried out before issuing the first act. These limits are in any 
case set up to safeguard the freedom of private parties, even 
though this protection occurs within the recognition procedure 
itself.  
 
3.2. Administrative conflict resolution 
The transnational act represents an instrument to govern 
administrative pluralism. Is therefore likely that the public players 
involved will express contrasting points of view concerning the 
same administrative matters, depending either on their praxis, the 
interpretation of norms or conflicts of interest. In other words, 
given that the cross-border effects concern not only the 
administration that issued the measure, but also other States - and 
at times also European bodies - in many EU norms these effects 
                                                          
41  For reference to the German concepts of Tatbestands-, Festellungs- and 
Bindungswirkung, see in general E. Schmidt-Aßmann, Verwaltungskooperation, 
cit. at 15, 299 f. 
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can be questioned by one of the host authorities or by the 
Commission (or by the European Supervisory Authority). This is 
foreseen, for example, when a State administration intends to 
contest a transnational act (e.g. through a safeguard measure) and 
it opposes the issuing of a joint decision or the recognition of an 
authorisation. In these cases often specific administrative 
procedures are provided for with the aim of resolving conflict 
between different administrations (e.g. negotiation, mediation, 
decisions taken by the Commission or other EU entities). The goal 
of these procedures is to reach a decision which is as far as 
possible shared between the parties in conflict, hence avoiding the 
recourse to the European judges 42 . In summary, they should 
transform conflict into cooperation. 
 As a consequence, in many cases the balance between 
public and private interests is not a product solely of the 
transnational authorisation but can also be realised outside of this 
as the outcome of a negotiation between the public players 
involved in a conflict within a sectorial union. For this reason, 
such measures can result in a limited stability of private rights 
which can lead to a high degree of uncertainty for private parties. 
 
3.3. The competence of the home country judges and the bi-
polarity of the transnational act 
Transnational authorisations can raise problems with regard 
to the protection of rights, as administrative pluralism often 
corresponds to a plurality of potentially competent courts 43 . 
According to general principles, the recipient must challenge the 
unfavourable decision in the court of the legal system to which the 
issuing administration belongs 44 . However, when a European 
                                                          
42 For an overview see, L. De Lucia, Conflict and Cooperation within European 
Composite Administration (Between Philia and Eris), in Rev. Eur. Adm. L., 1, 43 ff. 
(2012). 
43  E.g. F. Shirvani, Haftungsprobleme im Europäischen Verwaltungsverbund, in 
Europarecht, 619 ff. (2011); A.M. Keessen, European Administrative Decisions, cit. 
at 11, spec. chap. V. 
44 See in general Court of Justice, C-562/12 of 17 September 2014, Liivimaa 
Lihaveis, C:2014:2229. In doctrine, see, amongst other M. Ruffert, Der 
transnationale Verwaltungsakt, cit. at 12, who raises the question of the possible 
remedies against an administrative act issued by another State which violates in 
an extreme way the fundamental rights of a private individual (476); see also T. 
Kemper, Der transnationale Verwaltungsakt, cit. at 12, 755; F. Shirvani, 
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decision has to be implemented through an administrative act 
(with transnational effects) of a Member State45, this rule has to be 
adapted: Given that in this case the recipient can be considered 
directly and individually concerned by the EU decision, they must 
address the matter to the European court, without having to wait 
for the implementation of the EU measure at national level46. 
The position of third parties is more complex, however. In 
fact such measures can violate the principle of effective legal 
protection when the third party must undertake legal action in a 
country which is not that of their residence (or of establishment): 
economic costs or limitations with regards to the locus standi47 
could constitute a barrier to their access to the courts48. Without 
going into this complex problem in too much depth, it should be 
observed that in some circumstances these limits could 
nonetheless be compensated for by the fullness of the protection in 
front of an ordinary court. During a civil trial in which the 
applicant asks to be safeguarded in the face of the private activity 
authorised by the transnational measure enacted abroad, the host 
(ordinary) court must not question the legitimacy of the 
authorisation, focusing its attention solely on the conduct of the 
private party causing the alleged damage. In the judgment, the act 
itself is therefore unimportant and cannot serve as a justification 
for the detrimental conduct49. 
Most of these legal norms place the burden of responsibility 
of conduct above all on the beneficiary of the transnational 
authorisation who must consequently protect third parties and 
collective interests (e.g. public health, environment etc.), adopting 
all the necessary precautions, even if these are over and above 
                                                                                                                                              
Haftungsprobleme, cit. at 43, 619 ff.; A.M. Keessen, European Administrative 
Decisions, cit. at 11, spec. chap. V; J. Hofmann, Rechtsschutz und Haftung im 
Europäischen Verwaltungsverbund (2004).  
45 E.g. Art. 34, Dir. 2001/83: A Commission decision on one State’s refusal of 
recognition of a host authorisation of a pharmaceutical product. 
46  E.g. Court of Justice, C-188/92 of 9 March 1994, TWD v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, C:1994:90 and C-178/95, of 30 January 1997, Wiljo v Belgische Staat, 
C:1997:46. 
47 E.g. A.M. Keessen, European Administrative Decisions, cit. at 11, chap. V. 
48  E.g. N. Bassi, Mutuo riconoscimento, cit. at 12, 69 ff.; M. Ruffert, Der 
transnationale Verwaltungsakt, cit. at 12, 476. 
49 For a wider view see L. De Lucia, Administrative Pluralism, cit. at 14, 35 ff., 
with reference to the jurisprudence.  
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those prescribed in the authorisation itself50. In other words the 
transnational measure in the host country is characterised by bi-
polarity, as in principle it only guarantees the protection of 
specific public interests, but it does not govern private 
relationships and does not ensure the correct functioning of the 
social dynamics51. 
 
 
4. Recent moves away from transnational administrative 
authorisations 
In the face of these complicated regulations, a current 
legislative (and jurisprudential) trend can be seen which in some 
cases foresees the substitution of transnational authorisations with 
forms of centralisation (par. 4.1.) or, on the contrary, the 
weakening of the cross-border effect (par. 4.2.). 
 
4.1. Centralisation 
As an example of centralisation, mention can be made here 
of the new regulation for authorisations to take up the business of 
a credit institution, the responsibility for which in the Eurozone is 
now attributed to the European Central Bank52; in the past these 
acts were instead issued by the Member States and produced 
automatically transnational effects (the so-called “European 
passport”)53, or of the recent regulation of the European Union 
Agency for Railways54, which gives the Agency a series of powers, 
amongst which the issuing of the authorisations for the placing on 
the market of railway vehicles and types of vehicles and 
                                                          
50 See e.g. Art. 20, para. 2, Dir. 2001/18; Art. 25, Dir. 2001/83. 
51 See as above L. De Lucia, Administrative Pluralism, cit. at 14, 37 ff. 
52 Articles 20-21 of the Council Regulation No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 
conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. On this issue see for 
e.g. S. Antoniazzi, The ECB’s Banking Supervision And European Administrative 
Integration: Organisation, Procedures And Legal Acts, in this Journal, 2, 318 ff. 
(2015). 
53 Articles 25 ff. of the Directive No 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the 
business of credit institutions. 
54 Regulation (EU) No 2016/796 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Railways and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 881/2004. 
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authorisation for the placing in service of trackside control-
command and signalling sub-systems; in the past also these acts 
had automatic transnational effects55.  
In addition there is the registration of ratings agencies; today 
this administrative act is issued by the European Banking 
Authority56, whilst under the previous regulation it was the result 
of a composite procedure (similar to the joint decision) of national 
competence but still with transnational effects57. The same can be 
said of some biocidal products that now can be directly authorised 
by the Commission 58; this procedure was not provided for in the 
previous EU legal discipline (which dealt only with authorisations 
subject to recognition)59. Finally, whilst in the past the release on 
the market of novel foods and novel food ingredients was subject 
to authorisation adopted through a joint decision60, since 2015 
these measures have been passed to the competence of the 
Commission which must act with the support of the European 
Food Safety Authority61. 
 
4.2. Weakening of the cross-border effect 
There is however a movement in the opposite direction 
                                                          
55 Articles 20 ff. of the Directive 2008/57 (EC) of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the interoperability of the rail system within 
the Community.  
56 Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 May 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating 
agencies. 
57  Articles 15 ff. of the Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies. 
58 Art. 41, Reg. No 528/2012. According to the recital 26 of the Reg. cit. “To 
facilitate the placing on the EU market of some biocidal products with 
conditions of use analogous in all Member States, it is opportune that these 
products are authorised at EU level”. 
59 Art. 4 of the Directive No 98/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 February 1998 concerning the placing of biocidal products on the 
market. 
60 Articles 4 ff. of the Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 27 January 1997 concerning novel foods and novel food 
ingredients. 
61 Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 November 2015 on novel foods, amending Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1852/2001. 
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towards giving more weight to national interests at the expense of 
the transnational effect (and hence the unitary needs). 
This development we see above all in the rulings of the 
Court of Justice regarding driving licences62. Driving licences are 
administrative acts with automatic transnational effects63, which 
have the dual aim of facilitating the free movement of people 
taking up residence in a Member State other than the one issuing 
the licence and of improving road safety64. In the past, the Court 
of Justice, by virtue of the principle of reciprocal recognition, 
clarified that Directive 91/439/EC (which in this regard was 
similar to the current one)65  precluded “a Member State from 
refusing to recognise a driving licence issued by another Member 
State on the ground that, according to the information available to 
the first Member State, the holder of the licence had, on the date 
on which it was issued, taken up normal residence in that Member 
State and not in the Member State in which the licence was 
issued”66. Subsequently, however, the EU Judges - to curb the 
practice of the so-called “driving licence tourism” - recognised 
wider powers to the destination authorities to check the existence 
of the requirement of residence, allowing them to verify from this 
point of view the validity of every single licence issued in other 
Member States67. Therefore, despite the absence of any legislative 
change, in the interest of protecting road safety the Court has 
restricted the scope of the inter-administrative tie. Hence a new 
decisional model has emerged: the national administrative act 
                                                          
62 Directive No 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 December 2006 on driving licenses. 
63 Art. 1, par. 2, of the Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (Recast). 
64  E.g. M. Ruffert, Europäisiertes Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht im 
Verwaltungsverbund, in Die Verwaltung, 543 ff., spec. 554 (2008); M. Szydło, EU 
Legislation on Driving Licences: Does It Accelerate or Slow Down the Free Movement 
of Persons?, in German Law Journal, 13, 345 ff. (2012). See also N. Bassi Il mutuo 
riconoscimento in trasformazione: il caso delle patenti di guida, in Riv. It. Dir. Pubbl. 
Com., 1517 ff. (2008). 
65 Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29 July 1991 on driving licences. 
66 Court of Justice, C-476/01, of 29 April 2004, Kapper, C:2004:261, par. 47. See 
also Court of Justice C-230/97, of 29 October 1998, Awoyemi, C:1998:521. 
67 For a review of this legislation with reference to Germany, see M. Ruffert, 
Verwaltungsrecht im Europäischen Verwaltungsverbund, in Die Verwaltung, 547, 
spec. 551-555 (2015). 
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with transnational effects subordinated to controls68.  
Another couple of examples of this can be found in 
secondary legislation. In Directive 2001/18 (on the placing on the 
market of GMO products) the foundation of the authorisational 
effect is variable. As mentioned above, when there is the 
consensus of all the Member States, the competent national 
administration can issue the favourable measure: unanimity 
represents here the justification of the cross-border effects69. If 
there a is a conflict (i.e. when there are objections from one or 
more States) the decisional power passes to the Commission 
which must define the question in a binding way for all the 
Member States. This system has proved to be dysfunctional, 
however, essentially due to the alarm this causes in public opinion 
in some Member States70. For this reason in 2015 the directive was 
modified: today the Member States, in addition to being able to 
raise an objection to the placing on the market of a GMO, can 
ensure (through a rather complex system) during the 
authorisation proceedings that all or part of their territory is 
excluded from the cultivation of candidate products because of 
environmental policy objectives, town and country planning, land 
use, socioeconomic impacts, agricultural policy objectives, etc.71. 
In essence, each Member State can unilaterally refuse the 
transnational effect without this leading to an administrative 
conflict with the other States and without therefore generating the 
need for a Commission decision.  
The placing on the market of plant protection products is 
                                                          
68 E.g. E. Schmidt-Aßmann, Verwaltungskooperation, cit. at 15, 300 ff. For another 
example of this model, see also Art. 34 of the Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a 
Community Code on Visas. 
69 See the Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-6/99 delivered on 25 
November 1999, Greenpeace France and Others, C:1999:587, par. 56. 
70 See for all, M. Weimar, Risk Regulation and Deliberation in EU Administrative 
Governance — GMO Regulation and its Reform, in Eur. L.J., 622-640 (2015). 
71  Art. 26-ter, Dir. 2001/18, added by the Directive (EU) 2015/412 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 amending Directive 
2001/18/EC regarding the possibility for the Member States to restrict or 
prohibit the cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). See. M. 
Porpora, Gli OGM e la frammentazione della governance nel settore alimentare, in 
Riv. It. Dir. Pubbl. Com., 1661 ff. spec. 1678 ff. (2016). 
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another example of this72. Even though the regulation is a highly 
complex, it must be highlighted that, in contrast to the past, on the 
basis of current legislation each Member State can refuse to 
recognise the authorisation for the placing on the market issued 
by another Member State for reasons connected with the health of 
people or animals and for the protection of the environment73. 
Also in this case, the refusal, differently to the old regime74, does 
not give rise to an administrative conflict (and all that follows) but 
simply to the exclusion of the transnational effect in each single 
Member State. 
 
 
5. Towards the reshaping of the transnational 
administrative authorisation? 
Could these trends mean that the transnational 
administrative authorisation is in crisis and that it is destined to be 
re-dimensioned? Only time will give the answer to this question, 
if for no other reason than the fact that we need to see whether 
these tendencies extend to other fields. For the moment some brief 
observations can be made on this point. 
The principle of mutual recognition has been interpreted in 
various ways by scholars. For example according to some it 
represents one of the consequences of the “horizontal opening up” 
of the States originating from European integration 75 , which 
results in a form of governance of the single market based on the 
competition (or better a competition in the shadow of EU 
hierarchy) between national authorities and national legal 
orders76. Others, on the contrary, maintain that it gives rise to an 
institutional system aimed at resolving conflicts between the 
                                                          
72 Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the 
market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC. 
73 Articles 36, par. 3 and 41, Reg. No 1107/2009. 
74  Articles 10 and 11, Council Directive No 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 
concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market. 
75  See for e.g. M. Kment, Grenzüberschreitendes Verwaltungshandeln – 
Transnationale Elemente deutschen Verwaltungsrechts (2010). 
76 T. Börzel, European Governance: Negotiation and Competition in the Shadow of 
Hierarchy, in J. Comm. Mkt. St., 191 ff. (2010); in different terms, P. Maduro, We 
the Court, cit. at 1, spec. 111 ff. 
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norms of the various Member States77. 
As is well known, this second approach has greatly 
influenced the study of EU law. According to one of the most 
original theories on this theme, the concept of conflict between 
norms and legal systems in itself should constitute one of the 
bases for a renewed European constitutionalism78. At the centre of 
this complex and fascinating reconstruction is the idea that the 
strengthening of EU democracy necessitates the abandonment of 
the mere defence of the national State, which itself cannot be the 
federal prototype for the European Union. The proposal is thus 
made of a “horizontal constitutionalism”, meaning a system in 
which the function of the EU law is to ensure the co-existence of 
different legal systems within the EU, identifying rules and 
principles which could be acceptable to all. All of this should be 
founded on a (meta-)principle that is able to increase the 
democratic potential of the Member States: Taking their 
neighbours’ concerns seriously79. 
This idea, which has a markedly deliberative mould, is well-
suited to interpreting and justifying conceptually many of the 
secondary norms which regulate transnational administrative 
acts80 - norms and proceedings that in many cases are aimed at 
facilitating the reaching of consensus within the single sectorial 
unions of the national administrations around a decision issued 
(or to be issued) by a single Member State and consequently to 
avoid forms of rejection by national constituencies. 
It must be underlined that this deliberative need is often 
heightened by the fact that many transnational acts are 
                                                          
77 E.g. G. Rossolillo, Mutuo riconoscimento e tecniche conflittuali, cit. at 1. For a 
general overview, see also M. Ruffert, Recognition of Foreign Legislative and 
Administrative Acts, cit. at 12. 
78 The reference here is obviously to Christian Joerges, of which see for example: 
Id., M. Everson, Reconfiguring the Politics–Law Relationship in the Integration 
Project through Conflicts–Law Constitutionalism, in Eur. L.J., 644 ff. (2012); Id., The 
Idea of a Three-Dimensional Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form, RECON Online 
Working Paper, 5 (2010); Id., Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy, EUI Working 
Paper Law, 12(2005). 
79  C. Joerges, M. Weimar, A Crisis of Executive Managerialism in the EU: No 
Alternative?, Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 7, 29 (2012). 
80 E.g. H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe, A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy, 
cit. at 12, 645; see also L. De Lucia, Amministrazione transnazionale, cit. at 12, 
spec. chap. 6. 
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instruments for risk management. They are decisions (for example 
regarding GMOs, pharmaceuticals, plant protection products, 
biocidals and so on) which, owing to technical or scientific 
uncertainties, can endanger important public interests (for 
example human or animal health, the environment etc.). This 
justifies the recourse to highly complex administrative 
proceedings (involving many different national and European 
entities), who are able not only to generate consensus, but also to 
gain knowledge and guarantee rational decisions which can be 
adapted to the conditions of uncertainty 81 . All of this clearly 
requires the maximum level of trust amongst administrative 
bodies (especially technical ones) from the various legal systems. 
Even so, for some time now scholars have highlighted the 
limitations of this approach, for example by underlining that, if 
properly founded, also the lack of trust of an administration 
towards its counterpart in another Member State, must lead to 
legal consequences82. Moreover, as has been seen, the price of the 
deliberative horizontal governance (even more so for “risky” 
decisions) can be very high in terms of the complexity of decision-
making processes and can cause significant differences in the 
practices followed by the national administrations (which in turn 
can be transformed into protectionist behaviours) 83 . In other 
words the legal discipline of transnational acts in many cases has 
shown negative consequences, due to an excessive guarantee of 
institutional pluralism. 
These considerations explain the tendency towards 
centralisation in the fields mentioned above. This change is partly 
                                                          
81 On this matter there is a wide range of material. See for e.g. A. Barone, Il 
diritto del rischio (2006); W. Hoffmann-Riem, Risiko-und Innovationsrecht im 
Verbund, in Die Verwaltung, 140 ff. (2005); A. Scherzberg, Risikosteuerung durch 
Verwaltungsrecht: Ermöglichung oder Begrenzung von Innovationen?, in 
Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, 214 ff. (2004); 
Risk Regulation in the European Union: Between Enlargement and 
Internationalization, G. Majone (Ed), EUI (2003). 
82 E.g. E. Schmidt-Aßmann, Perspektiven der Europäisierung des Verwaltungsrechts, 
in P. Axter, B. Grzeszick, W. Kahl, U. Mager, E. Reimer (Eds) Das 
Verwaltungsrecht in der Konsoliedierungsphase, Die Verwaltung, Beiheft 10, 263 ff., 
spec. 272 ff. (2010). 
83 See for e.g. F. Bignami, The Challenge of Cooperative Regulatory Relations after 
Enlargement, in G. Bermann, K. Pistor (Eds) Law and Governance in an Enlarged 
European Union, 104 (2004). 
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linked to the recent crisis and to the different administration 
abilities of Member States in the field of finance84. It also stems 
more generally in part from the need to simplify certain 
authorisation procedures85. In any case this offers the advantage of 
unifying the decision-making moment, with significant benefits 
for example in terms of the protection of rights and of the clearer 
identification of the responsibility for individual decisions86. But 
above all centralisation allows for the optimisation of the State’s 
administrative resources87. For example the new rules on banking 
supervision and the authorisation of biocidals give fundamental 
preparatory tasks back to the national authorities. In essence, 
centralisation, despite simplifying the decisional process, is itself 
founded on complex collaboration techniques with the Member 
States and hence allows the interests and characteristics of each 
individual national context to emerge; all of which, however, 
under the control (but not necessarily under the hierarchy) of the 
EU authorities. It could thus be seen as a form of soften 
centralisation. Administrative pluralism has therefore not failed 
(nor could it fail); with respect to the principles of subsidiarity and 
effectiveness (Art. 298 TFEU)88, it has been streamlined, without 
being deprived of the instruments that guarantee deliberative 
forms of decision (and conflict resolution): suffice to think of the 
role that the comitology committees (or analogous bodies) play in 
                                                          
84 E.g. E. Chiti, In the Aftermath of the Crisis – The EU Administrative System 
Between Impediments and Momentum, in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies, 311 ff. (2015). 
85 See e.g. the Commission Staff Document Impact Assessment, Accompanying 
the documents Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the European Union Agency for Railways and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 881/2004, SWD(2013) 8 final ,of the 1 January 2013, spec. par. 3. See 
also the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on novel foods COM/2013/0894 final - 2013/0435 (COD), in particular 
par. 2, 3, and 6. 
86 E.g. B. Marchetti, Il sistema integrato di tutela, in L’amministrazione europea e le 
sue regole, cit. at 37, 209 ff.; E. Schmidt-Aßmann, Verwltugskooperation, cit. at 15, 
296. 
87 E.g. P. Maduro, We the Court, cit. at 1, spec. 111 ff. 
88 Stating that “the centralisation of decision-making can be due to the fact that 
the Member State alone is not able in a sufficient or effective way to carry out its 
administrative tasks”, G. Sydow, Verwaltungskooperation, cit. at 12, 47 (our 
translation). 
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these decision-making processes89.  
Along these lines, the fact should not be overlooked that the 
centralisation in the Commission (or other EU institutions or 
bodies) of authorisation competences is considered by the Court of 
Justice one of the instruments that can ensure the orderly 
functioning of the internal market where there is a risk of differing 
behaviours between the Member States (Art. 95 TCE and now 
Art.114 TFEU) 90; an objective that leaves the EU legislator a wide 
margin of choice91. 
The process towards giving more weight to national interests 
is a more complex issue. Above all given that the phenomenon 
described above depends on the characteristics of each sector, it is 
impossible to formulate general remarks on this point. However, 
it can be observed that in the case of driving licences the problem 
which led to the reduction in the scope of the inter-administrative 
tie, has an essentially procedural nature. In fact in future it cannot 
be excluded that a more sophisticated system of administrative 
cooperation (for example also through information technology) 
could contribute to overcoming many of the problems 
encountered92. On the other hand, especially for GMO products, 
there are political problems respect to which no general agreement 
has been found between the Member States and the EU 
institutions93. This has led the EU Legislator (on the initiative of 
the Commission) to change the balance in the sectorial unions, 
giving the Member States the possibility to be excluded, in full 
autonomy, from the effects of the authorisation94. 
                                                          
89 On this issue, see for all C. Joerges, J, Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining 
to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, in Eur. 
L.J., 273 ff. (1997). 
90 In jurisprudence, recently Court of Justice, C-270/12 of 22 January 2014, 
United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, C:2014:18, par. 110; in doctrine, in 
general M. Möstl, Preconditions, cit., 415 f. 
91  E.g. Court of Justice, C-66/04 of 6 December 2005, United Kingdom v 
Parliament and Council, C:2005:743, par. 45 f. 
92 For arguments on this area, see Court of Justice C-419/10 of 26 April 2012, 
Hofmann, C:2012:240, par. 82. 
93 See the Commission report on the proposal to modify regulation (CE) no. 
1829/2003 regarding the possibility of the Member States to limit or prohibit in 
their territory the use of foodstuff or animal feed which has been genetically 
modified COM(2015) 177 final. 
94  Nevertheless in October 2015 the European Parliament, contrary to this 
tendency towards re-nationalisation, rejected the proposal of the Commission 
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6. Final remarks 
What has been said so far does not mean that the project for 
the “horizontal governance” of the single market is definitively 
waning. It suggests rather that we need to take note of the 
practical problems that this conceptual and institutional approach 
has produced and to reflect on possible corrective measures. 
Without claiming to identify binding rules on this issue, the 
legislation mentioned above (and the rulings of the Court of 
Justice) give some interesting clues about a possible rationalisation 
of the legal discipline of some common market authorisation 
procedures. 
First, we need to move away from forms of “procedural 
optimism” (or better “procedural ingenuity”), meaning the idea 
that a well-structured administrative procedure can in all cases 
contribute to overcoming all forms of institutional dissent, 
including political dissent. The new legal discipline of the GMOs 
represents a perfect example of this.  
Secondly, it seems reasonable and useful to give EU bodies 
the competence to issue authorisations when:  
a) these can affect the entire EU market and 
b) they concern “(…) fields which are characterised by 
complex technical features”95 . In this case the centralisation of 
administrative powers would conform to the principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity. 
As a result, it would be better to resort to complex national 
decision-making - such as joint decisions or some form of 
authorisation subject to recognition - only when dealing with 
relations between two or three countries (as happens now for the 
cross-border transport of waste). Practice has shown that in other 
cases, this model can easily be transformed into a dissipation of 
administrative (and private) resources. For the same reasons, 
national authorisations with automatic transnational effects 
should concern simple and non-discretionary cases, as otherwise 
problems of market fragmentation (due to dishomogeneity in the 
execution phase) could arise. 
Obviously, if such indications were taken on board in future 
                                                                                                                                              
to extend the limitation mechanism already identified for the GMO cultures 
also to GMO foods and animal feed: see the European Parliament legislative 
resolution of 28 October 2015 , P8_TA(2015)0379 
95 See again Court of Justice C-66/04, par. 45. 
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by the EU legislator, a substantial strengthening of executive 
activity at European level would follow. However, this would 
require a major adjustment effort both in the legislation and in the 
behaviour of European bodies, above all to avoid excessively 
technocratic forms of decision-making96 and, more generally, to 
guarantee a respectful relationship with the networks of national 
authorities who continue to represent an essential factor for the 
legitimacy of the EU administration. Moreover, it would be 
important for the rules which call for the centralization to be 
structured in multi-polar form, to allow (and to force) the 
European administration to take full responsibility for the 
consequences of its decisions on the internal social dynamics of 
Member States. 
If this were to happen the process of centralisation that is 
currently taking place could bring significant benefits in the 
future. 
                                                          
96 On this issue see e.g. M. Weimar, Risk Regulation and Deliberation, cit. at 70. 
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Abstract 
The Schengen System is currently going through a radical 
shift. As we observe its relative failure, the inadequacy of our 
models (especially legal) as well as the possibility of an area 
composed by States without internal borders, have to be put in 
question. The paper argues that if ever the borders controls were 
to be definitely reintroduced, that would not mean that Schengen 
would completely disappear. 
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1. Introduction 
In may 2016, in the French Conseil d’Etat, in a conference 
about the European legal melting pot concerning foreign national 
law, professor Cassese underlined how the three constitutive 
elements of the State (territory, population, sovereignty) are 
currently going through a radical shift1. The Schengen System 
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Public Law – Berlin, June 17th-19th, 2016. 
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perfectly illustrates these shifts. As we observe its relative failure, 
the inadequacy of our models (especially legal) as well as the 
possibility of an area composed by States without internal 
borders, have to be put in question.  
Implementing the Schengen agreement of the 14th June 1985 
and 1990 convention2 set a particularly ambitious target, aiming to 
create a European area without internal borders for individuals3. 
It does not merely ensure E.U nationals, now European Citizens, 
the right to enter and stay in the territory of another member state. 
This was the object of the free movement of persons provided by 
the Treaty of Rome. Even if it took a few decades4, it was put into 
effect within that framework –with a few limits that will be 
addressed later. With Schengen, they will exercise this right 
without any formality, that is to say border control. But to reach 
such a target, not only the applicable rules regarding the 
movement of EU citizens have to be defined : it is also necessary 
to agree on the applicable rules for foreigners. This latter issue is 
relevant as entering one of the Schengen area territories allows 
entry to any other Member State’s territory. The movement of 
Europeans, free of any control, triggers an increase of cross-
country legal issues and consequently enhances the need for 
harmonisation.  
Clearly, such an agenda is deeply destructive for the three 
constitutive elements of the State. For the Territory it is destructive, 
                                                                                                                       
1 http://www.conseil-etat.fr/Actualites/Le-Conseil-d-Etat-vous-ouvre-ses-
portes/Les-colloques-en-videos/Le-creuset-normatif-europeen-l-exemple-du-
droit-des-etrangers 
2 OJEC, n° L 239, 22 Sept. 2000 
3 Even if it is one the European Community’s goal since the Single Act (see art. 7 
A), it was necessary to make a detour with an international agreement beside 
the European community because of the opposition of some member States (see 
J. C. Gautron, Droit et politique: le cas de Schengen, in E. Bort, R. Keat (eds.), The 
Boundaries of Understanding. Essays in Honour of Malcom Anderson, 155 (1999) 
However, since the incorporation of Schengen in the Community framework 
with the treaty of Amsterdam, the goal and the means to achieve it belong to 
the same legal order. 
4 One can assume that the main principles of the free movement of persons as it 
was conceived in the treaty of Rome was globally achieved with the three 
directives of 1990 about the free movement of the inactive (directives 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC), even if the implementation of 
those principles is still very discussed (EUCJ, 11 November 2014, Elisabeta 
Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, Case C‑333/13). 
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as what physically defines its limits partly disappears. This occurs 
as it no longer appears as a valid element to judge the territorial 
validity of administrative acts, particularly for foreigners. It is also 
destructive for the Sovereignty, since the State transfers at least part 
of its competency in order to unilaterally state who can or cannot  
enter its territory. Lastly, it is destructive for the People, since the 
State is no longer competent to define who foreigners are and 
what rights they are entitled to. 
In light of the above challenges, the success of Schengen 
might be surprising. No matter how tedious the beginnings were 
(with 5 years to negotiate the convention, 5 more on the 
implementation of technical elements such as Schengen 
Information System and 2-3 years of full-scale tests), the Member 
States managed to set up a space without internal borders -at least 
seemingly, making the Schengen Area one of the greatest 
achievements of the EU. 
The discrepancy between todays situation is therefore 
striking. Recently, Austria, Germany, France, Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden notified the European Commission about their 
reintroduction of borders controls 5 . France claimed the 
reintroduction was linked to the UEFA European Champions and 
the Tour de France. And then because of the emergency state as 
introduced further to the Nice attack. However, the risk of 
massive arrivals of refugees is the main cause of the 
reintroduction of border controls. The countries concerned with 
the reintroduction got in May the authorization to extend it until 
the end of the year 6 . It is slowly drifting from a temporary 
situation to a permanent one. 
                                                 
5 Which is possible pursuant article 23 of the Schengen Borders code (regulation 
n° 562/2006) but for a short period (30 days) that may be prolonged with a 
special procedure. See Commission opinion of 23.10.2015 on the necessity and 
proportionality of the controls at internal borders reintroduced by Germany 
and Austria pursuant to Article 24(4) of regulation n° 562/2006, C (2015) 7100 
final. 
6 Council Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation for temporary 
internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall 
functioning of the Schengen area at risk, 12 may 2016 and the full list available 
on the European commission website (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-
border-control/index_en.htm). 
GAUTIER - THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SCHENGEN AGREEMENT 
118 
 
Reintroduction of border controls comes alongside direct 
and indirect reconsiderations of the system itself by the States 
Members, as well as proposals aiming to «save» the system – but 
not without radical modifications (such as Netherlands’ idea to 
create a «mini Schengen» with fewer states). Even the 
Commission’s communication «Back to Schengen - a Roadmap»7 
issued last March does not give a very hopeful impression, 
admitting that the reintroduction of borders controls was 
necessary to face systemic failures, notably Greek ones. It is not 
the first time that the Schengen system has been strongly criticized 
and put into question, but this time might be the last. 
In view of the unique situation Europe is facing today, with 
what we refer to as the “migrant crisis”, one could say that the 
Schengen system is crumbling down under the effect of difficult 
circumstances. 
However, it seems to me that Schengen has been weakened 
by structural factors as well as the current inability to create a 
space composed by States, but without internal borders. This 
systemic weakness is twofold. On the one hand, the States were 
reluctant to the idea of being deprived from any attributes of 
sovereignty, which triggered an incomplete transfer of 
competency. Schengen seems condemned to be a patchy system. 
On the other hand, the functioning of the system was inspired by 
the free movement of goods, which turned out to be inadequate 
when it came to the free movement of people. New legal 
instruments need to be invented. 
 
 
2. Incomplete transfers of powers 
Schengen’s main agenda, setting up an area without 
internal border, was never fully accepted by the Member States. I 
am not referring here to the States that refused the principle as a 
whole and thus were granted opt-outs such as United Kingdom 
and Ireland (even if, in fact, the two countries take part in some of 
the repressive actions of Schengen8). For all the other members of 
                                                 
7  COM(2016) 120 final, 4.3.2016. The title itself implies that we are not in 
Schengen anymore... 
8 According to article 4 of the Protocol n° 21 on the position of the United 
Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, 
“The United Kingdom or Ireland may at any time after the adoption of a 
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the Schengen area (that is to say EU Member States, Norway and 
Iceland), transfers of power have been left incomplete. This exists 
because parts of the prerogative remained in the hands of States. 
Alongside this, the powers that were actually transferred are still 
under the influence of the national governments.  
 
2.1. Powers that were not transferred. 
Schengen was never an area within which foreigner-related 
issues were tackled together. The transfer of power took place 
only regarding the entrance and short-term stay of aliens (i.e. 
external borders control and visas policy)9. Concerning long-term 
legal immigration, common legal dispositions are scarce and 
deficient. The directive concerning the status of third-country 
national who are long-term residents10 or the directive on the right 
to family reunification 11  are, at least for now, much more a 
juxtaposition of national legal provisions than a downright 
alignment.  
It is quite easy to explain. Despite a relative consensus 
between the States on a very restrictive policy regarding entrance 
to the territory, there is no such unity when it comes to reliance on 
immigration and the fate of all foreigners that are legally resident. 
                                                                                                                       
measure by the Council pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union notify its intention to the Council and to the 
Commission that it wishes to accept that measure”. In pursuant to these 
provisions, the United Kingdom operates for example the SIS within the context 
of law enforcement cooperation, and both the United Kingdom and Ireland are 
bind by Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual 
recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals (OJEU, n° L 
149, 2.6.2001). 
9 In those areas, the legal framework is however impressive, especially with the 
Schengen Borders Code (Regulation (EC) N° 562/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community 
Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, modified 
several time since, consolidated version of March 2016 : OJ L 77, 23.3.2016), the 
common list of countries whose citizens must have a visa when crossing the 
external borders and a list of countries whose citizens are exempt from that 
requirement and the Visas Code (Regulation (EC) n. 810/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009, OJ L 243, 15.9.2009 ; amended the 
last time with Regulation (EU) No 610/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2013, OJ L 182, 29.6.2013). 
10 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003, OJEU L16, 23.1.2004. 
11 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003, OJEU L 251 , 03.10.2003 
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The demographics of the European states, their level of 
attractiveness for foreigners, their need for workforce as well as 
the public opinion within their borders are too contrasting to 
envision a real common immigration policy beyond a few 
dispositions about immigration of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly qualified employment12.  
This distortion between an almost complete alignment of 
short-term entry policies and a state-owned competence over 
long-term residence cannot work if there is no common agenda 
between the States, that is zero immigration. Any deviation from 
this -inexplicit- target will lead to tensions and further 
reconsideration of the idea of a space without internal borders. 
This is how the regularisation policies implemented by Italy and 
Spain (even though they would not have translated into a wave of 
immigrants, since their resident permit was solely valid in these 
two countries)13  lead to a temporary reintroduction of borders 
control in France. Likewise, Germanys’ unilateral announcement 
to welcome Syrian refugees led to deadlock in the European arena. 
Incomplete transfer of competency regarding migratory 
matters is a first factor of weakness. A second one is the way those 
powers are exercised. 
 
2.2. Transferred competencies retained by Member States 
In order to set up a legal area that is unified, yet composed 
by separate states, a minimal centralization of the decision-taking 
process seems necessary. The monitoring of its proper 
implementation should complement this. Within the EU, two 
institutions build a solid foundation for centralization. Firstly, the 
European Commission, ‘Guardian of the treaties’ and initiator of 
the legal process. Secondly, the European Court of Justice, for the 
benefit of which Member States have waived to dispense justice 
on their own behalf. It is known that states originally built 
Schengen outside of the EU, not only because of the oppositions of 
some of the co-members, but also to avoid the usual constraints of 
the normal functioning of the Union. Also known is the fact that 
                                                 
12 Council directive /50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the “blue card”, OJEU L 155 
18.6.2009 
13 See H. Delzangles, Des voies à harmoniser? Les politiques de régularisation, in C. 
Gauthier, M. Gautier (eds.), L’immigration légale: aspects de droits européens, 68 
(2011). 
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the integration into the European Union happened gradually 
through the ‘third pillar’ channel. The uptake of the ‘normal’ 
institutional framework took place at the expense of a new kind of 
opt-out, invented for Denmark (It belongs to the Schengen area 
but the legal dispositions within the system are considered as 
norms of international law - which the country has to ratify and 
can unilaterally oppose).  
Today, Schengen is no longer different from an ordinary 
EU policy. However, the core of the system still relies on both 
unilateral decisions by the states and collective mechanisms, 
instead of transfer of competency towards integrated authorities. 
Two examples illustrate how many competencies are retained by 
the Member States. 
The first one is the reintroduction of border controls. 
Although it seems logical that the creation of a common spaces 
would come along with safeguard clauses to allow the States to 
pull out when facing urgencies. This is how the Internal Market 
includes safeguard clauses in all its aspects. However, these ones 
have a very restrictive definitions and the Commission strictly 
regulates their application. One might say that the clauses 
concerning free movement of persons (as the right to move 
around freely for EU citizens) have been battered in the last years. 
The ‘public order’ clause has not soften since the mid-seventies 
and seems even less protective today when applied by the States 
to European citizens such as Romanians and Bulgarians 14 . 
Likewise, the « Social Security and Sufficient Resources » clause is 
at the heart of Great Britain’s concerns and debates around the 
Brexit. 
Within Schengen, the safeguard clause is in fact 
maintaining the States’ unilateral power, unknown in the Internal 
Market functioning. Despite its initial will, the Commission hasn’t 
managed to monitor the use of these clauses when the Schengen 
Border Code was adopted. This is true both in substance (the 
articles 23 to 30 could not be more lax) and in terms of process 
(only a notification to the Commission is needed). The latter can 
even be bypassed without any legal proceeding. For instance, 
when facing a massive flow of foreigners (especially from Tunisia) 
in April 2011, Italy decided to grant residence permits for 
                                                 
14 CE, 1er octobre 2014, Mme D., n° 365054, publié au Receuil. 
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humanitarian reasons. In response to that, France took the 
decision to reintroduce controls at its borders with Italy, since the 
flow of migrant was making its way towards the French 
territory15. In addition, it seems that the Tour de France is now a 
legitimate reason for reintroducing borders controls. Here it is, a 
space without internal borders but within which controls could be 
reinstated yearly, for France’s tour in July, Italy’s Giro in May or 
Spain’s vuelta in September. 
The second example shows how the transfer of competency 
was never fully accomplished and address the evaluation of the 
correct implementation by the Member States of the Schengen 
Agreements. The control of the EC acquis relies on the 
Commission and the ECJ, which can both be referred to by the 
Member States. The centralisation of control is, therefore, quite 
proficient. But Schengen is not like so. Monitoring for compliance 
of Applicant and Member States to the rules from the EC acquis is 
entrusted to teams composed by both Commission and Member 
States representatives16. Therefore, they all take an active role in 
mutual surveillance. In addition, reviewing the mechanism in 
2013 did not deeply modify it. Its principle is, besides, laid down 
in the article 70 of the treaty. The control shows that there is no 
environment of mutual trust. On the contrary, mutual suspicion 
cripples the usual legal tools of the Union law. 
 
 
3. Inadequate legal tools?  
Beyond the States’ reluctances and admitting that a further 
transfer of the necessary competencies is possible, there is still an 
obstacle to be overcame: find the adequate legal tools to manage a 
space without internal borders for people. 
 
 
                                                 
15  See M.-L. Basilien-Gainche, La remise en cause des accords de Schengen, 
http://ceriscope.sciences-po.fr/content/part2/la-remise-en-cause-des-accords-
de-schengen. 
16  Council regulation (EU) n° 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an 
evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen 
acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 
1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of 
Schengen, OJEU L 295 6.11.2013. 
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3.1. A precedent: free movement of goods. 
At first glance, it seems like we have the know-how. In fact, 
there is such an area without internal borders when it comes to 
free flow of goods, an area completed in 1992. This space legally 
relies on one principal : mutual recognition. It gave birth to what 
the German Doctrine calls transnational administrative actions. Pr 
Schmidt-Aβman defines it as so :«based on a ‘uniform law’ (a 
Community Regulation, a national legislation implementing a 
directive or a directly applicable directive) and enacted par a 
national authority, it has binding legal effects determined by this 
uniform law, in every member states, without the need of an act of 
recognition»17. The transnational administrative act brings to light 
a process de-territorialization in law. It disrupts the functioning of 
government systems by redefining the territorial scope of what 
epitomizes the State’s sovereignty: unilateral administrative acts. 
Concerning the free movement of goods, this unilateral act 
is the basic unit of the construction of the Community, since EJC’s 
«Cassis de Dijon» ruling. It displaced the need for harmonisation 
by the existence of mutual trust, which made transnational 
administrative acts legally and politically acceptable18. 
Even if it does not apply solely in the EU, the combination 
of mutual recognition / transnational administrative acts finds its 
best expression in Europe, where it effectively filled the void left 
by no overhanging federal construction. Logically, the 
construction of the Schengen area relied on the same ways and 
means. 
 
3.2. Managing people : Success and impasses 
At first sight, Schengen illustrates the success of the 
instruments just described. It is, in fact, based on the mutual 
recognition principle. It also relies on legal acts adopted by a 
Member State, with legal effects in other States, based on an 
authorization given by the EU law. This is how short-term visas 
(or Schengen visas) delivered by each members states accounts for 
                                                 
17  E. Schmidt-Aβman, Les influences réciproques entre les droits administratifs 
nationaux et le droit administratif européen, n° spécial du 20 juin 1996, AJDA, 196 
(1996). 
18 See M. Gautier, Acte administratif transnational et droit communautaire, in J. B. 
Auby, J. Dutheil de la Rochère (eds.), Droit administratif européen, 1069-1083 
(2007). 
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a permission to enter the territory of all the others. They are 
delivered through common process and conditions. As for long-
term visa (for which the issuance process has not been 
standardized), they account for short-time visa in other Member 
States territories 19 . They are a perfect example of mutual 
recognition. Likewise, when a government decides to register an 
undesirable alien in the SIS, the decisions binds on all the other 
Member States, which are then bound to deny them a visa and 
entry into the national territory 20 . It is, therefore, a truly 
transnational act.  
In some respects, the system Schengen generates an 
unconventional kind of transnational act, one where the execution 
itself is transnational. In his attempt to classify transnational acts, 
Prof. Mattias Ruffert underlined the right of hot pursuit provided 
by the Schengen convention21. Another example would be the 
possibility to organise joint flights in order to keep away 
undesirable aliens. Set up by one of the States, it enforces the 
others’ removal orders22.  
Nonetheless, these undeniable successes barely hide the 
obstacles that Immigration Law is facing when it comes to 
applying those principles. First of all, people are not merchandise: 
their behaviour after crossing the border is hard to anticipate. 
They will move again, study, work, get married, have children, 
maybe kill or steal. Then, unlike merchandise, people have basic 
rights. They cannot be handled like goods, which puts their 
management at stake. This is why the level of harmonisation 
needed to insure mutual trust, essential to the well functioning of 
the system, is immeasurably higher. Mutual trust is what asylum 
policy and European Arrest Warrant recently stumbled over : 
despite the adoption of several legislative measures harmonising 
common minimum standards for the treatment of asylum seekers, 
                                                 
19  Council Regulation (EC) n° 1091/2001 of 28 May 2001 on freedom of 
movement with a long-stay visa, OJEU L 150, 6.6.2001. 
20 According to the Schengen Border code and the Visa code (see note 9). 
21 M. Ruffert, The transnational administrative act, in O. Jansen, B. Schöndorf-
Haubold (eds.), The European composite administration, 277-306 (2011). 
22 Council Decision of 29 April 2004 on the organisation of joint flights for 
removals from the territory of two or more Member States, of third-country 
nationals who are subjects of individual removal orders, n° 2004/573/EC, 
OJEU L 261 du 6.8.2004. 
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the corner stone of the European asylum policy – the Dublin 
mechanism to determine the member State responsible for asylum 
application – is ruined by the M.S.S./ N.S. case law23; despite its 
huge success, the European Arrest Warrant is both undermined 
by the German federal constitutional court case law24 and, even if 
it is with less force, by the EUCJ case law itself25. 
This is why, undoubtedly, new mechanisms are to be 
invented. For instance, preliminary ruling between national courts 
could, in some cases, turn out useful. In fact, when controlling an 
act implementing an administrative act adopted by another 
Member State (such as a visa refusal based on a registration on the 
SIS made by another State), the National court cannot examine the 
latter, for sovereignty reasons26. And maybe, as the Commission 
seems to think, perhaps the Schengen Space will only exist 
alongside with integrated border police corps.   
In any case, Schengen does not seem to have the legal and 
political means to build anything better than a space with 
intermittent internal borders. 
 
 
4. Conclusion: What will be left from Schengen? 
If ever the borders controls were to be definitely 
reintroduced, would that mean that Schengen completely 
disappeared? No, as some components of the system will endure 
and will give the illusion of Schengen’s survival. It is particularly 
true for repressive instruments such as SIS or police and judicial 
cooperation. SIS has gradually become a data base with multiple 
                                                 
23  ECtHR, 21 January 2011, M.S.S. vs. Belgium and Greece, application n° 
30696/09 ; EUCJ, 21 December 2011, N. S., C-411/10 and C-493/10. 
24 See the press release of the Bundesverfassungsgericht about the 15 December 
case 
(https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/
EN/2016/bvg16-004.html) and A. Gaillet, Confiance et méfiance autour du mandat 
d’arrêt européen, AJDA, 1112 (2016). 
25 EUCJ, 5 avril 2016, Pál Aranyosi (C‑404/15) et Robert Căldăraru (C‑659/15 
PPU). 
26 CE, 9 juin 1999, F. (Rec. CE 1999, p. 170 ; AJDA 1999, p. 725-728, concl. B. 
Martin Laprade; LPA 4 janv. 2000, p. 13, note E. Aubin) ; CE, 23 mai 2003, n° 
237934, C. (AJDA 2003, p. 1576). See M. Gautier, Le dispositif Schengen, vecteur 
d'une nouvelle forme d'intégration juridictionnelle in Les dynamiques du droit 
européen en début de siècle. Études en l'honneur de J. Cl. Gautron, 69 (2004). 
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uses, where undesirable aliens, stolen objects, missing people and 
terrorists mingle - which is questionable from a civil liberties point 
of view but fits the expectations of the States their services. Beside, 
taking part in the SIS is now disconnected from the Schengen 
membership. This is how the United Kingdom gets to engage in 
SIS, as well as its evaluation and monitoring mechanism. At least, 
for the time being… 
Beyond all of this, a whole part of immigration law, 
especially regarding short-term visas, will endure, as long as the 
European States will keep a very restrictive view on their award. 
But then, one essential element would be missing. The abolition of 
borders, alone, justified a repressive cooperation such as this. 
However it does not, at this stage, appears as a fully realistic 
objective. 
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Abstract  
This article aims to discuss how and to what extent 
“digitalisation” is affecting and should affect the functioning of 
public administration in Italy. With the Public Administration 
Reorganisation Act of 2015, a quite comprehensive reform of the 
organisation of Italian public administration has been set in 
motion in which digitalisation is meant to be the main means to 
change the State. The article purports that terms such as ‘digital 
citizenship’ and ‘digital first’, upon which the reform hinges, 
should not be overestimated. In acknowledging digitalisation (and 
e-government) as an incremental process driven by the 
technological sophistication deployed, one should bear in mind 
that it is made of various dimensions such as information, 
transaction, political participation and different manners of 
interaction within PA and with citizens. Each of these present 
opportunities and risks and the concrete outcome depends both 
on the cultural and economic context in which information and 
communication technology is placed and political choices. The 
paper suggests that a normative model of the implementation of e-
government should be based on information and bureaucracy 
organisation rather than on the ambiguous conferment of 'digital 
rights'. 
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1. Introduction 
This article aims to discuss how and to what extent  
“digitalisation” is affecting and should affect the functioning of 
public administration in Italy, building on a research project 
whose outcomes will be published in one of a series of volumes 
revolving around the past and future of administrative law after 
150 years from the so called statutes of administrative unification 
of 1865 under the general coordination of the Department of Law 
of the University of Florence.1 
Two questions constitute the thread of the article. The first 
is whether we can still speak of a ‘digital administration’ as 
distinct from a traditional administration. We are undoubtedly 
going through a transitional era even though our daily experience 
teaches us that a great deal of Italian public administration keeps 
working according to the ‘dusty files’ culture celebrated by some 
                                                 
1  S. Civitarese Matteucci, L. Torchia, La tecnificazione della pubblica 
amministrazione (Technologisation of Public Administration), forthcoming 
(2017). Hereafter when referring to one of the papers collected in this book I will 
use the acronym TPA. 
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great XIX Century novelists. It is hardly deniable though that 
within a few years the ‘administrative transactions’ could be 
ordinarily digital and thus the ‘code of digital administration’ 
might become the ‘code of public administration’ tout court. With 
the Public Administration Reorganisation Act (of Parliament) n. 
124 of 2015, a quite comprehensive reform of the organisation of 
Italian public administration (PA) has been set in motion in which, 
according to the Italian Ministry for Public Administration 
Marianna Madia, «digitalisation is the means to change the State at 
long last and not simply one among many others. This is why it 
represents the heart of the reform»2. 
Secondly, we wonder whether and to what extent changing 
the means of communication within the public administration 
arena changes the substance of interactions which occur there. In a 
way this is the old issue of the relationship between form and 
substance, where the first now bears the semblance of a powerful 
technology. This is a question which especially besets public law 
scholars. Although it depends on the scope of the application of 
ITCs to public administration, it is not audacious to foresee the 
extreme scenario of the replacement of human decisions with 
computer decisions, which, thanks to the Internet, can store and 
elaborate a huge amount of information. In such a case we would 
have a ‘technical’ decision replacing a ‘political’ one. It is not clear, 
though, whether recent reforms by bringing forward digitalisation 
pave the way for automated decision-making too. 
The article is structured as follows. In the ensuing section 
some terminological and conceptual clarifications are offered, viz. 
the notions of “online public services” and e-government taken in 
an incremental perspective. I contend, namely, that within such a 
perspective the transactional dimension of e-government is to be 
conceived as the main goal to pursue as it is somehow more 
complete and desirable than the informative dimension only. The 
third section deals with the impact, both quantitative and 
qualitative, of e-government upon government and public 
administration, especially regarding the level of diffusion of e-
                                                 
2  See at http://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/pa-digitale/39379_marianna-
madia-il-digitale-cuore-della-riforma-pa-basta-indugi.htm (last visited 16 
March 2016). 
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government also in light of the “digital agenda” policy. The fourth 
section discusses the literature on the analysis and assessment of 
the practice and change brought about by ICTs in the activity of 
bureaucracies with an attempt to model the possible impacts upon 
different segments of such an activity. The fifth section sheds light 
on some analytical and conceptual aspects of the impact of the use 
of the ICTs on the structure and functioning of public 
administration, particularly by taking on open data, 
administrative procedure and participation, and the so called re-
engineering of bureaucratic processes, while the sixth section 
offers some final remarks. 
The point I shall make is that the introduction in the 
legislation of terms such as ‘digital citizenship’ and ‘digital first’ 
should not be overestimated. The idea of shifting the focus from 
policy to rights to change the inertia of e-government, which 
inspires the said reform, is little more than a good slogan. This 
choice belongs to the rhetoric of rights widespread in our 
contemporary public discourse which is particularly inadequate in 
this field. In describing e-government as an incremental process 
driven by the technological sophistication deployed, we should 
bear in mind that there are various dimensions of ICTs such as 
information, transaction, political participation and different 
manners of interaction within PA and with citizens. Each of these 
dimensions present opportunities and risks and the concrete 
outcome depends both on the cultural and economic context in 
which ICTs are placed and political choices. I purport that a 
normative model of the implementation of e-government should 
be based on information and bureaucracy organisation rather than 
on the ambiguous conferment of 'digital rights'. 
 
 
2. Conceptual and Terminological Premises. An 
Explicative-Normative Model for E-government 
First of all, we need to delimitate the phenomenon we want 
to enquire about, to which I will indifferently refer as ITCs or e-
government. It has evolved across the years, moving from the 
advent of the computer with the employment of simple software 
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to the design of complex informatics, to cloud computing.3 The 
phenomenon of e-government has a global nature. It concerns all 
the states and it has been the object of an ever growing attention 
by scholars of different social and political fields. Suffice it to think 
of the collection of cases analysed in the book ‘Comparative E-
government’ edited by Christopher Reddick (Springer, 2010) or of 
the several volumes (21) in the series Public Administration and 
Information Technology by the same Reddick for Springer.  
According to one widely acknowledged conceptual 
framework e-government can be described as a bi-dimensional 
phenomenon. 4  The first one regards the level of technological 
sophistication, ideally placed on the x-axis, the second the type of 
interaction between the recipients and the service, ideally placed 
on the y-axis (see fig. 1). 
 
 
 
Figura 1 from Hiller-Bélanger, 2001. 
                                                 
3  A. Osnaghi, ‘Pubblica amministrazione che si trasforma: “Cloud Computing”, 
federalismo, interoperabilità, Amministrare 59 (2013). 
4  J. Hiller, J, F. Bélanger, Privacy Strategies for Electronic Government, E-
Government Series Pricewaterhouse Coopers Endowment for the Business of 
Government (2001). 
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By service I mean here “online service”, expression which 
stands for the peculiar manner of interaction between providers 
and users whilst the actual content of such services includes any 
administrative task, namely – employing a traditional Italian 
doctrinal distinction – both ‘functions’ (PA prerogatives) and 
services in the strictest sense. A quite comprehensive definition of 
online service states it is «an activity or a series of activities, of a 
more or less intangible nature, which result in an exchange 
between a provider and a client where the subject of the 
transaction is an intangible good».5 
The level of sophistication can in turn be articulated in five 
stages: information, bi-directional communication, transaction, 
integration, and political participation.6 They are the first four that 
refer more closely to public administration for the latter 
prevalently concerns the issue sometimes evoked in terms of e-
democracy. It goes without saying, however, that e-democracy is 
significant to admin law as well. Article 9 of the Code of Digital 
Administration (CDA) establishes that administrative authorities 
should favour as much as possible any use of new technologies 
which is able to enhance citizens’ participation in the democratic 
process and facilitate the enjoyment of political and civil rights 
both individually and collectively. 
Some Italian literature in the 80s, embracing an optimistic 
view of the then dawning relationship between ICTs and 
democratic institutions, envisaged that the development of 
informatics would be the turning point for a change in the 
relationships between public institutions and citizens – within 
which admin law had to be adjusted as well – inspired to a full 
and authentic democratisation bolstered by the direct 
participation of people in government.7 At the beginning of the 
90s the advent of the Internet led a number of authors to consider 
it as the best solution to the old issue of the lack of quality and 
                                                 
5 C. Batini, Un’introduzione ai servizi di e-government, 23 Amministrare 38 (2013). 
6 One can find a similar classification in the Guidelines of 2011 regarding how to 
set up the institutional websites of any public administration issued pursuant to 
article 4 of the Directive n. 8/2009 of the Minister of la public administration 
and innovation. 
7 G. Berti, Diritto e Stato. Riflessioni sul cambiamento (1986). 
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quantity of representation that impairs liberal democracies.8  In 
such a climate several governmental programmes to boost e-
government assisted by conspicuous investments were 
implemented. 9  Such Panglossian views are nowadays far less 
popular as their auspices have been proven largely unattainable 
until now.10 Due to such failures, the present mainstream view, 
which can be named pragmatic, purports that technology has 
nothing particularly new to offer to democracy but reinforce the 
existing practices and political and social institutions. 11  Along 
with such conceptions a third coexists, which has been defined 
dystopian, where ICTs are viewed as a means of massive danger 
both to democracy and basic freedom up to their destruction.12 
Taking heed of such major concerns, the dominant pragmatic 
approach appears to be the most relevant if we focus on public 
administration. This is slippery terrain, however, because most of 
the times such an approach is all but neutral and in fact the rise of 
e-government has very often been associated with those positions 
that consider technology as an instrument of the new public 
management (NPM) ideology. For example to such ideology 
belongs the idea that ICTs might reduce negative externalities 
caused by the formalisation of administrative decisions into 
strictly codified procedures. We shall discuss this aspect 
throughout the paper, while now it is appropriate to turn to the 
sophistication issue. 
Among the other four levels of e-government 
sophistication, the information stage essentially concerns the 
                                                 
8 D.R. Johnson, D. Post, Law and Borders – the Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1367 (1996); B Santos (ed), Democratising Democracy: Beyond the Liberal 
Democratic Canon (2007). 
9 J. Morison, Online government and e-constitutionalism, 14 Pub. L. 15 (2003). 
10 B. Schafer, Democratic Revival or E-Sell Out? A Sceptic's Report on the State of E-
Governance in the UK Report to the XVIIth International Congress of 
Comparative Law, 9-11 July 2006; G. Longford, S. Patten, Democracy in the Age of 
the Internet, 56 U. New Brunswick L. J. 5 (2007). 
11 P. E. Agre, Real-Time Politics: The Internet and the Political Process, (2002) 18 The 
Information Society 311, 317; Longford and Patten (n 5) 9. 
12 B. Koops, Criteria for Normative Technology: The Acceptability of "Code as Law" in 
Light of Democratic and Constitutional Values in R Brownsword and K Yeung 
(eds) Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological 
Fixes (2008) 158. 
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creation of the institutional website pursuant to article 53 CDA, 
which establishes that institutional websites shall operate through 
a network which complies with principles of accessibility, 
enhanced usability, and availability and be disabled people 
friendly, complete and clear in information, inter-operational, 
reliable and easy to use. The second level, relating to bi-directional 
communication, consists of a non-fully complete form of 
interaction with the users because it does not include any online 
transaction. It contemplates an exchange of information between 
officials and users. It is possible that online forms have to be filled 
in, but the service is provided in an ordinary way. This is still a 
‘documentary’ stage, whilst transaction and integration are the 
levels of sophistication where the service is appropriately online 
and ICTs operate in a ‘meta-documentary’ way.13 In such cases 
one can speak of digital procedure in the specific meaning that the 
decision which shapes a particular legal relationship is operated 
through the website, namely by using data elaborating software 
which produces that decision. In many cases such transactions – 
for example the payment of a fine – do not seem to appear that 
different from what happens in e-commerce. In other cases, more 
complex administrative decisions are dealt with, such as permits 
or benefits. The difference between the transaction and integration 
stages regards the fact that in the latter a thorough transformation 
of back-office practices is pursued, so in a sense the stress is more 
on specific organisational tools. There is in the literature the idea 
that the integration stage would imply a proper shift from a 
bureaucratic-centred concept to a citizen-centred concept of public 
administration, where, that is to say, both the organisational and 
service dimensions would adapt according to the users’ needs.14  
Considering the other dimension of the phenomenon at 
hand – which looks at the recipients of e-government – a point 
stands out as regards the sophistication scale, which is whether 
the passage from the information stage to the transactional stage is 
to be considered a sort of progress towards the achievement of 
“true” e-government, as if, in other words, the higher the 
                                                 
13 M. D’angelosante TDA. 
14  A. Tat-Kei Ho, A., Reinventing Local Governments and the e-Government 
Initiative, 18 Pub. Admin. Rev. 434-44 (2002)  
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sophistication the fuller digital citizenship is. This seems to be the 
NPM approach, whose model is e-commerce and whose 
paramount value is efficiency. Such an approach may have 
influenced policy implemented by the EU commission in 
agreement with Member States between 1999 and 2006, which 
clearly show a trend to privilege the e-commerce/transaction side. 
In this period indeed one notes a sizeable increase in supply of 
online services, which reached 70% in 2007.15 However, this was 
not accompanied by an analogous rise in the employment of 
online services by the users. Viz. a clear asymmetry persists in 
Europe between supply and demand of e-government in favour of 
the former. The “Digital Agenda Targets Progress Report” (Digital 
Agenda Scoreboard) of June 2015 speaks about a slow increase in 
e-government. The use of e-government services, measured on the 
quantity of online forms submitted (only 25% of which is 
indicated as complete), has risen from 38% to 47% in five years. 
Such data constitute the average between remarkably 
differentiated situations in each Member State. As for Italy – 
which is among the countries at the bottom of the list (third last) – 
the figure is little more than 10% and it has not seen change across 
the five-year period. 
Those who simply do not have access to the Internet, a 
number, by the way, which is constantly dwindling, constitute a 
sub-cluster of people who do not benefit from online e-
government. The mentioned Digital Agenda Scoreboard refers to 
the Internet as a “success story” and in fact at the level of the 
Union the percentage of Internet users reaches 75%. As regards 
this point there are also considerable asymmetries between 
Member States and in fact in the majority of them around a third 
of the population do not access the Internet. This group includes 
disadvantaged people who are the most likely candidates to access 
social services aimed at fostering their social inclusion such as 
education, social assistance, job activation, etc. They are, 
moreover, those who are less likely to become ICT users, while to 
favour their access to social services an astute use of ITCs could 
                                                 
15 C. Codagnone, D. Osimo, Beyond i2010. E-Government current challenges and 
future scenarios, in P.G. Nixon, V.N. Koutrakou, R. Rawal, eds, Understanding E-
Government in Europe (2010) 39 fig. 3.1. 
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make a real difference in the good management of such services.16 
In other words, many of such non ICT users might never become 
e-government demanders. As has been noted a desirable policy 
would be to shift the objectives of digitalisation policies from 
«traditional efforts to help them use ICT to new approaches aimed 
at using ICT to help them».17 In brief, the idea that the focus of e-
government is to be seen in the transactional stage is not at all 
undisputed, as, on the contrary, one can sustain that the main 
value of digital administration is in information and that the 
transaction stage is neither inevitable nor fully desirable 
irrespective of contextual conditions.18 
It is undeniable that the moment of the decision on an 
administrative affair (transaction in the Hiller-Bélanger matrix) is 
the one which mainly attracts the curiosity of legal scholars. 
Suffice it to think of the various attempts to configure a species of 
“digital administrative act”.19 However, the effects of ICTs should 
be look into above all on the organisational dimension and how 
the latter adapt to or resist external inputs. As has been noted, the 
most crucial aspect resides in the difficulty of reconceptualising 
and actualising in terms of digital work how bureaucracies 
operates both internally and as a network of public 
administrations. 20  Hence the phenomenon of e-government 
should be further anatomised or simply more accurately analysed 
assuming a different explicative (partly normative) model from 
the Hiller-Bélanger matrix, centred on the functioning of public 
administration. I propose, thus, a mono-dimensional model in 
four stages, which combines sophistication and interaction 
according to different normative precepts (fig. 2). It considers 
mono and bidirectional information as the first dimension; 
transactions in the strictest sense, that is to say relating to those 
services supplied by PA which can be assimilated to e-commerce, 
                                                 
16 C. Codagnone, D. Osimo, Beyond i2010. E-Government current challenges and 
future scenarios, cit. at 15, 42-43. 
17 Ibidem, 43. 
18 P. Dunleavy, H. Margetts, New Public Management Is Dead – Long Live Digital-
Era Governance, 16 J. P. Admin. Res. Theory 467-494 (2006). 
19 I.M. Delgado TDA. 
20 G. Duni, Verso un’amministrazione integrata nei procedimenti amministrativi, 14 
Informatica e dir. 43-47 (2005). 
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out. The first regards the level of diffusion of e-government and 
therefore the success of digital agenda initiatives. The second, 
much more meaningfully, regards the analysis and evaluation of 
the practices which are brought about by the use of such 
technologies. In this section we deal with the first point, while the 
second will be addressed in the following section. There is a 
further aspect on which we will turn in section five which 
concerns the identification of the possible scenarios deducible 
from the legal rules which accompany the introduction of such 
technologies and that affect central notions of administrative law 
such as decision-making, procedure and participation. 
As to the first aspect, a sort of paradox lurks here. On the 
one hand, the pervasiveness of ICTs seems to exert its influence on 
the very structure of social and institutional models, as much so 
that it is familiar to refer to our historical time as the digital era. 
On the other hand, they are phenomena which require a specific 
governmental implementation, without which, that is to say, 
change barely takes place. In other words, one cannot say that 
politics is merely superseded by technology if choices, plans and 
investment are needed to make e-government become an ordinary 
practice and if such choices are not neutral towards the model of 
e-government one wishes to pursue. As we are going to see below, 
it seems that the employment of ICTs may enhance or emphasise 
the features of certain ideal-types or models of public 
administration but it does not constitute a model per se. It is 
somewhat evident, anyway, that such a digital era yields new 
asymmetries and disequilibrium. One of the so-called digital 
divides regards in fact the chasm between the traditional 
functioning of public administration – suffice it to mention the 
time issue – and new modalities of socio-economic interaction 
which develop thanks to the internet. 
Governments are expected to be able to detect and acquire 
remarkably complex and sophisticated operating systems and 
make them functional and – as the experience of some UE Member 
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States show – one should not take for granted that such an ability 
is just a function of the amount of resources invested.21 
It is in such a framework that “digital agenda” initiatives 
are to be located. At the level of the EU, the Digital Agenda for 
Europe, launched within the Europe 2020 strategy, has got 
broader scope than the digitalisation of PA, for it mainly regards 
economic growth and employment to be pursued in seven priority 
areas and 101 actions. Among the most prominent objectives there 
is the adoption of a new and stable regulatory framework for 
broadband, the creation of specific infrastructure for digital public 
services and the increase in digital skill. As mentioned before, the 
level of achievement of such goals by all Member States is yearly 
measured in the Digital Agenda Scoreboard where Italy is among 
the strugglers. The Italian Digital Agenda aims at filling this gap. 
Another figure, more comprehensive and refined than the 
Scoreboard, the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 
(http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/desi) provides more 
precise data regarding each country. This is a composite index, 
developed by the European Commission, with the purpose of 
assessing the growth of the Member States towards a digital 
economy, which considers a cluster of factors dealing with five 
dimensions: connectivity, human capital, Internet use, integration 
of digital technology, and digital public services. 
In the DESI report for 2015 Italy is ranked 25th within EU 
countries. Among the factors that determine such a result there is 
scarce connectivity, due to the little availability of fast Internet 
connections, paucity of digital skill and generally a limited use of 
the Internet. 31% of Italians have never used the Internet and the 
wariness towards online transaction is still widespread. Only 42% 
of habitual Internet users use online banking and only 31% trade 
online. All such factors bounce back on the development of e-
government and influence the dimension of online public services, 
which although closer to the EU average is however 
underdeveloped. The report pins down the lack of digital skill 
among bureaucrats as an explanation of this condition. 
                                                 
21 J. Keen, Integration at Any Price: The Case of the NHS National Programme for 
Information Technology, in H. Margetts, C.Hood (eds.) Paradoxes of modernization; 
unintended consequences of public policy reform, (2010) 138. 
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What the Italian CDA has promised for a decade, that is to 
say that central and local public administration shall rethink their 
organisation and operational way in light of new ICTs to «secure 
the availability, management, access, transmission, storage and 
fruition of information in digital modality» is far from being 
achieved. Another actual issue is that the CDA – which have 
already been amended many times – provides for the adoption of 
a sizeable number of measures of implementation through a 
variety of sources – such as regulations, ministerial decrees, 
guidelines, technical rules – most of which have not been issued 
yet.22 The delegated legislation, Act 26 August 2016, n. 179, passed 
by the government pursuant to article 1 of the Public 
Administration Reorganisation Act (of Parliament) n. 124 of 2015 
tries to face this problem by bestowing most of such a technical 
regulation upon the governmental Agency for Digital Italy.   
The same article 1 of the PA Reorganisation Act – 
pompously headed “digital citizenship” – aims at changing and 
integrating the CDA in order to further strengthen the centrality of 
digital administration. Particularly committing is the wording of 
article 1, par. b), which introduces the new principle “digital first”. 
Digital first means that by adopting digital technology on a large 
scale, administrative procedures and back-office practices have to 
be redefined and simplified to seek quick decision within certain 
time and transparency towards both citizens and corporations. It 
is uneasy to see, however, how the formulation of new principles 
– allegedly more convincing than the previous ones – can per se 
make the Italian Digital Agenda more effective.23 Article 3 of the 
CDA, in turn, provides citizens and corporations with a new right 
to the use of ICTs when they communicate with public 
administration. 24  Thereby such a right refers only to the 
                                                 
22 ‘Monitoraggio dell’attuazione dell’Agenda digitale italiana del Servizio Studi 
della Camera’, 20 March 2015, n. 159 
http://documenti.camera.it/Leg17/Dossier/Pdf/TR0270.Pdf.  
23 The main provisions concerning the Italian Digital Agenda can be found in 
the following law decrees: D.L. n. 83 del 2012 (c.d. “Crescita”); D.L. n. 179 del 
2012 (c.d. “Crescita 2.0”); D.L. 69 del 2013 (c.d. “del Fare”); D.L. n. 90 del 2014 
(“Semplificazione e trasparenza amministrativa ed efficienza degli uffici 
giudiziari”); D.L. n. 133 del 2014 (c.d. “Sblocca Italia”). 
24 This discipline resembles the Spanish’s one as set up by the Act of Parliament 
n. 11 of 2007, where a right to communicate with PA through electronic means 
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information level. We wonder whether article 1.1 of the PA 
Reorganisation Act, which delegates the government to reform 
ample sectors of the organisation of public administration, by 
broadening the scope of this right to enable citizens and 
corporations to have access to all data, documents and services 
now refers to the transactional stage as well. The report which 
accompanies the cited act of delegated legislation emphasises that 
the principle which inspires the reform is to put digital rights first 
so that – one can argue – processes of digitalisation of PA should 
be treated as the object of an obligation to fulfil them. This 
delegated legislation amends the CDA by establishing that PA 
makes its services (so apparently all its activity) digitally available 
and providing for a 'public class action' in case an administrative 
authority does not comply with such "obligations". The idea of 
broadening the scope of digitalisation to any "service" coupled 
with attributing a right to have PA to comply with such an 
organisational requirement may seem the best way of making sure 
that e-government becomes at last ordinarily practised. 
There are, however, a number of downsizes to this scheme. 
Firstly, one has to wonder whether and to what extent we can 
actually speak of a right-obligation relationship, as such judicially 
enforceable. The provision of a class action is far from decisive to 
this regard, as in Italian law it is a tool – available either to any 
consumers or their associations – conceived as a way to assess that 
either public services comply with the obligations set out in the 
consumer charters and qualitative and economic standards or that 
providers do not fail to adopt such charters or other framework 
regulations. Administrative courts are just allowed to issue 
recommendations to make amends of the mismanagement of the 
service if that is the case and provided that the action 
recommended does not negatively affect public finance. It is 
extremely difficult to fathom how such a pattern can be adapted to 
the sort of ‘obligations’ at hand. Anyway it is even more difficult 
to reconcile this action with the protection of specific individual 
digital rights and it is implausible that administrative courts 
would interpret these 'rights' as enabling individuals either to 
                                                                                                                       
has been established. See I.M. Delgado, Las notificationes electronicas en el 
procedimiento administrativo (2009) 63. 
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challenge PA to perform digitally or to impugn decisions not 
digitally processed/made as procedurally biased. An actual 
possibility is that the class action will become concretely available 
if and when the above mentioned governmental Agency issues 
technical standards and quality levels for PA to comply with. This 
will occur, though, when digitalisation has already gone well 
forward. 
Secondly, the same alleged extension of the right from the 
communication to transaction stage makes the notion of digital 
rights as proper rights even more implausible. It is then more 
plausible as well as desirable to interpret the reference to “rights” 
in a moral sense, linked in fact to citizenship, hence as the content 
of a principled political activation. We should not be too 
preoccupied with this rhetorical resort to the language of rights – 
which we are well used to in recent times – in so far as it is not 
taken in the wrong way. It can become harmful in fact if one 
wants to interpret it as empowering the courts to manage the 
policy behind such 'rights'. To be fair the same idea of a right to an 
indeterminate digitalisation of administrative activity is 
disputable for the reasons we have expounded above and others 
we are going to add in the next two sections. 
Leaving rights aside, it is more likely that the Italian 
struggle with digital agenda has to do with cultural and 
technological structural problems, which one should look into and 
cope with before investing on programmes which risk remaining 
manifestos. 25  Administrative and administrative law cultures 
represent in turn but a fraction of such structural problems. The 
paramount question regards, thus, how the use of ICTs interact 
with practices and modes of functioning of PA. In the ensuing 
section we shall discuss two examples, drawn from the literature, 
which seem representative of generalizable features. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Harshly critical remarks are made by G. De Michelis, Agenda digitale: di cosa si 
sta parlando?, Amministrare 69 (2013). 
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4. The Problem of Measuring the Impact of ICT upon 
Public Administration 
In my view two questions particularly stand out. The first is 
how to gauge the qualitative impact of ICTs on the functioning of 
PA, where by qualitative I mean not only efficiency gain – for 
example a reduction in procedural times and financial savings – 
but also the specific interaction between procedural patterns, 
decision-making, interaction with external subjects, etc. The 
second point, rather dependent on the first, revolves around 
whether, faced with either different models of public 
administration or different inputs coming from politics, ICTs 
determine a different impact and/or their qualitative features 
change. 
As to the first question the problem is what indicators to 
adopt to measure the impact. The following four indicators – 
drawn from a study which builds on an extensive survey of the 
literature – seem sufficiently explicative of the effects of ICTs on 
the functioning of PA: capabilities, interactions, orientations, and 
value distribution.26 
Impact in terms of capability concerns the effects of e-
government on how a certain administrative unit relates with its 
work environment, especially as regards quality of information 
and change in efficacy and efficiency of services. To a certain 
extent this first indicator is reconcilable with the informative 
dimension of e-government which we referred to in section 2 
above. The factors which are most relevant are the possibility of 
accessing data and the quality of the latter in terms of 
completeness and reliability. The impact on other factors traceable 
to ‘capability’, such as enhancement of productivity, reduction in 
costs, and improvement in programming activities is, however, 
less clear, scarcely perceptible or merely not that studied. By 
concentrating on interaction between administrative units one 
wants to look into how e-government exerts influence on the 
patterns of power exercise and control as well as communication, 
coordination and cooperation between public offices and private 
players. Orientations concern cognitive and evaluative 
                                                 
26  K.N. Andersen, H. Z. Henriksen, R. Medaglia, J. N. Danziger, M. K. 
Sannarnes, M. Enemærke, Fads and Facts of E-Government: A Review of Impacts of 
E- government (2003–2009), 33 Int’l J. Pub. Admin. 564-579 (2010). 
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considerations, for example whether concerns of a quantitative 
type have gained momentum in decision-making processes to the 
detriment of qualitative factors; whether there is a different way of 
structuring administrative problems; whether decision-makers 
sense that their discretionary power has been altered by e-
government. By value distribution, finally, possible change 
dealing with general goals sought out by public administration is 
meant, especially as regards rights and the individuals’ wealth, 
safety, health, freedom, etc. 
The analysis demonstrates that the greater and generally 
positive impact of ICTs is visible especially as regards capability 
relating to access and quality of information. Appreciable and 
positive is also the impact of the “interactions” indicator, even 
though it is unclear whether it is just the unidirectional process of 
information dissemination or an actual change of procedures 
involving the public to boost a better disposition of citizens 
towards PA. The impact of e-government in terms of value 
distribution (11%) and orientations (3%) is, however, rather 
scarce.27 Although this research was done more than five years 
ago, it is sensible to assume that it still provides a reliable picture 
of the impact of e-government. As to the limited impact of value 
distribution and orientations it might simply be the consequence 
of the greater sophistication necessary to apply ICTs to 
substantive aspects of administrative tasks as well as the difficulty 
in assessing them empirically. Be that as it may, in the study at 
hand the impact of ICTs upon the modalities of decision-making is 
praised by quoting a research carried out on four Swedish local 
authorities where the informatics applied to political components 
of administrative decisions has brought about more formalised 
decisional procedures, thereby simpler to hold to account as 
well.28 It goes without saying that before such data any evaluation 
remains debatable, because one can object, say, that such a 
formalisation inevitably impoverishes decision-making process 
(see below section 5). 
                                                 
27 K.N. Andersen and al., Fads and Facts of E-Government: A Review of Impacts of 
E- government. cit. at 26, 574-5. 
28  Å Grönlund, Emerging electronic infrastructures: Exploring democratic 
components, 21 Soc. Sci. Computer Rev. 55-72 (2003). 
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Before coming back later to such a discussion, what we can 
stress here is that the unremarkable impact of ICTs on how PA 
evaluates policy, interests, etc. reflects overarching aspects of their 
functioning which are barely changeable in the short term, in Italy 
least of all. This leads to the second question, relating to the 
influence of ICTs on the models of public administration on which 
they are grafted. A review carried out through Parliament, central 
government, and prime minister websites of 19 OECD countries, 
concerning the so called financial accountability – that it to say the 
level of reliability of information on the condition of public finance 
– shows that the differences detected between such countries do 
not depend on different implementation of ICTs. It depends, 
instead, on the “style” of public administration and legal 
requirements regarding the setting up and management of 
balance sheets and budget adopted in each legal system.29 In other 
words, this study confirms that a strong instrumentality of ICTs to 
other institutional aspects exists. Regarding this point, ICTs seem 
to work as factors of amplification and greater effectiveness of 
dynamics which should be otherwise ruled. Digitalisation tends to 
reflect and reinforce political and administrative models already 
well in place, particularly one of the four as described by the 
OECD, the Anglo-American, the German, the Southern European 
and the Scandinavian. The Internet constitutes a help to change 
towards a greater accountability of public institutions, but it is not 
an especially efficacious means of alteration of the distinctive 
features of any different models, such as citizen participation, 
public debate or other factors of enhancement of deliberative 
democracy in decision-making. The picture emerging from the 
research mentioned at the beginning of this article upholds such 
outcomes. 
 
 
5. The Effects of Digitalisation on the Functioning of 
Public Administration 
Taking heed of what we have expounded so far regarding 
the fundamental characteristics and impact of e-government on 
                                                 
29 V. Pina, L. Torres, B. Acerete, Are ICTs promoting government accountability? A 
comparative analysis of e-governance developments in 19 OECD countries, 18 Critical 
Persp. Accot. (2007) 583–602. 
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PA, we can now turn to discuss three more specific questions 
emerging from our research: open data, administrative procedure 
and participation, and the so called re-engineering of bureaucratic 
work. 
 
5.1. Open Data  
The “informative dimension/impact as capability” pair 
constitutes the most momentous aspect of our topic because it is 
likely to exert major consequences on the substance of 
administrative law in the short term. It particularly regards the 
access to information that PA possesses both by the individual 
and the public (so called civic access). This is part of the broader 
phenomenon – not entirely traceable to the question of accessing 
PA’s files – of the management of a massive amount of data 
boosted by the Internet, which has become the object of a heated 
debate. In the Italian legal system one can make out legal grounds 
for a sort of presumption that all information produced or 
possessed by PA is publicly significant and must be managed with 
the appropriate technique and organisation. From this point of 
view technology is often considered a source of opportunities and 
progress, for it creates the condition to enlarge and make rights to 
information more effective. Somebody speaks of a revolution 
which will transform our ways of living, working and even 
thinking.30 By managing such a huge and increasingly complex 
mass of information it would be possible not only to guarantee 
more efficient and personalised public services rather than having 
them provided on a category base, but also to drastically improve 
decision-making processes in any branches of public 
administration.31 
There are, however, those who raise various objections and 
suggest a more cautious stance. More commons remarks revolve 
around the threat to privacy and the warning that behind the 
enthusiasm for big data the commercial interests of powerful 
multinationals hide. There are also those who are sceptical about 
                                                 
30 V. Meyer-Schönberger, K. Cukier Big data: a revolution that will transform how 
we live, work and think (2013). 
31 G. Misuraca, F. Mureddu, D. Osimo, Policy-Making 2.0: Unleashing the Power of 
Big Data for Public Governance in M. Gascó-Hernández, Open Government. 
Opportunities and Challenges for Public Governance (2014) 174 
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the actual impact that the mere increase in data availability may 
have on decision-making and stress that such phenomenon does 
not touch on the ability and willingness of decision-makers to take 
into account such enhanced information dispassionately.32 
We wonder, anyway, whether and to what extent the 
practice of big data can change dynamics and individual legal 
positions within administrative procedure in the Italian legal 
system. The starting point is that the notion of open data has been 
acknowledged as regards databanks retained by PA by shifting 
from a conception founded on intellectual property – from which 
licensed economic rights are derived – to another founded on the 
freedom to reuse such data. As noted by a scholar, it is a process 
that emerged as a practice as the legislation still makes the access 
of individuals to data retained by PA subject to a fee.33  What 
happens with data that an administrative authority wants to set 
access free is that it issues a sort of non commercial licence rather 
than a commercial one so that anybody can reuse the data in any 
venue on condition that certain requirements are met, such as  the 
user avoids attributing official character to such information, he or 
she makes sure that information cannot be misunderstood etc. UE 
and domestic legislation has then been favouring such a trend by 
making the possibility of charging access to information with a fee 
an exception to the rule of freedom of access. Article 1.1 par c) of 
the Public Administration Reorganisation Act enlists the 
guarantee to access and freely reuse information produced and 
possessed by PA in an open format as a criterion for the 
government to abide by in adopting the delegated legislation. 
The interesting problem is how to use open data 
instrumentally. The idea is that their active use can trigger 
processes of “good administration” improvement as well as 
enable people to exercise a more effective political control. As to 
the former it means that individuals should be able to make such 
information count to uphold their own interest as participants in 
an administrative procedure. The issue here is that in such a case 
data belonging to a databank of an administrative authority is 
used to give substance to “participatory rights” pursuant to article 
                                                 
32 D. Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (2012). 
33 D. Marongiu TDA. 
CIVITARESE MATTEUCCI - DIGITALISATION AND REFORMS OF P.A. 
 
148 
 
10 of the Administrative Procedure Act 1990 in a procedure 
carried out by the same or another authority. The main problem is 
the level of reliability of such data and the way in which it should 
be taken into account by the proceeding authorities at the moment 
of adopting a decision. As we have seen the spontaneous origin of 
open data entails the paradox that their open usage depends on 
accepting their unofficial character. This is, however, a recurring 
topic of the information society and big data phenomenon, 
because it challenges the principle of authoritativeness of 
information based on the source from which it is drawn. In such a 
context one should sustain, though, that open public data – usable 
by any person who takes part in an administrative procedure at 
his or her own risk – does not present a different legal 
characteristic from any other data retrievable from the Internet 
and thus it does not bind public administration more than the 
normal allegation of  parties to support their claims. 
 
5.2. Administrative Procedure and Participation  
The latter point evokes the question of the bi-directional 
and deliberative (or transactional) dimensions of e-government, 
which as we have seen shows ambivalent aspects from the point 
of view of their impact on PA. Here we are ideally at the 
watershed of two separate concepts of e-government: one that 
considers it a means of affirming new public management and 
another that radically contends this equation between e-
government and NPM and on the contrary conceives the rise of e-
government a symptom of the crisis of NPM. It is worth noting 
that an identical conceptual dialectic goes through the very idea of 
administrative procedure, respectively seen either as an avenue to 
ascertain and compose as many interests as possible or as a means 
of rationalisation/simplification of the tasks assigned to public 
authorities. This inevitably reminds the Italian reader of the old 
discussion regarding the presence in the Administrative 
Procedure Act of both a guaranteeing and efficiency inspiration at 
the same time. 
In fact, the assimilation between NPM and ICTs – with the 
accusation that administrative procedure is helplessly long, non-
transparent, and bureaucratic – is not at all conceptually clear-cut. 
The fact that, for instance, the use of ICTs should lead to 
overcoming the linear-like pattern of procedural decision-making 
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to be replaced by a sort of simultaneous decision-making34 does 
not seem to undermine either the fundamental notion of a serial 
interdependence between the acts which form a procedure or the 
feasibility of continuing to purport a notion of administrative 
action as having a legal-bureaucratic character according to the 
Weberian tradition. I shall come to this point again in the next sub-
section. An important article published ten years ago openly 
challenges the assimilation between NPM and ICTs by proposing 
a new explicative model called DEG (digital-era governance) 
where the paramount importance acquired by informatics in 
changing administrative practices and interactions with citizens 
has determined the definitive decline of NPM.35 We find an ample 
reference to the nexus between participation and digital 
administration in article 1.1, par c) of the Public Administration 
Reorganisation Act where it is established that participation to 
decision-making of public institution shall be digitalised.  
A reference to this orientation can also be found in what an 
Italian scholar suggests about a concept of ameliorative 
participation which would especially fit the so-called digital 
environment 2.0, whose fundamental feature is interaction. Such 
an ameliorative participation presupposes the adoption of 
organisational patterns which foster the active role of citizens in 
conceiving and implementing public goals and actively 
cooperating with public institutions to implement them. This idea 
hinges on the concept of adaptation of the cycle of online 
administrative services to the needs of the users and so it 
emphasises those legislative provisions which get administrative 
units to change their behaviour to meet the outcome of internal 
and external assessment, such as directives regarding the charters 
of public services and the discipline of the so called “performance 
cycle”.36 Apart from the fact that one can still contend that this 
shift from a model of administration based upon the transmission 
to bureaucrats of a fraction of political representation to a model 
of deliberative democracy is desirable, such a scenario – which 
clearly springs out of a normative endeavour – does not look 
                                                 
34 G. Duni, L’amministrazione digitale (2008) 53. 
35 P. Dunleavy e al., New Public Management Is Dead – Long Live Digital-Era 
Governance cit. at 18, 478. 
36 G. Cammarota, TDA. 
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implausible in the medium term if one considers the massive 
presence of social media in our lives. There are hurdles to 
overcome, though, many of which we have mentioned earlier and 
among which traditional culture and values imbued in our 
bureaucracy especially stand out. 
 
5.3 Organisation and Procedural Forms. Orientation Effect 
of ICTs. Discretionary Power and Accountability 
The third point still concerns procedure, but this time from 
the viewpoint of its structure and its relationship to organisation, 
the overarching element in our model depicted in fig. 2 above. We 
can conceive the organisational dimension both in narrow terms 
and with reference to the decision-making process. 
 
5.3.1. Re-engineering Public Administration 
Two are, then, the more relevant factors of such a “mature” 
or enhanced stage of e-government. It is often said that e-
government programmes aim at “re-engineering” administrative 
procedure at the integration stage, where, that is to say, the design 
of organisational patterns and manner of decision-making (also 
involving different authorities and even citizens and corporations) 
is embedded in one point of access only. Re-engineering should 
take on the challenge to reorient the organisation and practice of 
PA around users’ needs by reforming procedural rules so as to 
conceive them as centred on the delivery of service rather than the 
exercise of power. One should bear in mind that such a shift of the 
barycentre of administrative procedure is neither neutral nor 
simply derived from the different technology employed. The idea 
of a user centrality can be instrumental both to the corporatisation 
of PA – which was dear to the first rise of e-government – and 
opposite ideas such as administration democracy, ameliorative 
participation, etc. Digitalisation can empower either of such 
objectives, but, while it remains important to choose one, the fact 
stands that our present knowledge suggests that ICTs is somewhat 
parasitic of existing models of PA rather than a factor which 
changes their fundamentals. 
Having said this, the transformation of the information 
vector from paper and ink to bits plays a major role in the 
dissemination of information necessary to determine a course of 
action. Through digital technology information can be centralised, 
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on the one hand, and easily shared and analysed among several 
units, in this way decentralised, on the other hand. It is supposed 
that this process of centralisation-decentralisation of information 
ensures both more transparency and accountability of officials.37 
In the Italian legal system, the discipline of the ‘digital file’ 
pursuant to article 41 CDA seems to embody such an idea. All 
acts, documents and data that pertain to a certain procedure, 
irrespective of whom has produced them, have to (should) be 
collected in a digital file which has to be directly accessible by all 
the authorities involved in that procedure. Still more 
comprehensive, for it affects the subjective dimension of PA, is the 
solution adopted in the Spanish legal system, where the legislation 
has set up an ‘electronic site of public administration’ which is 
meant to be a virtual room for carrying out administrative tasks, 
thereby trying to change the perception that citizens have of 
public administration as a complex web of inaccessible offices. The 
law establishes a specific link between the ‘electronic site’ and the 
discharge of administrative duties as well as between the former 
and a specific legal responsibility to act on the part of certain 
public bodies. 
Such coordination-cooperation between different public 
authorities seems to generalise the precept of "points of single 
contact" 38 . In the political science literature this issue is often 
treated under the label of joined-up government.39 Although there 
are those who underline the problems of a holistic concept of PA 
where vertical and horizontal integration (which absorbs even 
private parties in the unit which operates as the access point) risks 
confusing duties and accountability,40 the idea that this approach 
yields positive outcomes tends to prevail. Sharing tasks and duties 
between different administrative units should discourage self-
regarding behaviours, boost greater transparency in reciprocal 
                                                 
37 D. Petrakaki, Accountability in the Context of E-Government, in P.G. Nixon e al., , 
Understanding E-Government in Europe cit. at 15, 100. 
38 Article 6 of the Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on 'services in 
the internal market'. 
39 C. Pollitt, Joined-up Government: a Survey, Pol. Stud. Rev. 34-49 (2003). 
40  S. Zouridis, V. Bekkers, Electronic Service Delivery and the Democratic 
Relationships between Government and its Citizens. in J. Hoff, I. Horrocks, P. Tops, 
eds, Democratic Governance and New Technology (2000) 132. 
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interactions and greater accountability relating to a common 
achievement.41ù 
 
5.3.2. Automated Decision-Making 
At the apex of the integration stage e-government entails 
the automation of administrative procedures, which in a sense 
change from material to electronic, where human activities are 
replaced by bestowing ICTs with a number of automatic 
operations. 42  This too is deemed to bring about greater 
transparency, the foreseeability of outcomes, time certainty, 
easiness of control, strong accountability, and the possibility that 
procedures are looked after by personnel lacking specific 
professional skill once the software has been set up and 
appropriately instructed. 
In the Anglo-Saxon area the downsizes of such a shift are 
usually addressed from the perspective of the lawfulness and 
fairness of automated decision-making. A ground-breaking report 
of the Australian Administrative Review Council of 2004,43 which 
led in 2007 to issuing a best practice guide by the Australian 
Ombudsman, aired a number of concerns regarding automated 
decision-making. 44  This report acknowledged that the use of 
                                                 
41  M. Cole, J. Fenwick, UK Local Government: The Impact of Modernisation on 
Departmentalism 69 Int’l Rev. Admin. Sci. 259-270 (2003); B. Illsley, G. Lloyd, B. 
Lynch, From Pillar to Post? A one-Stop Shop Approach to Planning Delivery,  
Planning Theory & Practice 111-122 (2000); N. Curthoys, P.M. Eckersley, P.M. 
Ecklersley, E-Government (2003) 227-257. 
42 By automated decision-making one means «breaking down a decision to a set 
of ‘if then’ rules and criteria: a decision is understood as an algorithm (a 
sequence of reasoning) that selects from predetermined alternatives. An 
‘inference engine’ can systematically check whether the condition of a rule is 
met; if so, it can ‘conclude’ that the consequent of that rule applies» (A Le 
Sueur, ‘Robot Government: Automated Decision-making and its Implications 
for Parliament’, in A Horne and A Le Sueur (ed), Parliament: Legislation and 
Accountability (2016) 184. 
43 Administrative Review Council, ‘Automated Assistance in Administrative 
Decision Making: Report to the Attorney-General’, Report No 46 (2004) 
available at http://www.arc.ag.gov.au/Documents/AAADMreportPDF.pdf. 
44 ‘Automated Assistance in Administrative Decision-Making’ 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0032/29399/Autom
ated-Assistance-in-Administrative-Decision-Making.pdf  
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‘expert systems’, 45  whilst important to improve public 
administration performance and make savings, had to be 
attentively assessed to ensure its compatibility with the core 
administrative law values that underpin a democratic society 
governed by the rule of law. To this purpose it put forward as 
many as 27 guiding principles, the first seven of which directly 
relating to basic characteristics and values of administrative law. 
The most relevant precepts were based on the distinction between 
‘making a decision’ and ‘helping a decision maker make a 
decision’. The first case should be restricted to decisions involving 
non-discretionary elements, whilst, when expert systems are used 
to assist an officer in exercising his or her discretion, the systems 
should be designed so that they do not fetter the decision-maker 
in the exercise of his or her power by recommending or guiding 
the decision-maker itself to a particular outcome. Both these 
alternatives were deemed to require a statutory recognition of the 
use of computer programmes, even though the report mentioned 
views that this would not be necessary because such programmes 
are simply tools. Equally, the delicate power to override a decision 
made by or with the assistance of an expert system should be 
legislatively provided for and disciplined. 
As has been recently noted, also in the UK the issue of the 
legal basis of automated decision making is still to be dealt with.46 
In Le Sueur’s view the fact that there are specific provisions that 
expressly allow for decisions to be «made or issued not only by an 
officer of his acting under his authority but also (a) by a computer 
for whose operation such an officer is responsible» [Social Security 
Act 1998 (c. 14) Ss. 2-3], in spite of a rather loose approach in 
English admin law to the need for specific legislative authority for 
executive action, may be interpreted as a legal necessity for an 
express legal basis for automation. 
As regards this we can note that in the Spanish legal system 
there is a general provision referring to administrative action 
carried out via an information system appropriately set up so as to 
                                                 
45 In the report an expert system is defined as ‘expert systems’ as a «computing 
systems that, when provided with basic information and a general set of rules 
for reasoning and drawing conclusions, can mimic the thought processes of a 
human expert». 
46 A. Le Sueur, Parliament: Legislation and Accountability, cit. at 42. 
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make sure that the intervention of a person is not necessary.47 This 
ample clause does not exclude from its semantic scope any 
typology of decision and thereby it is open to any technological 
evolution in the realm of artificial intelligence. The question is that 
such a general and apparently unconditional acknowledgment of 
automated decision-making, while formally meets the 
requirements of the rule of law, risks turning out to be too thin a 
safeguard of the above mentioned administrative law values. The 
best way, the one however implied in the Australian 
Administrative Review Council report, should be to require a 
specific legal authorisation referring to each and every type of 
decision-making. 
As to Italian administrative law, one can equally wonder 
whether i) a statutory recognition of automated decision-making 
power is even necessary, ii) such a recognition may already be in 
place. 
i) Regarding the first point, the rule of law (principle of 
legality) is considered an unwritten principle of Italian admin law 
and as such its contours are vague. Pursuant to article 1 of the 
Administrative Procedural Act of 1990, no 241(APA) public 
administration has to pursue the objectives established by the law 
and conform its action to criteria of efficiency, impartiality, 
publicity and transparency. Moreover, when adopting measures 
that are not authoritative, it is expected to apply private law rather 
than public law except for when the law provides otherwise. A 
stronger notion of the rule of law (procedural fairness, obligation 
to give reason, hearing, etc.) is advocated when authoritative 
measures are issued, that is to say when any liberty or right of a 
person is affected by an administrative decision. In both cases it is 
difficult to decide whether that a human is accountable and 
responsible for the decision is or not a requirement of the rule of 
law. One could take the position that – also given that another 
clause of the APA reads that public authorities shall encourage the 
use of electronic communication between different authorities and 
between the latter and private parties – the resort to computing, as 
contended during the survey carried out by the Australian 
                                                 
47 I.M. Delgado TPA. 
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Administrative Review Council, is only a means, as such neutral 
to the rule of law. 
ii) As to the second point the hypothesis to confront with is 
that the delegated legislation amending the CDA, when it 
establishes that any administrative activity has to be made 
digitally available, covers automated decision-making as well. As 
one may recall this availability is meant to be the content of a 
citizen’s right. Yet, it is hard to conceive a right to have a decision 
made by a computer rather than a human being irrespective of 
any other circumstance or specific provision. Perhaps, on the 
contrary, a right to be made aware that an administrative 
authority decision has been automated and a right to opt out from 
that process would make more sense. 
Anyway, in both perspectives – which end up in a scenario 
not dissimilar to the Spanish one – the concerns expressed above 
would be far from overturned. 
A general recognition of automated decision-making does 
not take into account, for example, the line drawn by the cited 
Australian report as to the desirability of automated decision-
making, which relies upon the distinction between discretionary 
and rule-bound decisions and purports that, provided that all the 
measures advised are taken, when discretion is not at stake, the 
benefits of automated decision-making would overcome its 
drawbacks. 
This point is addressed by Le Sueur by observing that 
automated decision-making might achieve more consistent 
implementation of written law than can be done by human 
officials: «automation based on the application of objective criteria 
holds out the promise of legal certainty (like cases are treated 
identically), the elimination of bias, ensuring that no irrelevant 
considerations are taken into account, and that all relevant factors 
are included. To this extent, automation can be regarded as 
enhancing the rule of law».48 One can think, therefore, that the 
scenario of an automated procedure fulfils the Weberian ideal of a 
bureaucrat utterly dispassionate and fully accountable as long as 
                                                 
48 See at note 42 above, 190. 
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he or she is part of a hierarchy that abides by a rigidly pre-set 
protocol.49 
Yet there is another side to consider. Within such a 
perspective, other benefits which the functioning of complex 
organisations can provide thanks to non-conformist behaviours – 
the ones that Luhmann called useful illegality – get lost. In 
Luhmann’s view an unlawful behaviour is one that harms formal 
expectations. From a systematic perspective, though, behaviours 
which we can classify in a sort of grey area between legality and 
illegality can be nonetheless useful, even though they frustrate 
formal expectations.50 Luhmann provides some examples, such as 
following rules on the grounds of prohibited reasons or goals, 
abiding by the law but not within the time allowed, flouting 
habitually obsolete rules or rules whose application can harm 
more important interests etc. All these are unlawful but useful 
behaviours as they imply adaptive strategies which favour 
creative behaviours and adaption to a continually changing 
environment. One can look at this phenomenon from the 
perspective of the broader context in which an official has to make 
a decision. There is a sizeable amount of literature which, building 
on the work of Lispsky, suggests that administrative decision-
making is informed by an ampler set of cultural values than the 
bureaucratic-legal ones.51 
Purportedly, automation would get rid of such aspects of 
the functioning of administrative organisations, shifting the focus 
from the exercise of a kind of interstitial discretionary power 
accompanied by adaptive behaviours, which imply 
responsiveness for the use of some kind of contextual evaluation, 
to a form of accountability which turns into the technology 
employed. Relating to this there is another aspect discussed by Le 
Sueur, that is the chance that automated decision-making will 
favour a trend to design decision-making systems that hinge on 
                                                 
49 What is missing of the ideal Weberian’s bureaucrat is the intimate adhesion to 
a bundle of values and skills which inform bureaucracy as a profession. 
50 N. Luhmann , Funktionen und Folgen formaler Organisation (Berlin 1999-first ed. 
1964) 304, V chap. I.3 
51  M. Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracry: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
Services (1980); S. Halliday, Judicial Review and Compliance with Administrative 
Law (2004) 100. 
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bright line rules and reduce or eliminate the margins of discretion 
expressly or implicitly conferred by the law.52 
The issue of automated discretionary decision-making is 
undoubtedly the most challenging of all. In this case the problem 
regards the reproducibility through informatics of mental 
processes which occur when a political choice is made, that is to 
say to ponder facts and interests at stake to reach a correct 
decision whatever the meaning of a correct decision might be. In 
such a circumstance the problem is not only – and not much – the 
one regarding the ability to build “smart systems” but also to 
penetrate into the decision theory, which with particular regard to 
public organisations has long contended that decision-making 
processes can be encapsulated in a sequence of pre-set steps: for 
example, choice of the most appropriate course of action, 
implementation of the decision, and assessment of its effects. 
There are many other factors at stake, even of an emotional nature 
and it is not certain that their possible eradication from decision-
making by entrusting it to software yields the best possible course 
of action.53 
As we have seen the Australian Administrative Review 
Council’s view was that automation of discretion collides with the 
administrative law values of lawfulness and fairness, even though 
expert systems can be used as an administrative tool to help 
officials exercise their discretion. The allure of such systems is that 
they are able to face the greater issue of information age, that is to 
deal with the innumerable amount of information available to the 
decision-maker, burdened with the nearly impossible task to select 
what is relevant, 54 which implies he or she is able in a relatively 
short time to assign meaning to such data in a certain context and 
structure them. Such a function of an expert system seems to suit 
                                                 
52  The point is disputed actually. A Buffat, Street-Level Bureaucracy and E-
Government 17 Pub. Mgmt. Rev., 149-161 (2015), in reviewing the relevant 
literature detects two opposite attitudes. which she labels respectively 
‘curtailment thesis’ and ‘enablement thesis’, and calls for more empirical 
research on the topic. 
53 H.A. Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (1983); J.S. Lerner, Y. Li, P. Valdesolo, 
K.S. Kassam, Emotion and Decision Making, 66 Annual Rev. Psychol. 799-823 
(2015). 
54 O.E. Klapp, Meaning Lag in the Information Society, J. Comm. 57-60 (1982). 
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the idea of computing as helping a decision-making process rather 
than replacing a human decision-maker. 
However, scholars in the field of artificial intelligence 
applied to legal systems have long claimed that software-agents 
can be autonomy-furnished, viz. possessing the ability to detect 
connections with the organisational referring framework, 
choosing whether or not to abide by a rule, and establishing how 
to pursue individual and social goals within certain normative 
constraints.55. In other words they would be able to do things such 
as “exegesis, hermeneutics, legal interpretation, and scientific 
theorisation” and stimulate the emotional component which is 
part of dialectic reasoning, founded on typical features of human 
societies such as debate and discussion in the effort of attributing 
meaning to things.56 In such an interdisciplinary area of research 
as the one regarding simulation of dynamic systems it is believed 
that we are not far away from the possibility to transform 
«intuitive policy making into model-based policy design». 57  A 
‘guru’ of contemporary physics thinks that in the middle of the 
XXI century the era of “emotional robots” might be blossoming.58 
It is clear that if this is the direction that the systems of 
public decision-making will take, then current concepts of 
accountability and justiciability of administrative decisions will 
require a complete revision. 
The idea that we can limit ourselves to updating our 
traditional notions does not sound truly satisfactory. In a way, if 
we look at these problems from the familiar perspective of legal 
concepts we can apparently continue to rely on the received 
                                                 
55  R. Rubino, G. Sartor, Source Norms and Self-regulated Institutions, in P. 
Casanovas, G. Sartor, N. Casellas, R. Rubino, eds, Computable Models of the Law 
(2008) 263-274. P Lucatuorto, S Bianchini, Discrezionalita ̀ e contemperamento degli 
interessi nei processi decisionali dall’Amministrazione digitale, 10 Ciberspazio e 
diritto, 41-58 (2009), claim that e-government discretional decision-making, 
facing the reasonable and proportional comparison of competing private and 
public interests, could be supported by Artificial Intelligence tools. 
56 Ibidem. 
57  E. Pruyt, From Building a Model to Adaptive Robust Decision Making Using 
Systems Modeling, in M. Janssen, M.A. Wimmer , A. Deljoo, eds, Policy Practice 
and Digital Science. Integrating Complex Systems, Social Simulation and Public 
Administration in Policy Research (2015) 90. 
58 M. Kaku, Physics of the Future (2011) 83. 
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‘fictional legal notions’ (fictio iuris). In fact, it is sufficient to impute 
the artificial will of a software to a public body – in turn a fictio 
iuris itself – and thereby to a public authority to which the former 
belongs. This point, in other words, regards that special juridical 
attitude called doctrinal constructivism (dogmatic) which aims at 
mapping certain areas of law by employing a specifically 
constructed language. 
Spanish and Italian scholars have long elaborated specific 
legal notions made out of the consolidated precepts of doctrinal 
tradition to describe such new phenomena. Namely, such key-
notions of administrative law as ‘organ’ and ‘administrative act’ 
would not suffer from their being adapted to explain such things 
as the digitalisation of administrative decisions and the creation of 
virtual offices. Indeed ‘organs’ (those particular administrative 
units which are able to formally express the will of a public 
authority) can continue to be regarded as administrative units 
awarding legal powers which affect third parties, and 
‘administrative acts’ as those declarations made by an ‘organ’ that, 
by using the power conferred to it, produces any specified legal 
effect. In this way we can straightforwardly make sense of a 
‘digital organ’ and a ‘digital administrative act’. In other words, 
the fictional nature of such legal concepts fits the even more 
fictional nature of digital administration. As has been highlighted, 
the will which an administrative act embodies it is not really a will 
of a human being, it is instead always a “procedural will”59: an 
administrative organ, irrespective of it being an office composed 
either of human beings or electronic agents, always comes to issue 
a declaration of will, judgment, knowledge or wish in order to 
implement a legal provision with the goal of taking care of public 
interest. 
One wonders, though, what is the actual heuristic value of 
conceptual constructions which are capable of containing so very 
different substances, in other words of remaining unaffected by 
such a huge change of institutional practices as the one by which a 
human decision shifts into a ‘robot’ one. In fact, the notion of 
‘delegating’ a decision to an automated system raises a number of 
                                                 
59 I.M. Delgado TDA; M.S. Giannini, Istituzioni di diritto amministrativo (1981) 
292. 
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unique problems, which cannot be faced by merely updating our 
fictional legal notions. For instance, just mentioning a couple, who 
at the end of the day should be identified as the ‘decision-maker’? 
We cannot take for granted that it is the computer itself rather 
than the programmer, the policy-maker, the authorised operator. 
Moreover, is the concept of conferring a power by means of a rule 
appropriately used in this circumstance? As has been pointed out, 
unlike human agents, a computer software can never truly be said 
to act independently of its programmer or the relevant 
administrative authority.60 
 
 
6. Some Final Notes to Continue 
At the moment of drawing some final thoughts it is hard to 
resist the temptation to cast a glance at an aspect which lays in the 
backdrop of our topic as it is tangential to the scope of a research 
focused on ICTs and PA practices. It has to do with what 
somebody in the literature calls the Fifth State meaning a ‘place’, 
in principle anarchic, such as the Internet. It might be considered 
more a space that incorporates – or swallows – other social 
institutions based on political-territorial links than an instrument 
that public institutions use to pursue their goals. The question has 
been cursorily touched upon when referring to the relationship 
between State or public powers and democracy, but it has even 
broader boundaries. A scholar has recently conceptualised this 
idea of a Fifth State building on Castells' account of the Internet as 
a space of flows rather than a space of spaces,61 that thereby lets 
huge masses of players reshape access to information, people, 
services, and technology. 62  Here two opposite futurology 
perspectives appear, the pan-democratic utopia and the cybernetic 
pessimistic dystopia. In such cases there is always someone who 
points out a third strategy. One very popular indeed is legal 
                                                 
60 M Perry and A Smith, ‘iDecide: the legal implications of automated decision-
making’ (FCA) [2014] FedJSchol 17, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/FedJSchol/2014/17.html. 
61 M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (1996). 
62  W. Dutton, The Fifth Estate. Democratic Social Accountability Through the 
Emerging Network of Networks, in P.G. Nixon et al., Understanding E-Government 
in Europe cit. at 15, 3. 
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pluralism where power is seen as a sort of field of multiple forces 
which challenges the notion of the State as the unitary centre of 
political power and contends the idea of the State as the main 
arena of political battle. Several contemporary administrative law 
scholars do not consider the fall or decline of the State a problem 
per se. The GAL (global administrative law) movement, for 
example, revolves around the application of certain mechanisms 
for subjecting decision-making made in legal spaces lacking of a 
political centre to the procedural guarantees familiar to the 
national traditions of administrative law. One could, then, apply 
this framework to that quintessential acephalous space that the 
Internet is. The issue is, though, well beyond the perspectives of e-
government as a model of public administration whose 
legitimation is still derived from some relationships with political 
powers. 
Coming back to this narrower scenario, let us see what 
main points we can draw from what we have discussed so far. 
Technological change is already producing a significant impact on 
the functioning of PA and its relationship with citizens and 
corporations and even though Italy is still at an embryonic stage it 
is not hazardous to speak about the dawn of a digital era. This 
new era, as it happens for every technological innovation or 
change of paradigm, did not begin thanks to planned actions by 
public institutions. However, they remain necessary to try to steer 
such developments towards general interest. Digital agendas seek 
to both include as much as possible society and the markets in the 
arena of digital relations by fighting digital divide and securing 
quicker and safer trades and identify which model of e-
government a community wants to build. We should not take for 
granted, for example, that the overall inter-operability between 
public authorities and the one point of access to PA necessarily 
entails the assimilation of administrative decision to the concept of 
transaction (typical of e-commerce). Moreover, as we have seen, a 
polity should choose whether still to invest massively on getting 
everyone to become an Internet user by fostering demand or 
employ ICTs to make social welfare services more efficacious. In 
fact, as regards administrative decisions and procedural 
techniques of decision-making the range of possible developments 
and legal change are remarkably vast. The legislation has further 
emphasised the centrality of digital administration, introducing 
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symbolic terms such as ‘digital citizenship’ and ‘digital first’ as 
well as a number of measures to implement the expectations to 
which such terms allude. In light of such principles administrative 
procedures and back office practices should be redesigned (“re-
engineered”) to make them quicker and more timely, certain and 
transparent. To what extent this is going to happen in the short 
term and what kind of administration would turn out of this 
process is difficult to predict. In describing e-government as an 
incremental process driven by the technological sophistication 
deployed, we have noticed that all the dimensions of ICTs – 
information, bidirectional communication, transaction, 
integration, political participation – certainly present 
opportunities and risks whose concrete outcome depends both on 
the cultural and economic context in which they are placed and 
political choices. We have, in fact, proposed an explicative as well 
as normative model of e-government where information and 
organisation are the driving factors to take into account also in 
terms of technological sophistication, to which a wary attitude 
towards a too loose use of the language of rights (to digitalisation) 
should be added. 
A final word regards what can be defined a pragmatic 
approach to the topic at hand. Especially for Italy much more 
empirical research is needed as to whether and how ICTs are 
changing PA and its law, for example as regards the debate on 
what has been termed as the ‘curtailment thesis’. The literature 
teaches us two interesting aspects, however. The first is that along 
with some common features ways of implementing e-government 
and its impact vary from country to country. 63  The second 
concerns a rough evaluation of e-government as a whole. It is 
barely doubtable that the massive use of such technology can have 
disrupting effects, many of which we can already see for example 
on civil liberties. Let us think of the possible use of cookies by 
governmental websites. In addition, it can be the case that 
technology is instrumentally employed to reinforce citizens’ trust 
in political institutions to avoid real processes of democratisation, 
as the high level of digitalisation of countries such as China, 
                                                 
63 C. Reddick, Comparative E-government, cit. 
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Singapore, and Malaysia makes us suspect.64  Having said this, 
case study shows that part of the negative externalities can be 
avoided and that some concerns are misplaced at the proof of fact, 
for they produce, for example, greater participation and 
satisfaction of citizen users as the case of Swedish local authorities 
mentioned in section 4 shows. 
                                                 
64  L. Anderson, P. Bishop, E-Government to E-Democracy: Communicative 
Mechanisms of Governance, 2 J. E- Gov’t 11 (2005). 
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Abstract 
The deep roots and development of Mafia–type 
organisations in local and international settings is in part also a 
result of the services provided by professionals (for example, in 
money laundering). Doctrine and case law have highlighted the 
role of the professionals and their social networks in feeding the 
relationships of the Mafias in the socio-economic and institutional 
framework. Professional associations have been criticised for not 
always being able to prevent or suitably sanction collusive 
practices either because of inertia or “a desire to not rock the 
boat”. This paper will deal with a phenomenon which has also 
been studied by socio-historical sciences through the rigour of a 
juridical analysis. Therefore, what we will look at are the critical 
areas in the system, also from a de iure condendo point of view. The 
issue is looked into for the first time by studying four main 
critical areas in relation to each other: 1. criminal law; 2. the 
system of the professions and the role of the professional 
associations with particular reference to disciplinary proceedings; 
3. the role of the organs that control and sanction the professional 
associations; 4. data collection and access to databases of the 
courts and professional associations. 
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1. When professionals operate in the interest of Mafia-
type organisations. Case laws 
“The strength of the Mafia” lies “in complicit and 
functional cultures and behaviour”1, it finds nourishment 
externally2 and has its major element of strength in “social 
capital”3. This is where it interrelates with the managerial class, 
within which are to be found the professions, among the most 
culturally and technically qualified to be of assistance to the 
Mafias. As it is clear from case law and legal doctrine, the 
boundaries between legal and illegal are difficult to distinguish. 
This lack of distinction generates an indistinct zone which is 
commonly defined as “grey area”. We are here confronted with 
an “opaque space”, “made up of a variety of figures”, “different 
for competences, resources, interests and social roles”, where “the 
mafiosi” not always “occupy the dominant position compared 
to”, for example, “politicians, entrepreneurs and professionals”4.  
                                            
1 See N. dalla Chiesa, Manifesto dell’Antimafia (2014), 40. 
2 See R. Sciarrone, Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove (2009), 325. 
3 R. Sciarrone, Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove, cit. at 2, 46 and 325, otherwise it would 
be the same as other forms of organised crime. 
4 The issue has been studied in depth and clarified by R. Sciarrone, Complici, soci 
e alleati. Una ricerca sull’area grigia della mafia, in Studi sulla questione criminale, 1 
(2012), 66-67. Furthermore, the author remarks (71) how often “a Mafia 
governance model” is outlined in which “the mafiosi constitute the most 
important link in the network”. Moreover, expressions such as “entrepreneurial 
Mafia” and “Mafia business” give a clear representation of one aspect of the 
grey area. And this also entails connections or crossovers between the legal and 
illegal [see C. Visconti, Proposte per recidere il nodo mafie-imprese, Diritto penale 
contemporaneo, in 1 www.penalecontemporaneo.it (2014)]. In addition, “the 
presence of criminal organisations in the legal economy conditions the activities 
and the evolution of many economic sectors”, thus changing “radically the 
rules of the game” by asking “difficult and sometimes very risky choices of 
entrepreneurs”, S. Consiglio, E. De Nito, Quando gli imprenditori usano i clan: il 
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The Mafia networking5 generates direct benefits for 
professionals and, at the same time, a negative social, economic 
and institutional fallout. In this context, the specific role of 
professionals can take various forms and serve a variety of 
purposes: it can help mafias to achieve a number of objectives, 
formally legal or partially or totally illegal. All this activities can 
be led back to Mafia-type organisations (or “Mafia-type 
associations”), as defined by Article 416-bis, par. 3, of the Criminal 
Code (henceforth CC)6. There are various professional categories 
involved and types of professional activities that can be exercised 
for the benefit of Mafia gangs, and many cases have come to the 
attention of the judiciary. These activities might be covered by 
specific legal criminal definitions and specific disciplinary 
offences inside the professional associations. Therefore, before a 
more in-depth theoretical study, it is useful to examine a number 
of cases that have seen professionals involved in criminal 
proceedings. 
Within the medical profession, we might mention: the 
doctor who provided treatment to a fugitive Mafia boss7; or the 
doctor who “hid the trail” that would have led to the fugitive; the 
case of false information included in medical records; the 
ophthalmologist who concocted a serious diagnosis for a 
dangerous and bloodthirsty “camorrista” in order to have him 
granted house arrest8; the cases of the exploitation of the forensic 
psychiatric profession, a support to the judicial system, in the 
form of false diagnoses, or advice provided to facilitate the 
simulation of psychiatric diseases to be submitted to the judiciary 
                                                                                                           
caso del re dei videopoker, in L. Brancaccio, C. Castellano (eds.), Camorra, mercati e 
imprese, Le aree grigie nell’evoluzione dei gruppi criminali, 196 (2015). 
5 See R. Sciarrone, Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove, cit. at 2, 325 e 49. 
6 The Italian law uses the expression “Associazione di tipo mafioso” (e.g. Art. 
416-bis, c.c.). For a definition of a possible ideal-type of mafia, R. Sciarrone, L. 
Storti, The territorial expression of mafya-type organised crime. The cause of the Italian 
Mafia in Germany in 1 Crime, Law and Social Change (2013). 
7 Aggravated assistance, under Article 378, par. 2, c.c. See S. Corbetta, Obbligo 
del medico di far catturare il latitante in cura?, in 11 Dir. pen. proc. 1375 (2001). 
8 This refers to the order for preventive custody issued by the GIP (investigating 
magistrate) at the Court of Naples on 12 December 2012 which foresees the 
imputation of external collusion with the Camorra group led by Giuseppe 
Setola, of the Casalesi Clan. 
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for a wide variety of purposes (e.g. incompatibility with the 
regime of so-called “harsh imprisonment”)9. 
Then there is the case of the notary who was sentenced for 
providing his professional services which benefited the mafiosis10.  
Turning to chartered accountants, there was the case of a 
professional convicted of money laundering as well as for having 
concealed the criminal origin of large amounts of capital11.  
In terms of the legal profession the boundaries between 
legal professional activity and illegal conduct, whether ethically 
correct or not, are probably among the most complex to describe, 
in consideration, first of all, of the right to defence enshrined in 
Article 24, par. 2 of the Constitution, and of the particular ways in 
which the professional activity is exercised in order to maintain 
its independence12. Among the alleged misconduct of lawyers are 
reported: aggravated assistance13 (for example, the case of the 
defence lawyer who illegally acquires information concerning the 
criminal proceedings, with subsequent divulgation useful to their 
client in order to hamper the investigation or avoid arrest)14; the 
case of the defence lawyer for a “camorrista” who, in open court, 
issued threats to judges and journalists15; the case of the lawyer 
                                            
9 Under Article 41-bis of Law no. 354 of 26 July 1975. For reflections on this 
theme, with references to specific cases as well, see the contribution of a doctor, 
C. De Rosa, I medici della camorra (2011).  
10 Pursuant to Articles 416-bis and 110 c.c. In this case, Cass. pen., Sec. VI, 22 
March 2004, no. 13910, the legal obligation “of the notary” of the “general duty 
to provide, in favour of anyone who so requests, does not mean that the notary” 
should not “abstain from providing the services requested and even performing 
the role of guarantor and mediator, whenever it can reasonably be inferred that 
such activities involve illegal acts or apparently legal activities carried out by 
Mafia members”.  
11 Under Article 648-bis, aggravated by the special circumstance referred to in 
Article 7 of Law by Decree no. 152 of 13 May 1991, converted into law no. 203 of 
12 July 1991: judgment no. 17694 of the Criminal Court of Cassation, sect. V, 14 
January 2010. 
12 On this point see G.C. Hazard, A. Dondi, Etiche della professione legale (2005), 
228. 
13 Under Article 378, par. 2, c.c. 
14 Cass. Pen., Sec. I, 1 March 2005 and Sec. I, 24 February 1992, n. 4153, in Cass. 
Pen. 933 (1994). On this point see E. Dinacci, Favoreggiamento personale, in F. 
Coppi (ed.), I delitti contro l'amministrazione della giustizia (1996), 382.  
15 This fact, exceptional for its peculiarities, led to the conviction in the first 
degree for threats with the aggravating circumstance of them being made on 
behalf of the Mafia (Court of Naples, Sec. III, 10 November 2014). The reference 
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accused of collusion with the Mafia (Camorra)16 for allowing a 
gang affiliate in detention to maintain communications with other 
affiliates and to obtain false medical documentation certifying his 
incompatibility with a prison regime17; with reference to the same 
offence, the lawyer who became an “adviser” to a gang and 
providing legal advice, made suggestions designed to 
fraudulently evade the law, in order to acquire control of a 
company18.  
A professional enrolled in a professional association can 
assist Mafia-type organisations, but they can also do so in the 
exercise of public functions (in cases where they hold a role in 
public administration19 or elected office); they can integrate their 
professional, social and business network with the more extensive 
one of the Mafiosi20, who “often tend to act as intermediaries 
between different networks of relationships” with the illegal and 
legal world21. Finally, a professional, can be the head or a member 
of a Mafia-type group, projecting themselves fully into the 
“bourgeoisie Mafia”22. The concept of a “bourgeoisie Mafia” is 
                                                                                                           
is to the well-known case which saw, in the Assize Court of Appeal, Second 
Section, 11 October 2010, during the Spartacus trial, Roberto Saviano and the 
journalist Rosaria Capacchione being threatened.  
16 Pursuant to Article 416-bis and 110 c.c. 
17 The reference is to the order of arrest issued by the investigating magistrate at 
the Court of Naples on 12 December 2012. This case partly coincides with the 
abovementioned ophthalmologist.  
18 Cass. pen., Sec. II, 8 aprile 2014, n. 17894, in www.studiolegale.leggiditalia.it. 
19 For which disciplinary proceedings would be twofold, relating to the 
association and the administration, as a result of which the professional might 
be subject to sanctions from both the association and the administration. See on 
this point V. Tenore, Deontologia e nuovo procedimento disciplinare nelle libere 
professioni (2012), 14. 
20 See R. Sciarrone, Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove, cit. at 2, 52. 
21 M. Santoro, Borghesia mafiosa, in M. Mareso, L. Pepino (eds.), Nuovo dizionario 
di mafia e antimafia (2008), 74-75. On this point see also F. Curcio, ‘Ndrangheta, in 
Relazione annuale sulle attività svolte dal Procuratore nazionale antimafia e dalla 
Direzione nazionale antimafia nel periodo 1 luglio 2012 e 30 giugno 2013 (2014), 127 - 
128. 
22 Thus in many cases reinforcing the sociological model of upward social 
mobility Id., Ndrangheta, in Relazione annuale sulle attività svolte dal Procuratore 
nazionale antimafia e dalla Direzione nazionale antimafia nel periodo 1 luglio 2012 e 30 
giugno 2013, cit. at 21, 78. For a number of examples, see Id., Ndrangheta, cit. at 
21, 112 and M. de Lucia, Cosa nostra, in Relazione annuale sulle attività svolte, cit. 
at 21, 725.   
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extended and sometimes coincides with the more fluid and wider 
one of the “grey area”23; this includes the extraneus, such as the 
professional who becomes a point of reference in the network of 
the organisation and its activities, has a role in designing new 
strategies for the Mafias24 to adapt, is part of “a triangulation with 
public officials, criminals (...) and politicians”25, thus ending up 
colluding externally in Mafia type organisations as defined in 
Articles 416-bis and 110 c.c. The concept of bourgeoisie Mafia, the 
result of sociological analysis, has also been assimilated into 
juridical and trial language, as demonstrated by recent case law of 
the Supreme Court. By “bourgeoisie Mafia” the Court of 
Cassation means “white collars” i.e. Mafiosi who, thanks to their 
relations and the prestigious posts they occupy in society, collude 
with the Mafia in order to get some advantages (“easy and 
conspicuous wealth; support in elections”), allowing them, 
therefore, “to increase their spread and penetration in the vital 
nerve centres of society”26.  
 
 
2. The dialogue between social and juridical sciences: 
strengths and weaknesses 
The theme of the relationship between the professions and 
the grey area has to be studied while taking into account the 
political, legislative, investigative and procedural perspectives. 
Politicians, legislators, investigators and judges must always take 
into account the specificity of the socioeconomic networks. 
Insufficient knowledge is likely to affect, as indeed happens, the 
efficacy of investigations and prosecution, with a resulting 
reduction for the prospects of justice in court. The legitimacy of 
every measure that can be employed27, in fact, alongside the 
                                            
23 The concept of “bourgeoisie Mafia” was revived in the 1970s by M. Mineo, 
Scritti sulla Sicilia (1995), as recalled by U. Santino, La conquista di Bisanzio, 
Borghesia mafiosa e Stato dopo il delitto dalla Chiesa, in Segno 34 (1982) and, more 
recently, S. Lupo in G. Savatteri (ed.), Potere criminale. Intervista sulla storia della 
mafia (2010), 167. 
24 For reflections on this theme see F. Beatrice, Camorra, in Relazione annuale della 
Dna, July 2012 - June 103 (2013). 
25 See N. Amadore, I sovversivi: in terra di mafia la normalità è rivoluzione (2013), 
71.  
26 Cass., Sec. II, 8 April 2014, n. 17894. 
27 From phone taps to indictments to seizures to arrests. 
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investigative and prosecution strategy, is based on a delicate 
balance of several factors. From this point of view the historical, 
social and economic sciences stand out, with a subsequent effect 
on the most appropriate methods of analysis on the part of the 
operators. This is true above all of criminal activities that include 
offences such as Mafia–type organisation pursuant to Article 416-
bis and collusion with the Mafia pursuant to Article 110 c.c. Both 
this articles have applicative limits, also as a result of the 
linguistic formulations used28.  
Another factor is the legal classification of the crimes being 
prosecuted. The designation of crimes as Mafia-related29, 
provides, pursuant to Anti-Mafia Code30, that proceedings are the 
responsibility of the District Anti-Mafia Directorates (henceforth 
DDA), all the way to the temporary assignment “to local 
prosecutor’s offices” of “judges belonging to the” National Anti-
Mafia Directorate and of “those belonging to” the DDA31.  
As pointed out, what can sometimes be seen is a 
prosecution strategy that tends to absorb within the jurisdiction of 
the DDA criminal behaviour of dubious relevance to Article 416-
bis or other crimes that might lead, for example, to the 
contestation of the aggravating circumstance of the “Mafia 
facilitating” (the so called art. 7)32. The intention, in these cases, is 
to place the investigation and prosecution in a fast-track lane, 
better equipped in terms of resources compared to the so-called 
“ordinary business” lane33.   
                                            
28 On this point infra § 4. 
29 Pursuant to article 51, para. 3-bis, Code of Criminal Procedure. 
30 Article 102 of Legislative Decree no. 159 of 6 September 2011. 
31 Pursuant to Article 105 of the Anti-Mafia Code, in the case of “proceedings of 
particular complexity or that require specific experience and professional skills” 
“that is (...) specific and contingent investigative or procedural requirements”. 
32 Refer to Article 7, Law by Decree no. 152/1991 converted into law no. 203 of 
12 July 1991. On this point see L. Ciafardini, La costituzione, l’organizzazione della 
direzione distrettuale antimafia e i rapporti con la direzione nazionale antimafia, in B. 
Romano, G. Tinebra (ed.), Il diritto penale della criminalità organizzata (2013), 488. 
33 Id., La costituzione, l’organizzazione della direzione distrettuale antimafia e i 
rapporti con la direzione nazionale antimafia, in B. Romano, G. Tinebra (ed.), Il 
diritto penale della criminalità organizzata, cit. at 32, 486-490, for an analysis of the 
aspects related to the assignation.  
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Furthermore, all this would allow the use of more effective 
investigative tools34, such as: telephone taps that have as their 
presupposition35, sufficient and not serious evidence36. 
Because the legislative framework is mainly based on 
criminal justice, its case law and its legal doctrine, the sociological 
contributions to the phenomenon of professional are generally 
schematic37. Despite the necessary differentiation between 
approaches, there are proven reasons in favour of the need for a 
dialogue between legal and sociological sciences, sensitive to the 
need for a common intelligere of contiguity with the Mafia. As it 
has been clearly stated, with reference to the analysis of the 
“structure and impact of Article 416-bis”, it would be “in truth, 
superficial and misleading to discuss the” relative “structure and 
(...) impact without considering the social context in which the 
Mafia has accumulated its power, as well as the cultural 
representation that the Mafia has gradually assumed”38.  
The socio-historical research should therefore be a scientific 
reference point in the exercise of legislative39 and judicial power. 
To better understand the relationships between the sciences it is 
useful to highlight a number of aspects that characterise 
approaches to the subject. A certain distrust regarding the quality 
of its scientific output has been overcome in terms of sociological 
studies, the results of which, it was noted, were not always 
appreciated because of a widespread tendency to “be based on 
conjecture” and not on the information available. Gradually, there 
                                            
34 Di contra this choice should be assessed in terms of respecting of 
constitutionally protected guarantees. 
35 Pursuant to Article 13 of Law by Decree no. 152/1991 similarly, “when it 
comes to intercepting communications between those present (...) interception 
is permitted even if there is no reason to believe that criminal activity is taking 
place in the aforesaid places”. 
36 Derogating from the general provisions laid down in Articles 266 and 
following of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
37 Thus, recently, N. dalla Chiesa, Manifesto dell’Antimafia, cit. at 1, 48, 51-52 
speaks of a corporate culture (among others) in the professional associations 
that occurs when they reject “with contempt” or “treat reports with 
indulgence”. 
38 Cfr. M. Ronco, L’art. 416-bis nella sua origine e nella sua attuale portata applicativa 
in B. Romano, G. Tinebra (eds.), Il diritto penale della criminalità organizzata, cit. at 
32, 36.  
39 See G. Fiandaca, Il concorso “esterno” tra sociologia e diritto penale, in G. 
Fiandaca, C. Visconti (eds.), Scenari di mafia (2010), 203-211. 
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has been a greater recognition of its scientific output, due in part 
to the increase in the number of publications and a diversification 
in the topics studied. The wider reference to socio-historical 
insights is also due to the refinement and consolidation of 
methods of investigation and a series of factors, among which 
should be mentioned: the increased number of official sources 
and the possibility of accessing information; the improvement in 
the quality of the sources; the increase in “investigations in the 
field”; access to important sources such as, for example, 
supergrasses. Scientific contributions have also been characterised 
by their greater completeness and specialisation40 resulting in an 
appreciation by certain scholars, whose visibility in contexts other 
than purely scientific or judicial ones, particularly in the agorà of 
the mass media, allowed the attention of the general public and 
politics to be drawn to aspects of the Mafia that taken 
individually might have appeared insignificant. 
The interaction between legal and social sciences can be 
perceived in the national and international debate41 both in terms 
of advantages and critical areas, but in any case of utility. It is 
necessary to take these positions into account, on the assumption 
that the relationship between sciences improves the processes of 
knowledge of phenomena, increasing the possibility of 
                                            
40 Among the most significant reasons there is, in fact, A. La Spina, La sociologia 
del fenomeno mafioso dopo il 2006, in La Spina, A. Dino, M. Santoro, R. Sciarrone 
(eds.), L’analisi sociologica della mafia oggi, 2 Rass. It. sociologia 307 (2009), a 
raised awareness among scholars of the different specialties of sociology that 
has allowed a better understanding of the more specific aspects concerning the 
Mafias, through sociological interpretations of “deviance and criminal 
behavior,” “legal”, of “analysis of public policies”, “economic” and “political” 
and the sociology of the “cultural and communication processes” and of the 
“organisation”. 
41 It is interesting to recall the research conducted by S.P. Green, I crimini dei 
colletti bianchi (2008), XIII-XV, a translation of Lying, Cheating and Stealing. A 
Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime, 2006, on the subject of white collars in the US 
and UK. It is observed how if, on the one hand, it starts from the usual 
distinction between legal approach (in particular criminal), and sociological - 
where the former “focuses not so much on the social class and the 
characteristics of the offenders, as on the elements of the offence itself” - on the 
other, it concludes that the lawyer cannot ignore the mutual interference of 
“subtle distinctions of criminal law” with other “subtle distinctions”. Also very 
interesting is the analysis of psychoanalysis: see, in particular, the recent 
contribution of G. Starace, Vite violente (2014).    
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identifying the most efficient means of repression. Such a 
relationship generates, however, friction as well. This arises, in 
reality, not from the methodologies and classifications of Mafia 
phenomena, but rather from the transposition of the models into 
the concrete configuration of the crime and the punishment of the 
offender. The most critical positions are to be found among 
criminal lawyers who complain about the inability of sociological 
models to take into proper account the Constitutional principles 
of the determination of the legal fact and personal responsibility. 
Socio-historical analysis, on its own or with others, allows us to 
place and understand individual criminal events in a wider 
dimension, but also to explain the behaviour of individuals42. The 
use that the judiciary makes of socio-historical models can also be 
identified in judicial provisions - albeit to a lesser extent and still 
paying attention to the ontological limits of criminal law – and in 
documents adopted outside the courts (think of the reports of the 
DNA)43.  
Compared to lawyers, sociologists and historians move in a 
way that is more neutral, not recognising, if not rarely and for no 
less important but still formal aspects, difficulties in comparison 
with the legal sciences. Among the reasons for this is a sharper 
definition of the borders of the contributions: “overspill” is rare 
and for this reason the contributions can be appreciated more in 
the processes of legal positivism. The sociologist and the historian 
do not appear to be influenced (nor should they be) by the 
transposability that their models and interpretations of the Mafia 
phenomenon might have at both trial and legislative level. It 
should further be noted how this can also be explained in view of 
the difficulties inherent in legal technicality and the in-depth 
understanding of the juridical institutions of substantive and trial 
law. Among the criticisms made by legal scholars is that of a risk 
of “excessive influence” of the interpretative (in particular 
sociological) models in legal reconstructions44. One example is the 
qualification of cases of Mafia association and contiguity in the 
                                            
42 Needed for the configuration of criminal facts and the identification of 
personal responsibility. Among the authors mentioned most often is R. 
Sciarrone, Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove, cit. at 2. 
43 Cfr. F. Beatrice,  Camorra, cit. at 24, 90. 
44 Cfr. G. Leo, Crisi ed attualità del concorso esterno nel reato associativo, in 6 Corr. 
mer. 551 (2012). 
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grounds for sentencing and in the drafting of indictments by the 
prosecution. When operating within the traditional confines of 
criminal readings it is easy to understand the scepticism that 
prevails with regard to the socio-historical sciences, above all in 
the use that the judiciary might make of them, insofar as such 
readings might not sit well with the Constitutional principles of 
obligatory prosecution and personal criminal liability - in line 
with Article 25, par. 2, and Article 27, par. 1, of the Constitution. 
Crimes such as criminal association and extraneus 
involvement become a battleground between sociological and 
legal classifications, where, however, the only ones who defend 
their position, except sporadically, are legal scholars. Scholars of 
the socio-historical sciences, as mentioned, if and when they 
extend their analyses up to and beyond the boundaries that 
separate them from the legal sciences, do so mainly thinking 
about legislation, and not the legal issues underlying the practical 
application of the law, which, instead, is the most common point 
of confrontation for the criminal lawyer in particular. Judicial 
provisions and those of the coordinating or investigative 
authorities, instead, seem to be the main source of information for 
socio-historical science scholars, to the extent that, this 
methodological approach has been criticised for its excessive use 
of such sources, ontologically contaminated by the search for and 
ascertainment of truth at trial; while, again from the point of view 
of useful differentiation between the socio-historical and legal 
sciences, there is a greater demand for historical, sociological and 
anthropological studies inspired by empirical methods on the 
ground45.  
In terms of how lawyers understand their relationship with 
the social sciences, instead, the error has been pointed out which 
the lawyer risks committing when they relate with “social 
analyses” and “criminological studies”. The efforts of jurists 
would be misplaced in making automatic the transposition of the 
“conceptual models” into the “juridical area to deduce their 
effects or implications which are directly relevant in the area of 
the law”46; instead, what would be useful would be an 
                                            
45 In this sense, Raffaele Cantone, during a lectio magistralis at the Federico II 
University of Naples, 16 May 2014.  
46 C. Visconti, Proposte per recidere il nodo mafie-imprese, cit. at 4, 1-2. 
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“empirical” territorial analysis, because it would have the 
potential to evaluate “the efficacy of the (legislative and judicial) 
strategies”47. The empirical approach also allows for 
differentiating between the individual Mafias (for example, 
Mafia, Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta), providing the tools to overcome 
those generalisations that have misrepresented them as unitary 
and indistinct48.  
  
 
3. Opposing collusion between professionals and Mafia-
type organisations: the role of professional associations 
in the legal system 
The theme of contiguity has often been addressed in a 
picturesque way in the media, sometimes propagated through the 
echo of populist representations and movements49. Rarely though 
have judgments of unfitness or inertia of the professional 
associations and colleges (henceforth professional associations)50 
in combating Mafia infiltration considered the legal situation, 
along with the sociological, criminological and journalistic 
analysis. Instead, it is essential to consider criminal law and the 
regulations of the professional associations. Indeed, although in 
many cases the professional associations could have done more, a 
complete evaluation of the issue cannot be achieved without a 
close examination of the relationship between criminal and 
disciplinary proceedings.  
As regards the identification of professional associations to 
observe, the professions that are most involved in Mafia collusion 
                                            
47 Ibidem. 
48 G. Fiandaca, C. Visconti, Scenari di mafia, cit. at 39, 9. 
49 See A. D’Alessio, Concorso esterno nel reato associativo (ad vocem), in Leggi 
d’Italia, § 1 and G. Fiandaca, Il concorso esterno agli onori della cronaca, in V Foro it. 
1 (1997).  
50 In order to simplify from now on we will only use the expression professional 
association. Regarding the difference between associations and colleges, the 
Royal Legislative Decree no. 103 of 24 January 1924, provides that “the 
professional classes, not regulated by previous laws, are constituted of 
associations or colleges, depending on whether, for the exercise of the 
profession, they require a degree or a diploma from universities or colleges or a 
middle school diploma”. A distinction which does not correspond, among 
others, with the College of Notaries, access to which, obviously, requires a 
university degree.  
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have been verified empirically, and in consideration of the results, 
it was decided to limit the field of investigation to only those 
professions that require registration in professional associations 
and which fall within the category of the so-called regulated or 
protected intellectual professions51. 
Bearing in mind the Constitutional principles52, the laws 
and the professional associations that characterise the regulation 
of the professions, the structure of public law that marks the 
sector is justified for a number of reasons, among them the 
coincidence of the role of professionals with the function of the 
protection of state interests (e.g., health and justice)53, and the 
desire to “ensure the security, certainty and ethics of the 
professional relationship (...) which only remains intact through a 
correct and proper exercise of the profession (...)”54.  
Alongside the traditional duties of probity, dignity, 
decorum, independence, loyalty, honesty and diligence (which 
can be in various professional codes), the engineers’ Code is 
worthy of note: in Article 5 on legality it states that “any 
participation or contiguity in illegal activity in any way connected 
or linked to organised crime constitutes a serious breach of ethics, 
detrimental to the profession”. Similar provisions can also be 
found in the Code of Italian planners, landscape architects, 
                                            
51 Which excludes the unprotected or non-regulated professions. For further 
reading see C. Golino, Gli ordini e i collegi professionali nel mercato: riflessioni sul 
modello dell’ente pubblico professionale (2011), 27-28. 
52 Among the Constitutional principles, among the others mentioned, should 
be: the fundamental guarantee of inviolable human rights in Article 2 of the 
Constitution, insofar as the professional association can be qualified as a social 
group in which is expressed the individual’s personality and which therefore 
demands “the fundamental duties of political, economic and social solidarity be 
fulfilled”; Article 41, which conditions private-sector economic initiative to 
social usefulness, safety, liberty and human dignity; Article 54 which speaks of 
the “discipline and honour” of public office holders. Consider, in addition, also 
Article 33. par. 5, Const., with reference to state examinations; mention must be 
made as well as the Constitutional provisions governing work, including 
Articles 1 and 4. On this point, consider the Constitutional case law, in 
particular judgments no. 13 of 29 March 1961 and no. 7 of 8 February 1966. For 
further discussion, see C. Golino, Gli ordini e i collegi, cit. at 51, 41 ff. On this 
point see G. della Cananea, L’ordinamento delle professioni, in S. Cassese (ed.), 
Trattato di diritto amministrativo (2003), 1142-1147 
53 See on this point C. Lega, La libera professione (1952), 56. 
54 See C. Golino, Gli ordini e i collegi, cit. at 51, 62. 
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conservationists, junior architects and planners, which also refers 
explicitly to “involvement in a Mafia-type organisation”55.  
While the codes of doctors and psychologists, in terms of 
forensic roles or providing advice to the courts, include norms 
safeguarding their independence, also in order to protect the 
credibility of the professional concerned.  
It is clear that these normative presuppositions form the 
basis for a proper and sensitive exercise of disciplinary power 
when confronted with forms of collusion and aggravated aiding 
and abetting of Mafia crimes, as well as performing an ethical, 
social and cultural role for the professionals, both as individuals 
and as a category that interacts with citizens, businesses and 
public administrations56. 
Given the legitimate expectations that stem from the needs 
of civil society, the institutions, including European and 
international ones, the judiciary and anti-Mafia organisations and 
the members of the professional associations, it is essential to 
evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness and efficacy of the 
current regulatory framework in order to assess the possibility for 
reform, also in light of the most recent legislative interventions on 
the subject.  
Before moving on to a detailed analysis we should also 
consider how the issue has been dealt with in general terms in the 
past. As we know, the professional associations have been the 
subject of a reformist debate in a political-institutional setting that 
only saw partial formal implementation in the most recent 
legislation. The generally held view of normative inefficiency, 
also measured through the quantitative datum of the imposing of 
sanctions for Mafia crimes (a little-known and still very modest 
datum), is only a symptom, where the causes are to be found in 
the institutional and political field. It is useful in this regard to 
point out that had the question of disciplinary power been dealt 
with in isolation, it is likely better conditions would have been 
achieved for political convergence along a common line which 
would have been widely shared among professional associations 
                                            
55 See art. 11 “legality”. On this point see V. Tenore, Il regime disciplinare degli 
architetti, in V. Tenore, P. Mazzoli, Codice deontologico e sistema disciplinare nelle 
professioni tecniche: ingegneri, architetti, geologi, geometri (2011), 99-183. 
56 On this point see G. della Cananea, L’ordinamento delle professioni, cit. at 52, 
1161.  
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and, by extension, in politics and the legislature. If the debate had 
been limited to the relationship between the professions and the 
Mafias, there would have been a more realistic possibility of 
extending the discussion to encompass the long-overdue reform 
of disciplinary power. In contrast, the perception on the part of 
the professional associations of being subject to a generalised 
reformist “siege”, a result of European policies57, might have been 
the cause of rigid counter-positions.  
The aim of operating in an efficient framework of controls 
and sanctions is subordinate to the resolution of various critical 
regulatory areas, which can be traced to sources that depend 
primarily on the State58 and the professional associations. 
As we wish to demonstrate, the regulation of disciplinary 
power is the Gordian knot that needs to be undone to construct a 
new system better able to respond to the abovementioned legal 
situations. In attempting to provide an order to the development 
of the second part of this work, in which it is intended to address, 
from a legal point of view, the more concrete issues in a 
development of a perspective of anti-Mafia professional conduct, 
we can proceed to an analysis of the four major critical areas in 
the current system. 
The first concerns criminal law, insofar as in the general 
and abstract application of the relevant norms and case-law 
principles we can see the main legal presuppositions, but also the 
constraints on the exercise of disciplinary power. 
The second relates to the professional association, in 
particular insofar as regards the associations’ exercise of 
regulatory, administrative and disciplinary autonomy, all in the 
light of the recent reforms. 
The third critical area can be seen in the role that the law 
leaves to the institutions and bodies that interact with the 
professional associations, such as the Ministry of Justice, the 
prosecutors and the courts, and the Parliamentary Anti-Mafia 
Commission. 
Last, but not least, a reflection is needed on the state of the 
system for the collection and, above all, exchange and access to 
                                            
57 On this point see G. della Cananea, I problemi delle organizzazioni professionali e 
il loro futuro, in Id., C. Tenella Sillani (eds.), Per una riforma delle professioni (2002), 
7.  
58 In view of the absolute reserve of law covering criminal matters. 
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data concerning judicial and disciplinary measures regarding 
professionals involved in Mafia crimes.  
 
 
4. Anti-Mafia Legislation: critical aspects and prospects 
for reform 
The multidisciplinary approach is essential in 
understanding and regulating contiguity and collusion with the 
Mafia, insofar as they are phenomena of society and the 
institutions. Article 416-bis c.c., which is also the result of the 
contributions of the sociological and criminological sciences, 
assimilates the “social dimension” on a legal level, attributing to it 
an interpretive role as regards the Mafia association structure. In 
this way have been laid “the foundations for a more flexible 
approach” to combating “organised crime”59. 
The counterpart to this approach can be seen in the 
difficult transposition of the political will for repression into the 
technical-legislative canons and in the formulation of Article 416-
bis c.c.60, the constitutionality of which has been the subject of 
doubt61.  
Collusion with the Mafia, however, is not born without any 
precedents in case law,  and there is no doubt that it has come to 
be “a highly innovative means of opposing criminality”62, which 
goes well beyond the “symbolic-repressive function” and, by 
means of its “hermeneutic circularity between the fact and the 
law”, concretely allows the qualification and “discovery of factual 
situations (...) which” would otherwise have escaped “legal 
attention”63.  
                                            
59 A. Centonze, Contiguità mafiose e contiguità criminali (2013), 7, 13 -14. 
60 Article 416-bis, approved in an emergency situation, was introduced in the 
infamous year of 1982 which saw the murders of Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa 
and Pio La Torre, a member of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on the 
Mafia in Sicily and first signatory of Law no. 646 of 13 September 1982, which 
incorporated Law no. 575 of 31 May 1965, (originally) “Provisions against the 
Mafia” and introduced Article 416-bis into the Criminal Code. 
61 See on this point L. Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione (1990), 859 and A. Centonze, 
Contiguità mafiose e contiguità criminali (2013), 3. 
62 M. Ronco, L’art. 416-bis nella sua origine e nella sua attuale portata applicativa, cit. 
at 38, 32. 
63 Ibidem, 60. 
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Difficulties remain, but the case-law consolidated over a 
long period of application have seen the overcoming, to a large 
extent, of initial doubts and interpretative difficulties. The Court 
of Cassation, in particular, has managed to reconcile the impact in 
criminal-law terms with the sociological leanings of the norms. 
There remains the consideration that the sociological premises, by 
their nature, and even more so in reference to the social and 
economic contexts in which the Mafias are rooted, cannot provide 
static representations of general and abstract realities governed by 
law. Thus, for example, Article 416-bis c.c., according to what has 
been said, would be able to better express itself when it has as a 
reference a model “of hierarchical Mafia”, “where the offer of 
protection” is “exercised in a monopolistic way in a given local 
community”. Therefore, in the presence of more fluid 
organisational models64 and ones that are less hierarchical, there 
should be a reconsideration of the normative points of reference. 
In some cases this would mean having to respond to the needs for 
new definitions of crimes65, through a “desirable improvement in 
the instruments of enforcement of criminal law”66. These 
considerations do not appear, however, to coincide with the idea 
of a legislator which is ready to react in the fight against the 
Mafias. If this legislative dynamism, all the same, ends up being 
based on the need for continuous adaptation, it would mean 
having to deal with at least two critical issues: one legislative, the 
other more strictly legal. Indeed, it would require the continued 
attention of the legislature, while, as has been critically observed, 
the progress of action against the Mafia is unfortunately cyclical67, 
and, moreover, needs to look beyond the confines of the limited 
anti-Mafia legislation in the codes. Moreover, to say that there 
should be some sort of dynamic reference to classifications and 
sociological readings in an interpretive phase and in necessary 
reformist reconsiderations, would mean weakening the norm, 
which would ultimately open the way to further criticism and the 
resulting perceptive uncertainties. 
So we wonder, then, if a more realistic approach might not 
be helpful in thinking about anti-Mafia legislation, distinguishing 
                                            
64 “Fluid structure” is discussed in A. La Spina, La sociologia, cit. at 40, 302. 
65 Cfr. F. Beatrice, Camorra, cit. at 24, 89-90. 
66 Cfr. G. Fiandaca, Il concorso esterno agli onori della cronaca, cit. at 49, 202. 
67 R. Sciarrone, Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove, cit. at 2, XXI. 
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the implementation of existing legislation from the prospect of 
reform. An approach that we might wish to follow even more, for 
reasons that will be explained, in reflecting on the room for 
improvement in the professional associations, through the 
exercise of normative, administrative and judicial autonomy, but 
also of the undervalued instruments of moral suasion. Moreover, 
from a reformist perspective, the system should be read 
dogmatically, as a whole and in harmony with the Constitution: 
instances of prevention, control and repression find a response in 
normative sources that can be traced to many other fields, 
including public and administrative law. Among the many might 
be considered ineligibility for election, the transparency of the 
public administrations, and the rules governing public 
procurement.  
Returning to the substance of the responses to current 
needs and available means, the discussion needs to be led back to 
the legal concept of Mafia-type organisation according to Article 
416-bis c.c. This contains the reference, the typified, autonomous 
regulatory model “around which are gathered innumerable rules 
of substantive and trial law, as well as criminal law, which have 
given rise to a real special criminal system”, produced by 
numerous pieces of legislation, amended various times68. Among 
these, in view of our common thread that starts from the 
professionals to extend to the professional associations, should be 
considered: the special aggravating circumstance referred to in 
Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 152/1991, “for crimes carrying 
a sentence other than life committed under the conditions of 
Article 416-bis (...) that is, in order to facilitate the activities of the 
associations provided for in that article”, which provides that the 
penalty should be increased by a third; aggravated “personal 
aiding and abetting” of the Mafia pursuant to Article 378, par. 2, 
c.c.69; assistance to members, under Article 418 c.c.70; recycling, 
                                            
68 Which in part it flowed into Legislative Decree no. 159/2011, M. Ronco, L’art. 
416-bis nella sua origine e nella sua attuale portata applicativa, cit. at 38, 32–33: see, 
in particular, amplius, nt. 4, which lists and illustrates the sources of law referred 
to.  
69 Which punishes the person who is not a member of the Mafia–type 
organisation nor contributes to it insofar as extraneus pursuant to Article 110 
and 416-bis c.c., but who behaves in a way intended to provide assistance to 
D’ALFONSO  - THE PROFESSIONS AND THE GREY AREA 
 
 
182 
 
under Article 648-bis c.c.71; Article 391-bis, recently added to the 
Criminal Code72, which punishes “anyone who allows a prisoner, 
subject to the restrictions of Article 41-bis of Law no. 354 of 26 July 
1975, to communicate with others, in circumvention of the 
requirements imposed for that purpose” and, in particular, which 
provides for a special aggravating circumstance “if the offence is 
committed by a public official, a civil servant or a party practising 
the legal profession”73; and, finally, external collusion with the 
Mafia, under Article 110 c.c. 
Having recalled the main offences that presuppose the 
existence of a “relationship” with the Mafias, it is opportune to 
preliminarily anticipate that, leaving aside the ascertainment in 
the broad sense of Mafia crimes and the penalties that can be 
imposed, the professional associations, in any case, would be 
required to consider the behaviour of their member. Thus, a 
criminal judgment with final conviction, pursuant to Article 653, 
par. 2, Code of Criminal Procedure74, would prove the “existence 
of the fact,” the “criminal illicit act and the affirmation that the 
accused committed it”. Behaviour of a criminal sort must also be 
followed by those which, in contrast to the rules of professional 
ethics, would result in a disciplinary action, albeit within the 
                                                                                                           
those who have committed crimes that come under Article 416-bis c.c. in order 
to facilitate the circumvention and avoidance of investigations. 
70 Under which “anyone, except in cases of collusion in the offence or of aiding, 
provides shelter or food, hospitality, means of transport, means of 
communication to any individual who are members of the association shall be 
punished with imprisonment from two to four years”. 
71 Mafia association pursuant to Article 416-bis c.c. is one of the crimes under 
Article 648-bis CC. Among the aims of Mafia association is the reintroduction of 
illicit capital in legal channels (cf. in this sense Cass., Sec. VI, sentence no. 45643, 
30 January 2009, in www.iusexplorer.it). 
72 With Law no. 94 of 15 July 2009, Article 2, par. 26. 
73 Specifically in reference to the legal profession, during remarks on the bill no. 
733, Rome 18 November 2008, 6, the council of the Unions of the Criminal 
Courts of Rome, in 
http://www.ristretti.it/commenti/2008/novembre/pdf8/ucpi_sicurezza.pdf, 
claimed it was an “attempt to criminalise the defender, identified as a possible 
contact with the outside”. On this point see also R. Cantone, Agevolazione 
criminosa ai detenuti ed internati in regime detentivo speciale, in Leggi d’Italia (2010). 
74 “Efficacy of the criminal sentence in disciplinary judgment”. 
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limits of the exculpatory procedural assumptions which cannot 
but be considered in disciplinary proceedings75.  
Before coming to the end of the general classification and 
moving on to deal with the aspects related to the professional 
associations, some final considerations need to be made with 
regard to the crime of collusion with the Mafia, insofar as 
“speaking of contiguity to organised crime in Italy means above 
all” bringing up “the thorny issue”76. Extraneus collusion 
(pursuant to Article 416-bis and 110 c.c.), as noted, fulfils the 
concrete need to provide a criminal-law response that is 
“anything but dogmatic” to punish “cases of so-called ‘contiguity’ 
or of collusion and interweaving between organised crime and 
members of the political, professional and economic-
entrepreneurial world”77. The dogmatic framework, however, can 
certainly not be overlooked, since it is an aspect that is not at all 
subordinate to the evidentiary requirements underlying the 
application of the norm, as widely argued in doctrine and in case 
law. As regards the aspect we are interested in, the objective that 
norm sets is to typify and sanction the “behaviours of those who, 
within (...) the professional field, although unrelated to the group 
and not sharing its aims”, make themselves available, for reasons 
of self-interest or for environmental compromise, to perform 
illegal actions that redound to the benefit” of the criminal 
organisation78, which, in this way, increases its ability “to expand 
and enter the nervous system of society”79.  
The uncertainty which would result from the presence of 
crimes referred to Articles 416-bis and 110 c.c., in terms of the 
                                            
75 Article 653, par. 1, Code of Criminal Procedure in particular states: “The 
irrevocable criminal sentence of acquittal has the force of res judicata for 
disciplinary responsibility in front of the public authorities insofar as it is a 
finding that the crime does not exist or does not constitute a criminal offence or 
that the accused did not commit it”.  
76 C. Visconti, Sui modelli di incriminazione della contiguità alle organizzazioni 
criminali nel panorama europeo: appunti per un’auspicabile (ma improbabile?) riforma 
“possibile” in G. Fiandaca, C. Visconti (eds.), Scenari di mafia, cit. at 39, 189 and 
following. 
77 See A. D’Alessio, Concorso esterno nel reato associativo, cit. at 49, 2. 
78 M. Ronco, L’art. 416-bis nella sua origine e nella sua attuale portata applicativa, cit. 
at 38, 86. 
79 As stated in the most recent and aforementioned judgment of the Court of 
Cassation, Sec. II, no. 17894/2014. 
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Constitutional principle of certainty of law would create a 
vacuum (also caused by the legislative technique) completely 
filled, according to a substantial part of doctrine, by the albeit 
sometimes wavering and oscillating case law80. Although, as 
noted, the case-law definition of the elements of typing would 
lead to an ultroneous role for case law, opposed to the principle of 
the separation of powers81. This is not the proper place to retrace 
the extensive debate in doctrine exploring in detail the position of 
the crime of association. In truth, even in the face of the widely 
supported need for reform, de iure condito there is no doubt that 
case law, especially that of the Court of Cassation, has succeeded, 
“through the processing of typological cases”82, in the objective of 
qualifying the necessary requirements that constitute the offence 
and sanctioning collusive and contiguous conduct. The question 
that arises, and we find ourselves faced with a paradox, is that 
despite the “constant legislative activism”83, that has enriched the 
legislation of the abovementioned new typings, all the attention 
ends up only on Article 110 c.c., insofar as it is the main lever to 
lift the bourgeois-Mafia lid that blurs the socio-economic roots of 
the evolutionary dynamics of the Mafias84. Or that even the 
innumerable “criminal instruments” have ended up creating a 
confused mass and inevitable “inextricable problems of legal 
                                            
80 For a reasonable and linear reconstruction of the precedent of the case law of 
the Supreme Court see A. Bargi, Concorso esterno e strumenti patrimoniali di 
contrasto alla criminalità organizzata, in May-August Arch. pen. 489 ff. (2012). 
81 M. Ronco, L’art. 416-bis, cit. at 38, 88. Also P. Morosini, La creatività del giudice 
nei processi di criminalità organizzata, in G. Fiandaca, C. Visconti (eds.), Scenari di 
mafia, cit. at 39, 538, in taking up the various positions in doctrine on the role of 
the judiciary, observe how “When dealing with facts related to forms of 
organised crime (...) the criminal trial is not a neutral ground or one free from 
conditioning”. 
82 G. Fiandaca, Il concorso “esterno” tra sociologia e diritto penale, cit. at 39, 209. 
83 C. Visconti, Sui modelli di incriminazione della contiguità alle organizzazioni 
criminali nel panorama europeo: appunti per un’auspicabile (ma improbabile?) riforma 
“possibile”, in G. Fiandaca e C. Visconti (eds.), Scenari di mafia, cit. at 39, 198-199. 
84 In the sense of not considering Article 110 c.c. as a “new and bizarre invention 
of the judges”, C. Visconti, Sui modelli di incriminazione, cit. at 83, 189, identifies 
the normative references and retraces the precedents in case law, also with 
distant references to the Mafia. 
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status”85, thus suggesting the failure of “a weighted and 
consistent legislative strategy over the last twenty years”86. The 
overall repressive framework can nonetheless be appreciated and, 
with reference to collusion with the Mafia, the qualification in 
case law of many types of behaviour87 has made “the full acquis of 
case-law on the subject” less fluid and more limpid88.  
The efforts of case law are not sufficient however; in fact, as 
can be gleaned from the report of the DNA in 2013, the current 
“legal frameworks” are revealed as inadequate “to encompass 
certain actual realities”89. Moreover, questions of undoubted 
importance remain unresolved, such as, as noted, the system of 
penalties for collusion. The same penalty being applied for 
participation in a Mafia-type organisation, in fact, “albeit justified 
on a formal level” conflicts with the “intuitive (...) different 
negative social value” and causes “ethical problems” and “is 
repugnant to the social conscience”90. Each occasion of legislative 
revision needs to overcome the cyclical nature of anti-Mafia 
policies in Italy91, in the hope of a political continuity on an issue 
that, as has been critically observed, is often placed on political 
agendas as though it were “an issue of marginal interest, 
evocative of an intellectual munus”, “suited at most,” as has been 
critically noted, “for a number of Southern lawyers with no 
                                            
85 See C. Visconti, Sui modelli di incriminazione della contiguità alle organizzazioni 
criminali nel panorama europeo: appunti per un’auspicabile (ma improbabile?) riforma 
“possibile”, cit. at 83, 198-199. 
86 Ibidem. 
87 On successful interpretative action of the Supreme Court see V. Maiello, 
Concorso esterno in associazione mafiosa: la parola passi alla legge, in Cass. Pen. 1353 
(2009). 
88 See C. Visconti, Sui modelli di incriminazione della contiguità alle organizzazioni 
criminali nel panorama europeo: appunti per un’auspicabile (ma improbabile?) riforma 
“possibile”, cit. at 83, 197. 
89 Thus F. Beatrice, Camorra, cit. at 24, 90, with specific reference to the Camorra 
and the increasingly frequent use of the (“ambiguous”) Article 110 c.c.    
90 A. Bargi, Concorso esterno e strumenti patrimoniali di contrasto alla criminalità 
organizzata, cit. at 80, 493. 
91 On this point see again R. Sciarrone, Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove, cit. at 2, XXI. N. 
dalla Chiesa, Manifesto dell’Antimafia, cit. at 1, IX, in placing anti-Mafia policies 
in the history of united Italian notes how, while other most significant critical 
zones that saw our country separated from the democratic ideal were 
addressed within “a path”, “only one of the historical scars” has been excluded, 
resulting in its exponential upsurge, “Mafia criminality”. 
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professional duties as regards those accused of criminal 
association”92.   
 
 
5. Instances of repression and limitation to the autonomy 
of professional associations 
From the criminal definition of Mafia offences come two of 
three main routes that lead to the punishability of Mafia 
involvement by professional associations. 
The first two routes for the majority of professional 
associations run in parallel. The first is that of criminal law: the 
courts are responsible for imposing the penalty and any other 
measures93; this leads, therefore, to effects directly related to the 
criminal proceedings and the sentence, that is, to the types of 
crime.  
The second is the competences of the associations, with 
specific reference to regulatory and disciplinary ones. Such 
parallelism94 is initial and continual if the charges against the 
professional have both criminal and disciplinary significance: the 
system, in fact, provides - with specific exceptions and not a few 
uncertainties of application95 – that from the start of criminal 
proceedings (being sent to trial and not merely being under 
investigation) it has to suspend disciplinary proceedings until the 
final judgment. This is the so-called “pending criminal 
proceedings”, set out in Article 653 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, applicable in cases where accusations against the 
professional are the object of criminal trial.  
The third route instead is autonomous, entirely contained 
in disciplinary proceedings and regarding behaviour that 
conflicts with professional rules of ethics that have no criminal 
                                            
92 N. dalla Chiesa, Manifesto dell’Antimafia, cit. at 1, IX.  
93 In addition to the application of penalties for Mafia crimes, supra § 4, we limit 
ourselves to recalling “additional penalties”. For certain crimes and 
misdemeanours (Article 19 c.c.) is foreseen the “disqualification from a 
profession” (Articles 30-31 c.c.) or the “suspension from the exercise of a 
profession” - Article 35 c.c. Consider also the measure of the “temporary ban on 
engaging in certain professional activities (...)” (Article 290 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code) following the launch of criminal proceedings. 
94 Which obviously it does not have to only cover Mafia crimes. 
95 This is the case with the Association of Chartered Accountants and 
Bookkeepers and, more recently, for lawyers, as observed later. 
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relevance (that is, that are not the subject of criminal proceedings) 
or that are different from other facts that simultaneously have 
criminal and professional relevance and are subject to 
prosecution. Putting it more simply, there might be behaviour 
that does not coincide with the broad category we have 
highlighted of Mafia-related crimes, but which are part of a 
broader category of behaviour “of a Mafia flavour”, in such a way 
as to be characterised as offending the dignity or decorum of the 
profession among other things. 
It is useful to focus jointly on the first two routes described, 
by far the more important in terms of quantity and quality. As 
repeatedly underlined, pending criminal proceedings are one of 
the main critical elements that prevent an effective exercise of 
professional disciplinary action. This is an assessment that seems 
to emerge clearly in the recent hearing of the Parliamentary Anti-
Mafia Commission of the President of the CNF (the Italian Bar 
Council) on “the role of Italian legal profession in the fight against 
organised crime”96. The same problem can be found in all the 
other associations. This is not the place to provide an account of 
the doctrinal and case-law debate that has characterised the 
evolution and application of the institution of pending criminal 
proceedings, which developed before and after the revision of 
Article 653 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 2001, while it is 
opportune to consider the normative evolution, certain exceptions 
                                            
96 Stenographer’s report sitting no. 37 of 4 June 2014, in www.camera.it. The 
Commission preceded the hearing with a request to the CNF having as its 
subject “the lists all the lawyers under judicial or disciplinary investigation and 
indicating the reasons from January 2008 to the present”. From the contents of 
the hearing, also characterised by its lively tone, emerges a clear need to 
overcome the pending criminal proceedings. As observed by the President of 
the Commission, the Right Hon. Bindi, waiting for the final judgment does not 
make sense because it does not guarantee the citizen’s rights (12). But it is 
probably the results of the inquiry that aroused most concern: the number of 
judgments handed down by the CNF (a total of less than ten) really seem to be 
very few, even if the data suffer from the restrictions on access to information. 
In fact, as specified by the CNF, Ufficio studi (editor), Dossier di documentazione e 
analisi, no. 7/2014, 7, this is the court of appeal. With the result that the data 
provided to the Anti-Mafia Commission concerns only the decisions of the 
councils of the association being appealed. Moreover, as noted by the President 
of the CNF, Stenographer’s report sitting no. 37 of 4 June 2014,  5, the same 
organ “has no statutory powers over local associations”, so it cannot directly 
acquire information and data”.  
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and a number of uncertainties in application, as well as the key 
points case law has arrived at, in particular in the united criminal 
and civil sections.  
More than one decade after the review of the norm, case 
law has emphasised the principles of reference and outlined 
hermeneutic solutions which97 confirmed, in 2014, “the relevance 
of the principle”, for the first time enshrined in the United 
Sections in 200698, of the suspension of professional disciplinary 
proceedings99. This relationship between criminal and 
professional disciplinary action cannot alter the criticism made of 
the professional associations that do not comply immediately in 
imposing sanctions on members involved in Mafia crimes. We 
would find ourselves faced, in fact, by an insurmountable 
constraint of law determined by the multiple relevance of the 
penal and professional disciplinary offence. Consequently, the 
only concrete solution that can be proposed, taking this criticism 
into account, to be considered of an ethical, cultural and political 
nature, cannot but find a concrete projection in new protections of 
the juridical good, that is, in a desirable review of the legislation 
or, less likely, in reconsiderations of case law. While, as noted in 
doctrine, exceptions to the suspension of disciplinary proceedings 
would be contra legem, insofar as enshrined in a source of primary 
law, through the exercise of the normative autonomy of the 
professional associations, therefore by means of professional 
ethical sources100.  
The criminal and professional disciplinary levels end up 
intertwining, although not necessarily, in a second moment, that 
                                            
97 Also when they have not directly affected professional associations, but other 
“public authorities” (Article 653, par. 1 of the CPP) that can be linked to the 
former. 
98 Cass. civ., SS.UU., 8 March 2006, no. 4893 with a note by F. Morozzo Della 
Rocca, Procedimento disciplinare e pregiudizialità penale nel novellato art. 653 c.p.p. 
in 4 Giust. civ. 954 ff. (2007), speaks about a “new course” for pending criminal 
proceedings, in opposition to previous judgments of the Supreme Court, which, 
even after the quoted, Law no. 97/2001, had “continued to exclude pending 
criminal proceedings and, therefore, the applicability of Article 295 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure to disciplinary proceedings”. 
99 Already stated in previous case law regarding: the last being Cass. civ. 
SS.UU., with its judgment no. 11309 of 22 May 2014, in www.iusexplorer.it.  
100 V. Tenore, Deontologia e nuovo procedimento disciplinare nelle libere professioni, 
cit. at 19, 126. 
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of the professional disciplinary proceedings. In the event of the 
offence falling under the statute of limitations, pursuant to Article 
157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure101, for example, the 
proceedings will only be activated subsequently. In this (as in 
every other) case of sentences (for example, definitive conviction 
or acquittal), the process will occur at a time quite distant from an 
awareness of the fact. This may have important consequences. In 
the case of the continuing exercise of professional activity, 
pending the issuance of an irrevocable criminal sentence of 
condemnation, it might lead to a loss of credibility for the 
professional associations. In contrast, on the level of the 
protection of rights and implementation of the principle of 
innocence until final conviction, the professional who is finally 
acquitted, who in the meantime has been prevented from 
exercising their profession, would suffer an infringement of their 
rights in the case of the imposition of a professional disciplinary 
sanction on the basis of the same facts evaluated in the criminal 
trial. Here too it is the rationale of the pending criminal 
proceedings, as well as in the possibility on the part of the 
professional associations to have access to the necessary evidence, 
which, with greater and more suitable means, might be acquired 
and ascertained in the criminal trial. 
The professional is therefore a subject protected by the 
professional association and, from the point of view of balancing 
interests, their status and exercise of the profession are more 
highly valued than, say, the protection of the prestige of the 
profession, both in terms of internal relationships (with other 
professionals enrolled in the same association or with the 
authorities of the professional associations) and in external 
relationships (with citizens, institutions, other professionals)102.  
                                            
101 The terms of which, it should be remembered, are doubled in the case of 
Mafia crimes under Article 51, par. 3, Code of Criminal Procedure. 
102 This prestige that might lead the professional to take the risk (at trial) of 
appealing against a judgment of acquittal, therefore one in their favour, because 
the formula is not one of the comprehensive ones, such as: “because the crime 
does not exist” or “because the accused did not commit it”. Judgments, then, 
pronounced with other formulae (such as acquittal for reasons of non-
punishability for conduct after the fact) “which, while not applying a penalty, 
involve - in different forms and to different degrees - a substantial recognition 
of the responsibility of the accused or, at least, the attribution of the fact”, and 
which, as such, would be able to harm the “moral” but also “the legal interests 
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In reflecting on the possibility of overcoming the 
application of the institute of pending criminal proceedings, it is 
useful to recall, de iure condito, two different current disciplines 
which, instead, would allow the professional association to 
proceed in any case with its disciplinary proceedings, under 
given circumstances. The first is sanctioned by Legislative Decree 
no. 139 of 28 June 2005, “Constitution of the Association of 
Chartered Accountants and Book-keepers (...)”, which has the 
status of a lex specialis, like the more recent law no. 247 of 31 
December 2012, “New regulations for the organisation of the legal 
profession”103. These are, therefore, primary sources, operating in 
derogation of Article 653 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A 
second hypothesis is that of the norms of the professional 
association which state that disciplinary power can be exercised 
independently, also simultaneously with criminal proceedings104. 
This second model, as critically observed in doctrine, “is exposed 
to objections in judgment”105, insofar as the association rules and 
regulations cannot “derogate from the so-called pending criminal 
proceedings (...)”106 contained in a source of primary law. In 
contrast, the first model of derogation merits particular attention, 
insofar as it is appropriate for untying the Gordian knot that 
prevents the overcoming of the current system based on pending 
criminal proceedings. 
                                                                                                           
of the acquitted” - (cf. the judgment n. 85 of the Constitutional court, 4 April 
2008, in 2 Giur. cost. 1032 (2008), on this point M. Bargis, L’imputato può 
nuovamente appellare (con un limite) le sentenze dibattimentali di proscioglimento: la 
corte costituzionale elimina (e nel contempo crea) asimmetrie, in 2 Giur. cost. 1046 
(2008) - leaving them still open to “possible consequences (...) of a professional 
disciplinary nature” - other than “accounting and administrative” (see on this 
point the United Sections of the Court of Cassation, sentence 11 march 1993, no. 
6203 and no. 6989 of the Sixth Section of the Court of Cassation of 30 March 
1995). In the same way, the professional, to protect their prestige and integrity, 
according to Article 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, may waive the 
statute of limitations to seek a judgment of acquittal with the full formula. 
103 Article 50 “Disciplinary proceedings”, par. 10, states: “the professional who 
is subject to criminal proceedings is also subjected to disciplinary proceedings 
for the fact that was the subject of imputation, unless they have been acquitted 
because the crime did not exist or the defendant did not commit it”. 
104 This is the case of the “Code of Architects (…)”, (Article 37, par. 5).  
105 V. Tenore, Deontologia e nuovo procedimento disciplinare nelle libere professioni, 
cit. at 19, 126. 
106 Ibidem, 201. 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL.8  ISSUE 1/2016 
 
191 
 
With reference to the regulations of chartered accountants, 
Article 50, par. 10, of Legislative Decree no. 139/2005, in 
conjunction with Article 20, par. 1 of “Regulations for the exercise 
of territorial disciplinary functions” of 2009, provides that the 
council of the association “having opened disciplinary 
proceedings and carried out the hearing stage, may order 
suspension, pending other proceedings before the judicial 
authorities”. The application of this nor107 does not allow the 
clarification of uncertainties in interpretation, as noted in the 
professional disciplinary seat108, despite clearer guidance already 
provided by the association itself109.  
The most recent law no. 247/2012 sets out a new way of 
interaction between professional disciplinary and criminal 
proceedings for the legal profession. Article 54 regulates the 
relationship between the disciplinary proceedings and the 
criminal trial, affirming that the former “are defined by a 
procedure and evaluations which are independent of the criminal 
proceedings which has as its object the same facts”; if the organs 
involved believe that “for the effects of the decision” it is 
“essential to acquire documents and information pertaining to the 
criminal trial”, it may suspend disciplinary proceedings for a 
“fixed” period, but for no more than a “total” of “two years”, 
during which “the limitation period will suspended”. The law 
gives, therefore, discretion to the competent bodies, establishing 
the presuppositions for the suspension of disciplinary 
proceedings. It notes that professional disciplinary proceedings 
                                            
107 Ibidem, 200 ff., discussing in detail the current regulations, states that 
“courageously it is expected that prosecution does not suspend or prevent the 
initiation of disciplinary proceedings where the conduct constitutes independent 
evaluation of the provisions of the Code” (our italics). 
108 As an example, consider the maximum measure taken by the National 
Council of Accountants, 19 May 2011, no. 9, which states that “Article 653 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, affecting the relationship between professional 
disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings both initiated both against 
same professional for the same offences, introduced a prejudice between the 
proceedings cited, determining in fact the suspension of disciplinary 
proceedings pending the criminal outcome”.  
109 A question by an association to the National Council of Chartered 
Accountants and Statutory Auditors, on the “duration of disciplinary 
proceedings (...)” on 21 October 2014, was answered by the Director-General of 
the association reiterating the optional nature of the suspension of disciplinary 
proceedings, referring to the provisions of the abovementioned Article 20. 
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should not be suspended when the acquisition of documents and 
information from the criminal proceedings is not deemed as 
indispensable. The legislature of 2012, in this way, sought to 
protect the public interest by the activation of disciplinary 
proceedings in a certain time frame, “lining them up” 
(consistently with Article 55) with the regulations on the 
“prescription of professional disciplinary action”.  
Furthermore, the legislator, as regards the hypothesis of 
conflicting judgments, has provided a mechanism for balancing 
the effects. Article 55 provides for the reopening of proceedings110 
and acquittal if “a disciplinary sanction was imposed and, for 
those same acts, the court” has issued “a sentence of acquittal 
because the crime does not exist or because the accused did not 
commit it”; or a new free assessment of the facts when the 
professional disciplinary process has “issued an acquittal and the 
criminal court has issued a conviction for an offence committed 
intentionally founded on facts relevant to the determination of 
disciplinary responsibility, which were not evaluated by the 
district board of professional discipline”.  
These provisions have been defined as ‘singular’ by 
authoritative doctrine111 and concerns were also expressed about 
them during the process of approval112. In any event, it is possible 
to appreciate their innovative character, insofar as a coordinated 
reading with other institutions reduces the previously mentioned 
criticality in the application of pending criminal proceedings. It 
remains, without doubt, entrusted to the associations the role of 
the supervision of legality in the professional disciplinary 
settings. The institutes will be verified in the seat of application.  
In an era in which justice, because of the length of time 
trials take, sees its axis move increasingly towards other models, a 
high degree of distrust of the professional disciplinary function 
seems to persist. The model, hopefully, in its application, enriched 
                                            
110 “At the request of the accused or the accuser” (par. 2). 
111 In this sense, G. Alpa, L’illecito deontologico e il procedimento disciplinare 
nell’ordinamento della professione forense, in Nuova Giur. Civ. 4 (2014), note 10, 
which defines as “singular (...) the institution of the reopening of disciplinary 
proceedings” as in Article 55. 
112 In the Dossier prepared by the “Ufficio studi del Senato” “ai disegni di 
legge”, in November 2012, no. 406, in 
http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/00737342.pdf, 17 to 18. 
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by an evolution characterised by the desire to maintain solid 
references to the level of principle, can also be replicated for other 
associations through national legislative action, while respecting, 
where necessary, the special features of the regulations of each 
profession. The practical application of the new regulations for 
lawyers generates new presuppositions that should allow the 
legal associations to resolve the critical issues recently highlighted 
in the Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission, in particular the 
effective ability of the association to protect the interests of the 
whole community with regard to combating Mafia infiltration in 
the sectors of the economy, the institutions and society113.  
Undoubtedly, from the combined reading of other 
provisions, it is possible to pick up on the signs of a process of 
improvement which, although not complete, when applied with 
determination, clarity and widely shared objectives, might 
support the opening of a new phase. The reference is, in 
particular, to the provisions concerning: prescription, typing114, 
limitations on the suspension of disciplinary proceedings, 
information and control activities of the national bodies over the 
territorial, interim suspension, disbarment, training of the 
members of the district, territorial and national disciplinary 
councils and guaranteeing the independence the decision-making 
of the same in the exercise of their disciplinary functions. Each of 
these elements presents problem that have to be considered 
individually and in the wider context. Among these, the last 
element is what is commonly considered the major cause of the 
supposed inefficiency imputed to the professional associations. In 
the public mind, in fact, the overlapping of roles between the 
professional who violates the rules of ethics and the other 
professionals who evaluate the application of sanctions has a 
negative impact on independence and reasoned judgment. Such a 
critical reading of the phenomenon, which has many supporters, 
however, must be brought back to the juridical and dogmatic 
level. It must be said that it is not at all easy to formulate models 
capable of ensuring a proper balance between (the principles of) 
                                            
113 Infra § 6. 
114 As happens, for example, for the Lawyers’ Code of Ethics, which lists the 
duties of conduct in a series of articles, the last paragraph of which provides for 
the sanction that can be imposed.  
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fairness or impartiality115 of the professional disciplinary bodies 
and the independence of the professional associations that takes 
the form of an appropriate and necessary level of representation 
of the professionals116. To take as the basis of the reasoning a 
practical element, we can look first at the composition of the 
disciplinary boards, trying to define the features of the models 
outlined by the system.  
A first model that moves in the direction of extending the 
professional disciplinary bodies to include subjects other than the 
professionals themselves is that of the notaries. The system 
foresees that the competent regional administrative disciplinary 
commission should be chaired by a magistrate117. What we have, 
then, is a mixed college. A further guarantee is provided by the 
challenge on appeal118 and, on the occurrence of certain 
conditions, to the Court of Cassation119.  
A second model is the one outlined with the rules 
regarding deregulation in the Decree by the President of the 
Republic no. 137 of 7 August 2012. For the associations affected by 
this legislation - the majority (the medical and legal professions 
are excluded) - Article 8 establishes territorial disciplinary 
councils in the territorial boards of the associations, to which are 
entrusted the tasks of investigation and decision regarding 
disciplinary matters relating to members. It is first established 
that, regardless of the number of members of the disciplinary 
board, the single disciplinary matter must be bealt with by a 
                                            
115 V. Tenore, Deontologia e nuovo procedimento disciplinare nelle libere professioni, 
cit. at 19, 114 ff., 179 ff. and 213 ff. 
116 On this point, see the judgment no. 10875 of the United Sections of the Court 
of Cassation, 30 April 2008, at http://www.iusexplorer.it, according to which 
the disciplinary function is exercised to protect the interests of the same 
category by the same professional bodies that represent “the professional group 
most directly offended by the behaviour of one of its members and therefore 
more interested in the repression of ethically improper conduct”. 
117 The reference is to Legislative Decree no. 249 of 1 August 2006, amending 
Law no. 89 of 16 February 1913. Articles 148 to 153 lay down a set of rules that 
define the model of the notarial profession.  
118 The reference is to Article 158, par. 1 of Legislative Decree no. 249/2006 as 
amended in 2011, with the limits of applicability pursuant to Article 36 of 
Legislative Decree no. 150 of 1 September 2011. On this point see Cass. Civ., Sec. 
II, 23 January 2014, no. 1437. 
119 The first model (notaries) was subject to criticism, M. Gozzi, Il procedimento 
disciplinare nell’ordinamento delle professioni, 4-5 Riv. Dir. Proc. 956 ff. (2013). 
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board consisting of three persons, chaired by the senior 
member120. For the nomination of members of the disciplinary 
councils, the basic principle is that of the incompatibility between 
the office of the territorial association and the office of member of 
the corresponding territorial disciplinary council. This principle is 
also extended to the national disciplinary councils, in line with 
the regulations of the national councils of the association. With 
regard to the appointment (by the president of the court) of 
external parties (magistrates), it is possible to also include subjects 
who are not members of the association121. The role of the 
president of the court should be highlighted insofar as they have 
to select the other components from a list drawn up by the 
associations themselves122. 
This function, instead, is not foreseen in the new lawyers’ 
association123 – and in this case we would be in the presence of a 
third model – which foresees an elective system. This choice of 
the legislature has given rise to criticism because it would lead to 
a compression of the “relationship of representation between 
board and members”124. On the other hand, it can be held that the 
role attributed to the president of the court might represent a 
further guarantee, substantial but also relating to image, of the 
independence and authority of the names chosen to play an 
                                            
120 This point was subject to criticism, insofar as, M. Gozzi, Il procedimento 
disciplinare nell’ordinamento delle professioni, cit. at 119, § 5, the reduction in the 
number of members would impede - as instead happened previously, when it 
was the entire professional association that reached a decision - the 
pronouncement of the “conspicuous plurality of elected members who ideally 
should have represented the judgment expressed by the entire professional 
category”. 
121 See article 8, par. 2 and 4. 
122 According to Article 8, par. 3, those who can be nominated are “specified in a 
list of individuals proposed by the corresponding association boards or colleges 
(...) subject to the binding opinion of the supervisory minister”.  
123 According to Article 50, par. 2, of Law no. 247/2012, which provides that 
“the district disciplinary council is composed of members elected by 
democratically one member, one vote, in respect of gender representation 
under Article 51 of the Constitution, according to the regulation approved by 
the CNF”. 
124 On this point, See M. Gozzi, Il procedimento disciplinare nell’ordinamento delle 
professioni, cit. at 119, 5, who observes how the general provisions contained in 
Legislative Decree 137/2012 would be going in the opposite direction to those 
of the notaries and the legal profession. 
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important role in the protection of the public interest and the 
positions of individual rights of the members of the associations.  
It is evident how the models will be tested in the 
disciplinary setting and evaluated considering the other precepts 
laid down in order to guarantee independence125. The model that 
foresees elections and therefore finds concrete expression in the 
principle of the accountability of members practicing in full the 
autonomy of the association will equally be able to meet the 
objectives of independence and reasoned judgment. We cannot, 
however, overlook the existence of a greater degree of 
permeability and risk for the boards, particularly in territories 
and historical phases in which the presence of the Mafia is 
heightened. 
From the insights gained in the analysis of one of the most 
important aspects and from the consideration of the need for a 
reading of the system that considers individual norms in their 
practical application, it is easy to understand how, by returning to 
an organic vision, the task of opposing Mafia infiltration and 
contiguity in a broad sense cannot fall only to the legislator. On 
these conceptual foundations a real anti-Mafia sense could take 
root in the associations, in turn traceable to a broader concept of 
anti-Mafia ethics, which should involve all public or private 
bodies that have their own codes of ethics and disciplinary bodies 
called upon to judge responsibilities and impose sanctions, also in 
terms of warning and guarantee for the daily exercise of all the 
functions and activities that, inevitably, impact on society and the 
institutions.  
 
 
6. For an Anti-Mafia policy in professional associations 
amid inefficiencies in the information and control 
systems.  
There are two additional elements to be evaluated: the 
system for the collection of information and data on professionals 
involved in the Mafia and the supervision of the workings of the 
                                            
125 It should be remembered, in lowering the level of risk, how, like the notaries, 
the regulations for the lawyers’ association (Article 50, par. 3 of Law no. 
247/2012) provide that “members belonging to the association in which the 
professional against whom they must proceed is inscribed” cannot be members 
of the judging panel of the district disciplinary council. 
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associations. The description of these two factors might contribute 
to the evaluation of the effectiveness of the system of controls 
with respect to cases of inertia and improper exercise of the 
disciplinary function. The analysis of the organisation and the 
exercise of the administrative and judicial powers given over to 
the control and further investigation of the legal facts we are 
interested in appears necessary for various reasons. Above all, in 
the face of a sometimes harsh academic criticism of the activity of 
the associations126 and sociological contributions that highlight 
the negative effects of a certain corporative culture that “prevents 
the recognition of the presence or infiltration of the Mafia in its 
own professional association”127, it is necessary to reflect starting 
again from the norms. It must first be noted that there are no 
systematic insights in legal doctrine128 nor unique normative 
references, and “the ways in which this form of ‘control’ can and 
should be carried out” appear insufficient. 
The supervisory functions, exercised in consideration of 
the legal nature of public entity of the associations, have been 
attributed to a large extent, though not exclusively, to the 
Ministry of Justice129. These consist essentially in requests for 
clarification and, sometimes, in activities of inspection. Their goal 
is to verify the proper operation and exercise the power of 
dissolution and shutting down of local or national associations in 
the case of proven dysfunction or “of serious and repeated 
violations of the law, variously defined by the regulations as 
                                            
126 As regards “false guardians of professional ethics” see F. Stefanoni, I veri 
intoccabili (2012), 142 ff. The author, taking up a number of legal cases, and 
statistics on the activity of the associations, highlights the paucity of cases that 
result in penalties; moreover, among the factors conditioning the disciplinary 
function are: “the subjective qualities of the members, resources and time 
available, the number of statements, backlog to be dealt with, (...) good 
relationships, friendships or enmities (...)” and electoral favours. Also in the 
case of professionals involved in or convicted of collusion with the Mafia, the 
situation is described as particularly critical. For a reminder of the case studies 
in the field of the collaboration of professionals with the Mafia see N. Amadore, 
La zona grigia, professionisti al servizio della mafia (2007).  
127 See on this point N. dalla Chiesa, Manifesto dell’Antimafia, cit. at 1, 209-213. 
128 On this point, see V. Tenore, Deontologia e nuovo procedimento disciplinare nelle 
libere professioni, cit. at 19, 228 and C. Golino, Gli ordini e i collegi, cit. at 51, 273 
who point out the deficiencies in this area. 
129 In particular, the Directorate General of Civil Justice, Office III, sectors 1 and 
2, respectively “Notarial” and “Professions”. 
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violations of the duties of the organ (...) tasks which lie with the 
Ministry of Justice”130.  
The control function is also exercised by the public 
prosecutor131, either independently or in support of the Ministry. 
In this case too, the functions attributed do not allow a single 
reading, in that, except for certain provisions of a general nature, 
they have as their normative reference the specific legal 
provisions of the individual associations132.  
However, it is useful to analyse some of the functions that 
might be exercised. In addition to the role of pushing for the 
launch of disciplinary proceedings (also exercisable by fellow 
professionals, local boards or third parties), the public prosecutor, 
informed by the associations of the decisions taken in disciplinary 
proceedings, has the power to impugn them133. The functions of 
the prosecutor thus appear more incisive than the power of 
supervision of the Ministry134.  
The disciplinary measures pronounced by the associations 
can, therefore, be challenged, as can be seen from most of the laws 
governing the individual associations, in the national councils, in 
the ordinary court of first instance or appellate or cassation 
(united sections and not), or, in some cases in the administrative 
court135. 
The disarticulation and uncertainty of the regulatory 
references136 and of the extent of controls understood in the broad 
sense, represents a first acute shortcoming of the supervisory 
system, so non-linear and ineffective at the operational level as to 
                                            
130 Relazione sulla amministrazione della giustizia nell'anno 2013 - Dipartimento per 
gli affari di giustizia. 
131 V. Tenore, Deontologia e nuovo procedimento disciplinare nelle libere professioni, 
cit. at 19, 242 and amplius 242-252: “Identified each time as prosecutors at the 
courts of appeal and/or prosecutors at the courts in the district where territorial 
disciplinary boards are located (...).” 
132 Ibidem, 245 ff., the author reconnects the individual functions to the specific 
legislative disposition of the associations. 
133 The supervisory function may also consist in the possibility of participating 
in the preliminary disciplinary proceedings. 
134 Consider also the role that these exercise before the Court of Cassation in 
case of appeal. On this point, see V. Tenore, Deontologia e nuovo procedimento 
disciplinare nelle libere professioni, cit. at 19, 191. 
135 Ibidem, 166-198 for a reconstruction with doctrinal and case-law references. 
136 Think merely of the different role assumed by the prosecutor according to 
the law establishing the association. 
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constitute an initial strong limitation for the subject of Mafia 
collusion, but in general for any other matters relating to the 
associations. As regards the authority of the Ministry, a body with 
reference to which we can actually speak of supervisory powers, 
dissolution is an extreme act, principally intended to punish 
repeated violations or failure to function and thus leaving 
individual violations outside the margins of operation, such as 
inertia with respect to individual disciplinary actions or specific 
misapplication of the rules of professional ethics. We can 
therefore conclude that for this type of supervision the principle 
of the autonomy of the associations continues to prevail, with a 
balancing of interests that appears to be insufficient.  
To this must be added the other critical issue represented 
by the shortage in terms of information that can be detected in the 
systematic collection of data concerning professionals involved in 
Mafia crimes and the communication of the same to the organs, 
not just of control. As there are no systems of data collection, 
there is obviously no possibility of accessing compiled and 
individual data that bring together Mafia crimes, professionals, 
the state of criminal and professional proceedings, disciplinary 
measures taken or inertia. This state of affairs does not even allow 
important agencies responsible for combating the Mafia, such as 
the Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission, access to 
comprehensive information. This also affects the ability of 
operators and scholars to have access to data on the subject.  
The most comprehensive database should be the “single 
national database of anti-Mafia documentation”137, obviously 
with limited access for security and investigative reasons, of 
extremely wide scope, whose targeted access, among other things, 
would lead to great expense for such complex inquiries. The 
amount of information contained in it does not allow us to 
imagine its being used for the purpose under discussion, unless it 
a specific function be established normatively. 
The databases of the professional associations not only do 
not allow, therefore, systematic research, but also appears to be 
absolutely inadequate138 compared to their stated aims, even only 
                                            
137 See art. 96-99 of Legislative Decree n. 159, of 6 September 2011. 
138 Though there are some partial exceptions: think of the files of the Association 
of Chartered Accountants and Bookkeepers. 
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to gain timely information to be reworked later. One step 
forward, which could be easily carried out, is that already hoped 
for of giving over to the judiciary the monitoring of “the 
judgments of the Court of Cassation”139 on Mafia crimes, up to 
those on the first and second degree. A key role could also be 
played by the Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission which 
already has an important archive containing a wealth of 
documentation, which includes reports from judges, law 
enforcement officials, journalists and researchers140.  
From a point of view of legislative approval, therefore, it is 
necessary to consider this limit, since, as has been critically 
observed, “there is no database of professionals arrested for 
criminal association or aiding and abetting (...). There are, 
unfortunately, no numbers, statistics or monitoring that might 
provide an idea of the macro phenomenon. In practice it is not 
known how many white-collar workers are arrested or involved 
in investigations into the Mafia”141. Some steps in this direction 
were made by the Anti-Mafia Commission of the current 
legislature, which has initiated, for now with the CNF, a path of 
cooperation that will hopefully quickly reach the area of interest. 
The goal must be to overcome incongruous barriers to access and 
to reach systems, albeit differentiated, for the sharing of data of 
interest. The current critical issues emerged during the Anti-Mafia 
Commission142 at the hearing of the President of the CNF in June 
2014. Thus, for example, it was recognised how the law does not 
permit the CNF “to acquire directly the provisions that have been 
filed in cases in which disciplinary proceedings were initiated and 
then for the most varied of reasons the proceedings were 
concluded”143; nor is there an organic system suitable for 
acquiring information for the CNF about professionals facing 
prosecution144. In these conditions it is difficult to imagine a new 
                                            
139 See N. dalla Chiesa, Manifesto dell’Antimafia, cit. at 1, 103. 
140 See L. Pepino, Antimafia. I. Commissione parlamentare, in M. Mareso, L. Pepino 
(eds.), Dizionario di mafie e antimafia (2013), 10-11, which on this point also refers 
to M. Pantaleone, Antimafia occasione mancata (1969), 11. 
141 N. Amadore, La zona grigia, professionisti al servizio della mafia, cit. at 126, 41. 
The reference is to Cosa Nostra, but the judgment is obviously extendable to the 
other Mafias. See also 45-46. 
142 On which, Stenographer’s report cit. at 96, 5 discussed above. 
143 Ibidem, 5. 
144 Ibidem, 47. 
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course that places among the priorities of the associations the 
fight against the Mafias. We are talking, in fact, of essential 
conditions for the operability of the organs of the associations.  
Placing the reasoning in a broader perspective, the culture 
of legality should be the focus of political debate, prior to and 
simultaneous with what takes place in the national, European and 
international legislatures, and the professional associations. The 
concept of the culture of legality must have a wide scope, with a 
natural dialectical-multidisciplinary thrust, extending to new 
legislative and associative systems, with the aim of following up 
the proposals made by the highest institutions in the field145 and 
the movements and associations involved in the anti-Mafia 
struggle.  
The impetus for reform should be born in a state of tension 
capable of pushing levels of participation “towards a civil or 
cultural movement”, which is that of the anti-Mafia movement, 
beyond its borders and towards every other form “of 
participation (...) political, trade union, associative, cultural (...) 
for peace (...), environmental (the fight against the eco-Mafia), (...) 
for justice or social, civil and human rights”146. The permeability 
and the versatility of the shapes and textures of an even wider 
and transverse anti-Mafia would create a natural contrast to the 
“systemic nature of the Mafia phenomenon”147. The anti-Mafia as 
a political, social, institutional, legislative, judicial reality would 
be greatly strengthened by a real anti-Mafia in the professional 
associations 148, shared by all the professional associations, 
without uncertainty on the legislative, disciplinary, cultural, 
                                            
145 F. Beatrice, Camorra, cit. at 24, 90. 
146 N. dalla Chiesa, Antimafia (Movimento), in M. Mareso, L. Pepino (eds.), 
Dizionario enciclopedico di mafie e antimafia (2013), 47. 
147 Ibidem, 25, discusses about the systemic nature.  
148 Among the initiatives we might recall is the “Ethical charter of the 
intellectual professions” born in Modena in 2011 as part of the joint committee 
of the professions and the Manifesto of the Committee of professionals 
(www.professionistiliberi.it) of Palermo, who along with LiberoFuturo and 
Addiopizzo foresee the voluntary signing by professionals and public or 
private employees of a “Declaration of Commitment” with membership of a 
public directory that involves the obligation to respect the contents of the 
Manifesto, which if violated will see the exclusion of the professionals. The 
declaration can be seen at http: // 
www.professionistiliberi.org/?cmd=il_manifesto.  
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ethical and communicative levels, carefully conceived in terms of 
legislative technique and in harmony with Constitutional 
principles, but bold in wanting to oppose any denial and firm in 
sanctioning the phenomena of collusion and aiding and abetting. 
Every tool available to the professional associations should be 
pointed in a single direction, as should ethical training, which 
should be carried out following a multidisciplinary approach, 
reconnecting behaviour to values and principles, to the effects on 
the economic and social level, with the intention of animating a 
“collective consciousness” aimed at strengthening, as has been 
observed, “a coercive power that is inherent in the social norm, 
from blame to the isolation of the group”. Evidently the definition 
of behaviour contrary to the law and the rules of professional 
conduct is essential and the professionals themselves should 
contribute to this through an ongoing case law (in the broadest 
sense) of the associations, one that is unitary and transparent. The 
borders between legality and illegality must be as visible as 
possible, while in some places they are sometimes wilfully 
obscured for the benefit of a few, with the serious consequence of 
not being identifiable any more or, and this is even more serious, 
not shared and recognised by the majority. Only by ensuring the 
credibility of the professional and social role of professionals can 
a clear contrast be achieved to the (non) culture of lawlessness 
that takes root and thrives in the grey area.  
From this point of view, it is useful to refer to the legal 
nature of professional associations and to the different forms of 
autonomy. Professional associations foster collective149  and 
general interests. They are the expression of «a social group»150 
and recognise themselves in their own “social sub-layer”151. By 
respecting the limits established by the legal system, it is the 
professional associations’ duty to discipline ethically and 
deontologically the professionals’ conduct and exercise the 
powers of control and sanction. Such power is to be concretely 
intended in a dynamic sense, always taking into account the 
evolution of the above-mentioned interests. 
                                            
149 Of the professional enrolled in the professional associations. 
150 F. Teresi, Ordini e collegi professionali (ad vocem), in Dig. Disc. Pubbl. 452 
(1995).  
151 G. della Cananea, L’ordinamento delle professioni, cit. at 52, 1175. 
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THE RISE OF GLOBAL STANDARDS.  
ICAO'S STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 
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Abstract 
This article aims, using the examination of the regulation of 
aviation safety by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) as a case analysis, to demonstrate how the relationship 
between bureaucratic power and political authority, a recognized 
problem in public law studies, has shifted into a new context. 
Global regulatory regimes express a great variety of 
standards. This involves critical issues, regarding both sovereignty 
and legitimacy. Sovereignty, because the increasing number of 
‘rule-makers’ implies a redefinition of the role of States, and 
legitimacy, because global regulatory regimes do not follow 
traditional paths of legitimacy as defined within the model of 
national public powers. 
Standards adopted by ICAO have a high degree of 
effectiveness, considering they are not formally binding. This 
effectiveness is due to the role assigned to standards in the ICAO 
Convention, and to the various tools used for ensuring 
compliance, which are primarily procedural. The adoption of a 
Universal Security Audit Programme for member States ensures 
control over the implementation of standards. Consequently, the 
development of this regulatory system is not merely adopted and 
‘proposed’ to member States, but strongly fostered far beyond the 
initial understanding. But there is also another crucial factor to be 
considered. Technicality promotes uniformity, at least on a formal 
level. The need for a ‘common framework’ of technical rules, as 
safety standards are, is better met through a global regulatory 
regime, expression of bureaucratic power, rather than through a 
political authority. The balance between these two elements, 
however, is not clearly defined, and finds at the global level a new 
dimension of comparison. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Global standards as a relevant area of critical issues 
on sovereignty and legitimacy 
Global regulatory regimes express a great variety of 
standards1.  
As has been observed, “standards are exemplary measures 
against which people and things are judged. They can be informal, 
resembling norms and habits; they can also be formal, resembling 
laws or written codes of conduct or embedded in material objects. 
Both formal and informal standards are involved in nearly every 
aspect of human life”, but “formal standards […] are those that are 
primarily invoked in global governance”2. 
In fact the ‘production’ of formal standards is one of the 
major features of global regulatory regimes3, though not always 
                                                           
1 See B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, R.B. Stewart, The emergence of Global Administrative 
Law, 68 Law Contemp. Probs, 15-61 (2005).  
2 A. Loconto, J.V. Stone, L. Busch, Tripartite Standards Regime, in George Ritzer 
(eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization (2012), 1. 
3 See S. Cassese, Il diritto Globale. Giustizia e democrazia oltre lo Stato (2009); Id., 
The global polity: global dimensions of democracy and the rule of law (2012); M. 
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considered crucial, especially if the analysis is limited to the 
‘institutional charters’ (of global regimes). However, as has been 
noted, “institutional charters do not reveal how organs in ICAO, 
IMO, WMO, FAO, and the WHO, for example, have responded to 
changes in the world just as the Security Council has responded to 
perceived changes in security threats”4 . Powers and functions 
outlined in ‘institutional charters’ do not always reveal to what 
extent different tools used by the ‘administrative’ bodies follow 
the aims of global regulatory regimes. 
This implies the emergence of various forms of soft law that 
are not easily placed within traditional sources of international 
law5. 
Issues regarding the relationship between States and global 
regulatory regimes, and resulting implications regarding 
sovereignty and legitimacy, can be better understood by looking 
at the ‘normative product’ resulting from the activity of global 
regulatory regimes. 
There are in fact relevant implications for sovereignty and 
legitimacy. 
The phenomenon of supranational sources of law (difficult 
to entirely understand through classic tools of international law) 
concerns “the central problem of sovereignty: what are powers 
reserved to government; who exercises which of them, and how 
should they be exercised?”6. Assigning the role of rule-makers to 
bodies outside national States produces institutional and 
regulatory outcomes which, even if can hardly be qualified as a 
clear “transfer of sovereignty”, causes indeed wide allocation of 
regulatory and decisory power, due to the creation of a new 
institution, as the pattern in the European Union can confirm7. It 
                                                                                                                                              
Bussani, Il diritto dell’Occidente. Geopolitica delle regole globali (2010). Specifically 
on the exercise of legislative functions by International Organizations, see J.E. 
Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers (2006) and D. Sarooshi, 
International Organizations and their exercise of sovereign powers (2005). 
4 J.E. Alvarez, International Organizations cit. at 3, 218. 
5 Ibidem, 257. 
6 D. Sarooshi, International Organizations cit. at 3, 7. 
7 As the Court of Justice of the European Communities highlighted since 1963 in 
the well known decision Van Gend & Looos, 5 February 1963, Case 26/62, “van 
Gend & Loos v. Netherlands”, observing that “this Treaty [the ECC Treaty] is 
more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the 
contracting states. This view is […] confirmed more specifically by the 
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also appears that States are not always entirely free to decide 
whether to adhere or not to a global regulatory regime. Even if it is 
theoretically possible to withdraw, it is very unrealistic: 
participation is the most effective way to influence rules that also 
affect, directly or indirectly, non-member Countries8. The idea that 
States are bound, on supranational level, only by consensus, has 
been contested by Hart, where he states that “[t]here is no way of 
knowing what sovereignty states have, till we know what the 
forms of international law are and whether or not they are mere 
empty forms”9. According to Hart, sovereignty of States is strictly 
connected to supra-national law. With this in mind, the 
examination of ICAO regulatory regime enables to verify to what 
extent sovereignty of States is limited10. The idea of legislative 
power controlled exclusively by States 11  does not reflect the 
complexity of contemporary international relations. Rules 
‘produced’ elsewhere may have a profound effect on a State’s 
domestic legal systems12: “most citizens greatly underestimate the 
extent to which most nations shipping laws are written at the IMO 
in London, air safety laws at the ICAO in Montreal, food 
standards at the FAO in Rome, intellectual property laws in 
Geneva at the WTO/WIPO, banking laws by the G-10 in Basle, 
chemical regulations by the OECD in Paris, nuclear safety 
standards by IAEA in Vienna, telecommunication laws by the ITU 
in Geneva and motor vehicle standards by the ECE in Geneva”13. 
There are implications regarding legitimacy, because we 
have to face the experience of rules coming from sources having a 
legitimacy different than State or State legislation14, but which are 
                                                                                                                                              
establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which 
affects Member States and also their citizens” [italics added]. 
8 G. della Cananea, Al di là dei confini statuali. Principi generali del diritto pubblico 
globale (2009), 201. 
9 H.L.A. Hart, The concept of law (1994, 2nd), 224. 
10 See D. Sarooshi, International Organizations cit. at 3. 
11  An idea which has indeed, authoritative advocates: see 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30 juni 2009, in which States are 
considered “Masters of Treaties”, and therefore are always free to decide 
whether to adhere or not to supra-national regimes. 
12 M. Bussani, Il diritto dell’Occidente cit. at 3, 88. 
13 K. Braithwaite, P. Drahos, Global Business Regulations (2000), 488. 
14 L. Torchia, Diritto amministrativo, potere pubblico e società nel terzo millennio o 
della legittimazione inversa, in S. Battini, G. D’Auria, G. della Cananea, C. 
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effective15 and able to introduce “measures against which people 
and things are judged”. The idea that global regulatory regimes 
require the same democratic standards that are now applied to 
States is controversial16: those forms of legitimacy, which do not 
follow traditional paths of direct democracy, are situated by their 
nature at the crossroads between bureaucratic, technical power 
and political authority. 
 
1.2. The aviation safety SARPs by ICAO, as paradigm of 
the relationship between technical power and political 
authority 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (hereinafter 
ICAO) is the global ruler of “aviation safety”, which may be 
considered a merely technical subject, but really has a key role in 
developing the regulation of air transportation. Issues concerning 
aviation safety have global relevance. Typically, the consequences 
of a journey by aircraft (particularly if “safety” is not properly 
considered) could have an effect at supra-national level; so that 
the same technical features of the activity and its cross-border 
nature encourages the adoption of a global regulation in this field. 
Aviation safety does not only involve issues related to the 
prevention of accidents, but has a broader meaning, connected to 
all risk management activities concerning air transportation and 
travelling. 
It has been defined by the ICAO Air Navigation 
Commission17 as the “state of freedom from unacceptable risk of 
injury to persons or damage to aircraft and property”18 and also as 
“a condition in which the risk of harm and damage is limited to an 
acceptable level”19.  
                                                                                                                                              
Franchini, A. Massera, B.G. Mattarella, G. Napolitano, A. Sandulli, L. Torchia, 
G. Vesperini (eds.), Il diritto amministrativo oltre i confini (2008), 61. 
15 See O. Dilling, M. Herberg, G. Winter, Exploring Transnational Administrative 
Rule-making, in  O. Dilling, M. Herberg, G. Winter (eds.), Transnational 
administrative rule-making. Performance, legal effects and legitimacy (2011), 4-7. 
16  See A. Buchanan, R.O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions, 20 Ethics Int’l Aff., 405-437 (2006). 
17 It is a Commission established by the ICAO Council, see infra, par. 2. 
18  ICAO Working Paper AN-WP/7699, Determination of a Definition of 
Aviation Safety, 11 December 2001, paragraph 2.2. 
19 ICAO, Doc 9735, Safety Oversight Manual. 
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These definitions that refer to unacceptable or acceptable level 
of risk indicate a dynamic concept, constantly changing, involving 
not only technical assessments, but also legal, financial, and 
management issues. 
It is therefore a task that involves a high degree of expertise, 
which may not be easily accomplished by a single State, especially 
developing Countries. 
Some scholars have disputed the idea that a single State is 
not able to manage aviation safety by itself, arguing, with specific 
reference to the U.S. system, that “the Congress of the United 
States has the greatest influence on the level of safety, or 
acceptable risk under which we operate. Congress, of course, 
writes the law that govern the operation and development of the 
National system. Congress also controls the budget of the 
Department of Transportation and in turn, the Federal Aviation 
Administration”20. 
From this point of view the national dimension is not 
excluded at all, and maintains central relevance, since these issues 
are solved through the adoption of rules of law, where the only 
constraints for States come from signed international treaties. 
This approach does not appear entirely satisfactory. 
Aviation is in fact an activity which by its very nature cannot be 
confined within national borders, due to the fact that risks 
associated to air transportation and travelling are likely to spread 
globally. So a single State, even if exercising sovereignty on its 
own territory, is unable to independently manage the “safety” of 
international civil aviation without the cooperation of other States. 
As has been rightly pointed out, “global risks require global 
management and call for concerted international action”21. This 
concerted international action produced, as a result (significant 
though not fully satisfactory), the signing of a treaty, namely the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (hereinafter the 
Convention).  
This Convention has established a defined global 
regulatory system, creating an “international administration” 22 , 
                                                           
20 F.M. Isaac, Is It Safe Up There?, 28 Transp. L. J. 185 (1998). 
21  J. Huang, Aviation Safety through the Rule of Law. ICAO’s Mechanisms and 
Practices (2009), 8. 
22  According to the taxonomy proposed by B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, R.B. 
Stewart, The emergence of Global Administrative Law cit. at 1, 21. 
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invested with relevant regulatory power. A first key issue 
concerns the delegation of powers to the organization, and the 
actual exercise of functions among the bodies that constitute it (see 
par. 2). The analysis shows that plenary, representative bodies (as 
the Assembly in the ICAO case) may not be considered the 
organizational core of global regulatory regimes: the true 
regulatory power is entrusted mainly to a body with 
‘administrative’ features (the Council), with the fundamental 
contribution of smaller entities (Air Navigation Commission and 
Panels), raising problems regarding the participation in the 
formations of standards. The adoption procedure of standards is 
therefore carefully examined (see par. 3.2), highlighting how the 
recourse to proceduralisation allows to overcome the gap between 
democratic legitimacy and effectiveness. 
The exam of organizational and institutional dimensions is 
essential to understand the influence of global regulatory regimes 
on national legal orders. But the most significant issue involves 
the analysis on the ‘normative product’ of the global regulatory 
regime, ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs, see 
par. 3.1). It is possible to demonstrate that, although they are not 
explicitly part of the Convention, they give effective content to its 
provisions, due the express mention within some articles of the 
Convention, and therefore gain, in some cases, binding value. 
SARPs impose, in addition, procedural and substantial limits on 
States, regarding the possibility of non compliance (see par. 4.1). 
This leads to the idea of duty of cooperation in establishing an 
international order, that does not halt to the original transfer of 
powers, but has further consequences, and involves actors not 
entrusted, at national level, with legislative functions. The 
implementation of SARPs by States confirms this hypothesis: 
usually national legislations refers to ICAO standards with a 
procedural mechanism which assigns binding value to them, 
through the mediation of administrative bodies, excluding 
political evaluation. Implementation is fostered also through 
procedural tools (see par. 4.2): the Universal Safety Oversight 
Audit Programme, although does not per se increase the binding 
strength of SARPs, easies their implementation, evidencing critical 
points in each State experience. 
The analysis shows, finally, how the global dimensions of 
interests protected (as aviation safety) promotes the institution of 
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a global regulatory regime, with relevant consequences in terms of 
transformation of the role of States, that shifts significantly from 
the law-making process to the implementation phase. 
 
 
2. The institutional framework of ICAO 
ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations, which 
was established by the Convention23.  
In 1944 the original signatory States were 52, but to date 191 
States have signed the Convention24 . Membership to ICAO is 
directly linked with adherence to the Convention. Adherence of 
the original signatories was declared by the ratification addressed 
to the Government of the United States, the depository of the 
Convention25. Today, member States of the United Nations, may 
become members of the ICAO by adhering to the Convention26. 
The aims of the ICAO are the administration and 
development of the principles set out in the Convention27 . As 
noted by a scholar, the way this task is organized “emphasizes the 
predominantly technical nature of the mandate of the 
Organization”28. 
The promotion of aviation safety has always been a central 
element of the activity of ICAO29 and has been achieved mostly 
through development and continuous updating of a 
comprehensive set of Standards And Recommended Practices 
(SARPs), set out in the Annexes of the Convention 30 . These 
Annexes have been supplemented by a comprehensive audit 
                                                           
23 Art. 43 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
24  As indicated at the date of October 31, 2013 by the ICAO website, 
http://www.icao.int/MemberStates/Member%20States.English.pdf visited on 
April 20, 2015. 
25 Art. 91 (a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
26 Art. 92 (a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
27 According to art. 44 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, “[t]he 
aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the principles and 
techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and 
development of international air transport […]”. 
28 L. Weber, International Civil Aviation Organization (2011), 17. 
29 ICAO Assembly Resolution A37-5 reaffirm that “the primary objective of the 
Organization continues to be that of ensuring the safety of international civil 
aviation worldwide”. 
30 See infra, par. 3. 
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system to monitor the implementation of technical safety 
standards by ICAO member States (Universal Safety Oversight 
Audit Programme)31. 
The Organization is composed of three main bodies (the 
Assembly, the Council, the Secretariat) and several Committees. 
The Assembly is the main policy-making body of ICAO. 
Each contracting State has a seat in the Assembly and one vote, on 
an equal basis32. Decisions are taken by majority of the votes cast33. 
In most cases, however, decisions are taken by consensus. The 
Assembly meets in ordinary session once every three years. 
Therefore, although the Assembly has the power to “delegate to 
the Council the powers and authority necessary or desirable for 
the discharge of the duties of the Organization and revoke or 
modify the delegations of authority at any time”34, it is unlikely 
that it will use these powers to adopt detailed decisions capable to 
strictly define limits for the Council operations. 
The Assembly highlights the main principles and objectives 
that ICAO must pursue, but it is the Council that makes 
administrative and regulatory decisions, with those objectives in 
mind. The Council is the real executive governing body of the 
organization, a “permanent body responsible to the Assembly”35. 
It is composed of thirty-six states, elected by the Assembly36. It is 
important to note that in electing the members of the Council, the 
Assembly shall give adequate representation to different criteria37: 
- 11 States are chosen among those of chief importance in 
air transport;  
- 12 States are chosen among those which make the greatest 
contribution to the provision of international air navigation 
facilities;  
                                                           
31 See infra, par. 4.2. 
32 Art. 48 (b) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
33 There are also quorum requirement to be fulfilled for the meetings of the 
ICAO Assembly. 
34 Art. 49 (h) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
35 Art. 50 (a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
36 Art. 50 (b) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The number of 
the member of the Council has raised over the years: the original text of the 
Convention provided for just twenty-one members of the Council. 
37 Art. 50 (b) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
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- 13 States are chosen among those whose designation will 
ensure that all the major geographic areas of the world are 
represented on the Council.  
This mechanism is aimed at guaranteeing adequate 
representation of different interests within the Council, which is 
the organizational core of ICAO, where most relevant decisions 
are adopted38. 
In other words: legitimacy is sought through representation 
of interests. 
The Council has several different tasks, but, as noted 
earlier, the most relevant is to make regulations. The Council is 
entrusted with the adoption of international Standards and 
Recommended Practices 39 . Decisions of the Council usually 
require approval by a majority of the members40, but in the case of 
adoption or amendments of SARPs, a majority of two-thirds is 
required: this means that the approval of 25 members of the 
Council is necessary41. The Council is assigned another major role 
relevant to the subject in question: it administrates and supervises 
the audit system which verify how States implement ICAO 
Standards 42 . It is important to underline that a specific audit 
system is not expressly mentioned in the Convention, but has been 
“created”, on the legal basis of the substantive provision of art. 54 
(j) of the Convention43. 
The Secretariat is the ICAO bureaucratic structure. The 
Secretary General is the chief executive officer of ICAO, and is 
appointed by the Council44. 
The Air Navigation Commission (ANC), established by the 
Council under art. 54 (e) of the Convention, is the main technical 
body of the ICAO. Its main task is to “consider, and recommend to 
the Council for adoption, modifications of the Annexes to this 
Convention”45.  So its role in the adoption of SARPs is clearly 
                                                           
38 See infra, par. 3.2. 
39 Art. 54 (l) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
40 Art. 52 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
41 Articles 54 (l) and 90 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
42 See infra, par. 4.2. 
43 Which gives to the Council the task to “[r]eport to contracting States any 
infraction of this Convention, as well as any failure to carry out 
recommendations or determinations of the Council”. 
44 Art. 54 (h) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
45 Art. 57 (a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
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crucial, and consequently it’s important to highlight the method of 
appointment of ANC members. Scholars have observed that 
“[t]hese [powerful democratic] States have long played a 
disproportionately large role in selecting key personnel to steer 
international organizations”46. The ANC is composed of nineteen 
members47, appointed by the Council in their personal capacity as 
experts 48  (not as representatives). Members are chosen from 
candidates nominated by Contracting States, and the term lasts 
three years49. This short term, the required majority of  Members 
of the Council to appoint the Members and President of the ANC, 
and the voting  by secret ballot50 are countermeasures designed to 
overcome problems regarding the dominant influence of 
developed countries. 
Panels may also be set up by the ANC or the Council, 
creating small groups of experts, with a relevant role in the 
adoption of SARPs51. These ad hoc temporary bodies of qualified 
experts contribute significantly to the tasks carried out by ANC52. 
They are directly appointed by the ANC and act in small groups53, 
improving efficiency at the expense of a wider participation in the 
deliberative process. 
The appointment and promotion of ICAO Officers is 
regulated by the ICAO Service Code, which largely reflects 
principles laid down in the United Nations Staff Regulations and 
Staff Rules. They ensure the highest standards of efficiency, 
competence and integrity, and take into account the importance of 
recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible54. Staff 
                                                           
46 E. Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance (2014), 19. 
47 Since 2005. The number of member of the ANC was originally fifteen. 
48 Art. 56 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation requires that «these 
persons shall have suitable qualifications and experience in the science and 
practice of aeronautics». 
49 ICAO, Rules of Procedure for the Council, Doc 7559/8, art. 16. 
50 ICAO, Rules of Procedure for the Council, Doc 7559/8, Appendix D. 
51 See infra, par. 3.2. 
52 Art. 1 of ICAO, Directives for Panel of the Air Navigation Commission, Doc 
7984/5, states that “[t]he purpose of a panel of the ANC is to advance, within 
specified time frames, the solution of specialized problems or the development 
of standards for the planned evolution of air navigation which cannot be 
advanced within the ANC or established resources of the Secretariat”. 
53 15 to 20 members, according to art. 2.3 of ICAO, Directives for Panel of the 
Air Navigation Commission, Doc 7984/5. 
54 ICAO Service Code, art. 4.1. 
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of the organization are appointed by the Secretary General, but the 
Council has established a Commission for the Processing of 
Applications for the Director Level, that operates in accordance 
with consolidated procedures for the appointment of Directors set 
out in the ICAO Service Code. 
 
 
3. Standards And Recommended Practices 
3.1. Standards and Recommended Practices adopted by 
ICAO 
The 96 articles of the Convention lay down the principles of 
international civil air navigation, but they certainly cannot deal 
with all the provisions relating to air traffic. 
Moreover, the more detailed the provisions, the quicker 
they are subject to technological obsolescence. For this reason art. 
54 (l) of the Convention, gives the Council the power to “[a]dopt 
… international standards and recommended practices; for 
convenience designate them as Annexes to this Convention”. 
Therefore “Annexes” are mentioned in the Convention, but are 
adopted by the Council in a separate and subsequent manner55, 
and concern, at least at first glance, technical provisions. 
There is also another reason that justifies the Annexes. It is 
the need for uniformity. When it comes to technical rules, it 
becomes a need shared by all States. For this purpose, the 
Convention provides a specific obligation for each contracting 
State to “undertake[s] the highest practicable degree of uniformity 
in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation 
to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters 
in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air 
navigation” 56 . Uniformity is therefore intended as a value, 
something that can ensure a higher degree of safety57. To ensure 
uniformity, and therefore safety, is assigned to the ICAO the task 
                                                           
55 See infra, par. 3.2. 
56 Art. 37 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
57 It should be observed, however, that for decades – since the institution of the 
ICAO – many States did not implement SARPs, and also failed in the duty to 
notify differences from SARPs in national legal systems. See M. Milde, 
International Air Law and ICAO (2012), 178. It is only since 1995, with the 
establishment of the ICAO safety oversight program by the Council (see infra, 
par. 4.2), that the perception of the need of uniformity has become sharper. 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL.8  ISSUE 1/2016 
 
215 
 
of issuing Standards and Recommended Practices in all matters 
that concern, even indirectly, aviation safety58. 
Standards and Recommended Practices are both considered 
Annexes. 
A Standard is defined by ICAO as “any specification for 
physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance, 
personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is 
recognized as necessary for the safety or regularity of international 
air navigation and to which Contracting States will conform in 
accordance with the Convention”59. 
A Recommended Practice is defined by ICAO as “any 
specification for physical characteristics, configuration, material, 
performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of 
which is recognized as desirable in the interest of safety, regularity 
or efficiency of international air navigation and to which 
Contracting States will endeavour to conform in accordance with 
the Convention”60. 
It should be underlined that, although the Annexes are not 
formally inserted within the text of the Convention, the reference 
made to them in the same text assigns to the Annexes an 
effectiveness comparable to that of the provisions of the 
Convention itself. 
The provisions of the Convention mention standards, 
especially in matters of safety, where contracting States must meet 
certain requirements. Some examples may be mentioned 
regarding specific provisions of the Convention. 
Art. 28, with reference to air navigation system, states that 
each contracting State must: 
                                                           
58 Standards and Recommended Practices can deal with: “(a) Communications 
systems and air navigation aids, including ground marking; (b) Characteristics 
of airports and landing areas; (c) Rules of the air and air traffic control practices; 
(d) Licensing of operating and mechanical personnel; (e) Airworthiness of 
aircraft; (f) Registration and identification of aircraft; (g) Collection and 
exchange of meteorological information; (h) Log books; (i) Aeronautical maps 
and charts; (j) Customs and immigration procedures; (k) Aircraft in distress and 
investigation of accidents; and such other matters concerned with the safety, 
regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as may from time to time appear 
appropriate”, art. 37 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
59 Assembly Resolution A36-13, Appendix A. ICAO Doc 9902. 
60 Assembly Resolution A36-13, Appendix A. ICAO Doc 9902. 
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- provide in its territory airports, radio services, 
meteorological services and other air navigation facilities to 
facilitate international air navigation, “in accordance with the 
standards and practices recommended or established from time to 
time, pursuant to this Convention”61; 
- adopt and put into operation the appropriate standard 
systems of communications procedures, codes, markings, signals, 
lighting and other operational practices and rules, “which may be 
recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this 
Convention”62; 
- collaborate on international measures to secure the 
publication of aeronautical maps and charts, “in accordance with 
standards which may be recommended or established from time 
to time, pursuant to this Convention”63. 
Art. 33 sets up a system of mutual recognition of certificates 
and licenses, based on the standards “which may be established 
from time to time pursuant to this Convention”. This provision 
expressly moves from the assumption that standards have a 
dynamic content, not to be considered definitive, but open to 
change – to be established from time to time. States agree in advance 
to each other’s level of compliance of ICAO’s safety provisions, 
even those not yet established in the Convention, but to be 
introduced in the future by the Council, as the body designated 
for the adoption and amendment of standards. 
Art. 39 (a) states that an aircraft that does not meet the 
requirements of international standards of airworthiness must 
declare on its airworthiness certificate any details of divergence 
from standards. The same rule, according to art. 39 (b) of the 
Convention, applies to a person holding a license that does not 
fully satisfy the conditions laid down in international standards 
for that license. A certificate or license so endorsed prohibits 
international air navigation, unless approved by the State whose 
territory is entered64. If someone uses a certificate which does not 
respect international requirements as defined in Standards, a State 
may ban them from flying in its territory. 
                                                           
61 Art. 28 (a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
62 Art. 28 (b) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
63 Art. 28 (c) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
64 Art. 40 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
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In all these cases, the text of the Convention expressly refers 
to Standards and Recommended Practices and establishes relevant 
legal consequences in case of non compliance (e.g. prohibiting 
flight in the territory of a member State). The above mentioned 
examples appear relevant, as long as they expressly mention 
standards in the text of the Convention. At the same time 
standards can add specific content to the general provisions of 
Convention. In those cases, Standards and Recommended 
Practices are not merely secondary rules, established by the 
Convention and not necessarily binding for member States which 
may decide whether to implement them or not; they instead 
assign effective content to the provisions of the Convention. 
ICAO has developed, over the past seventy years, 19 
Annexes. Most of them contain both Standards and 
Recommended Practices. Almost every Annex has been amended. 
The content of SARPs is peculiarly relevant with reference 
to safety. Annexes related to safety include: 
- Annex 1, regarding Personnel Licensing, which sets 
standards on skill, competence and training of pilots, air 
and ground personnel, and other requirements to meet 
in order to be authorized in exercising defined activities; 
- Annex 2, regarding Rules of the Air, which sets standards 
on air travel and conditions in which visual flight or 
instrument flight is allowed; 
- Annex 6, regarding Operation of Aircraft, which 
standardizes operational rules on aircraft; 
- Annex 8, regarding Airworthiness of Aircraft, which sets 
standards on the airworthiness requirements. 
Certificates of Airworthiness are issued by contracting 
States, based on their national regulation (often heavily 
influenced by SARPs), but respecting SARP 
requirements ensures recognition of the Certificate in 
other member States; 
- Annex 11, regarding Air Traffic Services, which sets 
standards on air traffic control, flight information and 
alerting services; 
- Annex 13, regarding Aircraft Accident and Incident 
Investigation, which provides international requirements 
for the investigation of aircraft accidents and incidents; 
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- Annex 14, regarding Aerodromes, which sets standards on 
the planning of airports, from physical characteristics to 
airspace requirements; 
- Annex 19, regarding Safety Management, which is mostly 
based on existing provisions, consists of the provision of 
a Safety Management System to re-enforce the role of 
States in managing safety at national level. 
The institutional and regulatory model of ICAO, therefore, 
relies on Annexes to develop a systematic and integrated 
framework of rules, able to assign effective content to the 
provisions of the Convention. 
Licenses of Personnel and Airworthiness offer clear examples 
in this direction. Both “are issued or rendered valid by the State in 
which the aircraft is registered”65. So it would appear that the 
competence to issue certificates and licenses is entirely entrusted 
to States. In fact States are assigned the role of execution bodies to 
implement the rules already established and adopted at an inter-
institutional level, rather than national. 
Indeed, art. 33 of the Convention provides: 
“Certificates and licenses issued or rendered valid by the 
contracting State ... shall be recognized as valid by the other 
contracting States, provided that the requirements under which 
such certificates or licenses were issued or rendered valid are 
equal to or above the minimum standards which may established 
from time to time pursuant to this Convention”. 
As already noted, minimum standards are established by 
Annexes, adopted by the Council and not directly and expressly 
accepted by the contracting States in advance. A single State can 
decide to implement standards different from those introduced by 
the Annexes, but in this case other member States can deny 
recognition to such certificates or licenses issued by that State. In 
other words: recognition of one State’s license in another State is 
not based on a general principle of equivalence, which admits only 
limited exceptions on a single case comparison of protected 
interests66 (as happens in cases of mutual recognition in UE law on 
the basis of articles 34-36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
                                                           
65 Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
66  See L. Torchia, Il governo delle differenze: il principio di equivalenza 
nell’ordinamento europeo (2006), 53-129. 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL.8  ISSUE 1/2016 
 
219 
 
European Union), but operates on the basis of implementation of 
specific standards already in use. 
Annex No. 13, regarding investigation of accidents and 
incidents involving aircraft67, offers a clear example of the content 
of SARPs. The “State of Occurrence” (in the territory of which an 
accident or incident occurs) has a duty to investigate in case of an 
accident 68  involving an aircraft registered in another member 
State, and shall take all reasonable measures to protect the 
evidence and to maintain safe custody of the aircraft and its 
contents, for such a period as may be necessary for the purposes of 
an investigation69. If the accident occurs in the territory of a non-
member State, the “State of Registry” (of the aircraft involved) 
should endeavour to institute and conduct an investigation in 
cooperation with the “State of Occurrence” (of the accident) but, 
failing such cooperation, should itself conduct an investigation 
with such information as is available 70 . If the location of the 
accident or the serious incident cannot definitely be established as 
being in the territory of any State, the “State of Registry” shall 
institute and conduct any necessary investigation of the accident71. 
SARPs therefore regulate the relationship between the 
aeronautical authorities involved: this relationship must be based 
on full cooperation in the exchange of information and 
documentation, and on disclosure, with other States involved, of 
evidence collected. 
Such a complex and broad set of standards, undoubtedly 
containing technical prescriptions, cannot just be reduced to a set 
of technical rules, as long as each option is selected comparing 
substantive interests and expresses a political decision of some 
sort. E.g.: greater safety implies higher costs, while – as already 
explained72 – the model established by the ICAO Air Navigation 
                                                           
67 The purpose of this investigation, according to paragraph 3.1 of Annex 13, is 
“the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity 
to apportion blame or liability.” 
68 Which is an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft, in which  
a person is fatally or seriously injured, according to Chapter 1 of Annex 13. 
69 Paragraph 5.1 of Annex 13. 
70 Paragraph 5.2 of Annex 13. 
71 Paragraph 5.3 of Annex 13. 
72 See supra, par. 1.2. 
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Commission73 is not that of an abstract and absolute absence of 
risk but rather the establishment of “an acceptable level” of risk74. 
It is therefore crucial to scrutinize how SARPs are 
approved, whether through a general participation in the 
decision-making process or within smaller groups, which have 
different consequences in terms of legitimacy. 
 
3.2. The Adoption Procedure of SARPs 
SARPs are adopted by the Council 75 . This important 
regulatory function is not entrusted to the plenary body (the 
Assembly), but to a more restricted one. A closer analysis of the 
procedure highlights how the content of SARPs are actually 
shaped at an earlier stage than the adoption by the Council76. 
The procedure is the same for the adoption of new SARPs 
and for the amendments of already existing SARPs. For many 
years the number of Annexes remained at 18, and only recently 
has Annex No. 19 been added, but the existing Annexes have been 
subject to a continuous process of amending and updating, 
usually introducing new prescriptions. 
Early proposals77 regarding SARPs are analyzed first by the 
Air Navigation Commission. Several consultative mechanisms can 
be used 78 : meetings, inviting all contracting States; panels of 
technical experts 79 . As already mentioned, “ANC panels are 
technical groups of qualified experts formed by the ANC to 
advance, within specified time frames, the solution of specialized 
problems which cannot be solved adequately or expeditiously by 
the established facilities of the ANC and the Secretariat. These 
                                                           
73 It is a Commission established by the ICAO Council, see infra, par. 2. 
74  ICAO Working Paper AN-WP/7699, Determination of a Definition of 
Aviation Safety, 11 December 2001, paragraph 2.2; ICAO, Doc 9735, Safety 
Oversight Manual. 
75 Art. 54 (l) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
76  ICAO, Making an ICAO Standard, 
http://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/Pages/standard.aspx. 
77 A proposal can be submitted by member States, a body of ICAO and other 
international organizations. 
78 L. Weber, International Civil Aviation Organization cit. at 28, 189. 
79 See ICAO Doc 7984/5, Directives for Panels of the Air Navigation 
Commission. 
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experts act in their expert capacity and not as representatives of 
the nominators”80. 
There are also other bodies with a consultative capacity, 
such as Air Navigation study groups 81  or Council technical 
Committees82, but “[i]n summary, technical issues dealing with a 
specific subject and requiring detailed examination are normally 
referred by the ANC to a panel of experts. Less complex issues 
may be assigned to the Secretariat for further examination, 
perhaps with the assistance of an air navigation study group”83. 
The first effective version of proposed standards is that 
drafted by the panel of experts. This proposal is submitted to the 
Air Navigation Commission for preliminary review, usually 
limited to controversial issues. 
After this phase, the proposals of the panel with eventual 
amendments by ANC are transmitted to member States to get 
their comments. Usually States have three months to comment on 
the proposals. Comments of States are analyzed by the Secretariat, 
which prepares a working paper to illustrate them. 
The ANC makes a final review of the proposed text of 
SARPs. The Annexes so amended are submitted to the Council for 
adoption. The final decision on the proposed SARPs rests with the 
Council.  
The Council is given the task of adopting the final text, with 
a majority of two thirds of its members84. There are 36 member 
States on the Council 85; a majority of two thirds corresponds to 25 
members, while the total numbers of ICAO members is 19186; this 
shows that a very small number of member states is entrusted 
with the relevant power to adopt the text of the Annexes. 
The text so adopted by the Council is submitted to each 
contracting State. 
The Annexes so approved will become effective 3 months 
after submission to member States, unless within this period the 
                                                           
80 ICAO, Making an ICAO Standard. 
81 It assists the Secretariat with advisory functions. 
82 Established by the Council. 
83 L. Weber, International Civil Aviation Organization cit. at. 28, 191. 
84 Art. 90 (a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
85 See supra, par. 2. 
86 See supra, par. 2. 
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majority of them register their disapproval87. The power of the 
Council is limited by this procedure, but it must stressed that since 
the signing of the Convention, this veto power assigned to the 
States has never been exercised. Moreover, the large number of 
members creates a situation where it is difficult to obtain the veto 
majority requested (more than 90 States) in the short period of 
only 3 months. The competence of the Council therefore 
encounters many fewer de facto limits than may appear at first 
sight. 
This analysis of the procedure reveals that a relevant role is 
assigned to panels of experts and technical sub-commissions. The 
recourse to these technical bodies is aimed at increasing the 
effectiveness of the decision making process, which it does, but it 
has two relevant consequences. 
First of all it reduces the participation of States in the 
decision making process, due to its composition and structure. As 
the groups are intended to be small88, a large number of members 
are excluded. 
Moreover, the technical composition of these groups 
emphasizes the gap between industrialized and developing 
countries, as it is unlikely the latter will be able to participate 
effectively on all sub-commissions. 
In these cases the gap between democratic legitimacy and 
effectiveness of global regulators emerges with particular 
intensity. To overcome those critical issues, it has become common 
practice for the Air Navigation Commission, which must approve 
the technical standards drafted by the relevant bodies, to notify 
the result of their activity to contracting States as well, in order to 
allow comments89. 
The recourse to proceduralisation is therefore considered a 
crucial tool, aimed at allowing a wider participation and 
contribution of States that can’t regularly take part in the technical 
bodies’ work. This enables those States to express opinions on the 
proposed rules at the time of their drafting, even if in a position of 
                                                           
87 Art. 90 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
88 Paragraph 2.1 of the Directives for Panels of the Air Navigation Commission 
states that  “[t]he ANC shall establish panels normally comprising 15 to 20 
members, keeping in mind the need for expeditious and efficient handling of 
panel business.” 
89 J. Huang, Aviation Safety through the Rule of Law cit. at 21, 57. 
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objectively less influence than those of the States regularly present 
in the technical bodies. The relevance of panels is therefore still 
crucial. The Air Navigation Commission has proposed, in 2013, a 
full reform of the panels’ organization and functioning90, in order 
to better support the complete air navigation work program and 
to enhance participation, according to objectives of the Twelfth Air 
Navigation Conference, held in 2012, confirming the importance 
of this issue. 
 
 
4. The implementation of SARPs 
4.1. Value of the Standards and implementation by States 
SARPs, according to art. 90 of the Convention, “become 
effective” after a specific procedure91. Their “entrance into force” 
concerns only the international level, as there are no indications 
regarding the legal status at national level. States, in fact, do not 
have a formal explicit obligation. They have a general obligation, 
to “collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of 
uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and 
organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and 
auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will 
facilitate and improve air navigation”92. 
The complex system defined by SARPs has therefore to be 
implemented by States. SARPs are the tools that guarantee 
uniformity. Implementation, though, may be subject to exception. 
Art. 38 of the Convention states that “[a]ny State which 
finds it impracticable to comply in all respect with any such 
international standard or procedure, or to bring its own 
regulations or practices into full accord with any international 
standard or procedure after amendment of the latter, or which 
deems it necessary to adopt regulations or practices differing in 
any particular respect from those established by an international 
standard, shall give immediate notification to the International 
Civil Aviation Organization of the differences between its own 
practice and that established by the international standard”. 
                                                           
90 ANC AN-WP/8735, Modernization of Panels of the Air Navigation 
Commission. 
91 See supra, par. 3.2. 
92 Art. 37 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
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So States have the chance to differ their national regulation 
and practices from standards and procedures93. But this exception 
has both procedural and substantial limits. 
Regarding the substantial limit, it is possible to differ from 
standards only if it is “impracticable to comply” to them, or if it is 
considered necessary to adopt different regulations. The decision of 
non-implementation is not subject to the discretionary, sovereign 
choice of a State. It is instead a choice that must meet specific 
requirements. 
Regarding the procedural limit, a State must notify ICAO, 
within 3 months, the differences between its own practice and that 
established by the international standards. This allows the ICAO 
and other member States to recognize deficiencies in a national air 
regulation system, and if necessary prevent possible risks. States 
have therefore the right to differ from SARPs, but must give 
adequate motivation for non-compliance. 
This particular system has led to uncertainty regarding the 
juridical nature of SARPs. Some authors believe that States have 
no legal obligation to implement or to comply with the provisions 
of Annexes, unless they find it ‘practicable’ to do so94. But the need 
to interpret the obligations of member States, bearing in mind the 
purpose of the Convention, leads to a different conclusion. The 
main focus of the provisions regarding Annexes 95 , as already 
highlighted, is not the freedom of action of the member States, but 
the achievement of uniformity of international standards. In 
addition, a close look at interests protected by the Convention 
clarifies that the objectives pursued96 shape a normative system 
which embodies a common interest of all States. Certain safety 
                                                           
93 Art. 38 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation does not expressly 
refers to “Recommended practices”, although art. 90 states that Annexes (which 
include also Recommended practices) “become effective” at the end of the 
adoption procedure. J. Huang, Aviation Safety through the Rule of Law cit. at 21, 
62 notes, however, “that subsequent ICAO Assembly resolutions have tended 
to blur the distinctions between standards [and] recommended practices”. 
94  T. Buergenthal, Law-making in the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(1969), 76. 
95 The reference is to articles 37 and 38 of the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation. 
96 I.e. art. 44, (a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, regarding 
“the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the 
world”. 
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obligations, therefore, are not to be considered just reciprocal 
between member States, but for higher aims. The adherence to the 
international aviation regulatory system is not only linked to the 
principle of State sovereignty and the freedom of action of States, 
but also to the duty of cooperation in establishing an international 
order. This duty implies the implementation of Annexes in 
domestic legal orders, with exceptions subject to the above 
mentioned limits. There is also another reason that fosters 
implementation: non-compliance affects significantly the 
participation in international air navigation and air transport, and 
this reduction therefore represents a strong incentive (to give 
compliance) for States97. 
States have implemented SARPs through different 
techniques. 
In the Italian system, Annexes are implemented “through 
administrative tools” (in via amministrativa) 98 , and the bodies 
entrusted are the Ministry of Transportation and ENAC 99 , in 
accordance with guiding standards of a Presidential Decree100 : 
among these guiding standards, it must be highlighted the 
“[t]end[ency] to achieve uniformity of legislation with 
international regulations” 101 . Rules regarding issue, renewal, 
integration, suspension and revocation of licenses are exclusively 
those of Annex No. 1 of the Convention, due to the express 
mention in the national rule102. Presidential Decree July 4, 1985, n. 
461, states, in addition, that Standards usually have to be 
implemented as binding norms, unless it is “impracticable to 
comply, as ascertained by a motivated decree”103. The theoretical 
choice, in the Italian system, is between implementation or non-
implementation, when impracticable. But the approach generally 
applicable means the Standards have to be implemented in a way 
to give them binding force. 
                                                           
97 M. Milde, International Air Law and ICAO cit. at 57, 172. 
98  Art. 690 of the Royal Decree 30th March 1942, n. 327, “Codice della 
navigazione”. 
99 Italian Authority for Air Navigation. 
100 Presidential Decree July 4, 1985, n. 461. 
101 Art. 2 of the Presidential Decree July 4, 1985, n. 461. 
102  Art. 731 of the Royal Decree 30th March 1942, n. 327, “Codice della 
navigazione”. 
103 Art. 1 of the Presidential Decree 4th July 1985, n. 461. 
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According to the Australian Air Navigation Act, “[t]he 
Governor General may make regulations, not inconsistent with 
this Act, … for the purpose of carrying out and giving effect to the 
Chicago Convention, … any Annex to the Convention relating to 
international Standards and Recommended practices (being an 
Annex adopted in accordance with the Convention) and the Air 
Transit Agreement” 104 . In this case implementation is not 
provided by law, but at a lower level. In Finland, the Certificate of 
Airworthiness is issued by the Finnish Transport Safety Agency: 
“[d]etailed regulations on the design, manufacture, equipment, 
properties and maintenance of aircraft, parts and appliances, as 
well as on the content and arrangement of inspections and tests 
required for approval” are adopted by the Finnish Agency, “based 
on the standards and recommendations referred to in the Chicago 
Convention”105. 
In developing countries, the inclusion of international 
safety standards may occur by “mere reference to the title, number 
and year of issue of such standard or amendment or to any other 
particulars by which such standard or amendment is sufficiently 
identified, without quoting the text of the standard or amendment 
so incorporated” 106  by the Director of the Aviation Agency, 
reinforcing the idea of a distinct set of rules that does not need 
further elaboration for the implementation in the national legal 
system. 
The Federal Aviation Administration of United States has, 
pursuant to art. 83 of the Convention, the power to “exchange 
with that country [the Administration entitled with air safety 
regulation functions] all or part of their respective functions and 
duties with respect to registered aircraft under the following 
articles of the Convention: Article 12 (Rules of the Air); Article 31 
(Certificates of Airworthiness); or Article 32a (Licenses of 
Personnel)”107. This provision outlines a normative equivalence in 
the exercise of regulatory functions of national administration of 
different States, due to the common ‘normative basis’ shared by 
these bodies. Furthermore, the Federal Aviation Administration 
has undertaken, without any express indication by the legal 
                                                           
104 Art. 26 of the Australian Air Navigation Act, 1920. 
105 Sec. 22 of the Aviation Act, Finland, 2009. 
106 South Africa, Civil Aviation Act, n. 13/2009. 
107 § 44701, Sec. 49, USA Code, 2011. 
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provisions that regulate its activity, a progressive action, to 
uniform its framework for “Safety Management” to the ICAO 
system 108 , observing that “FAA supports harmonization of 
international standards, and has worked to make U.S. aviation 
safety regulations consistent with ICAO standards and 
recommended practices”109. 
The result of this summary comparative analysis shows 
that in most cases internal legislation refers to ICAO Standards, 
with a procedural mechanism which gives them binding value 
through the mediation of administrative bodies. No relevance is 
given to political evaluations. From this point of view, national 
administrative bodies are no longer acting as an expression of 
internal politics, but rather as longa manus of the international 
organization. 
Art. 1 of the Convention emphatically states that “[t]he 
contracting States recognize that every State has complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory”. But 
this reaffirmed sovereignty lacks much of its meaning. It is ‘diluted’ 
in the various subsequent steps, and the rule ‘produced’ within the 
international framework enters the internal legal systems on its 
own strength. 
 
4.2. Compliance through Universal Safety Oversight 
Audit Programme 
Safety audits are an essential element of ICAO’s work to 
improve safety. 
As has been seen, the Convention imposes several 
obligations on States, mainly to encourage the highest practicable 
degree of uniformity in regulations and practices, in any matter 
where it will help and improve air navigation. Therefore, a State 
that finds it impracticable to comply must notify differences of its 
national regulation from ICAO Annexes. 
These obligations, however, were not always respected by 
contracting States. Without the filing of differences by states, 
neither ICAO nor other member States had any clear and objective 
information on the degree of implementation of Annexes. 
                                                           
108 Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular No. 120-92. 
109 Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular No. 150/5200-37. 
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In 1998, therefore, ICAO established the Universal Safety 
Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP)110. The Program is founded 
on the following elements: 
- it consists of regular, mandatory 111 , systematic and 
harmonized safety audits, which shall be carried out by ICAO; 
- it is applicable to all member States; 
- it aims at ensuring transparency and disclosure in the 
release of audit results; 
- it introduces a systematic reporting and monitoring 
mechanism in the implementation of safety-related SARPs. 
Audits are performed by ICAO teams, composed of experts 
from the Organization and from member States, other than the 
audited state. Every member State has signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding, which gives the consent to audit. 
USOAP has gone under several phases112. 
In the first phase of audits, almost 180 States were visited 
and audited. 
Between 2001 and 2004 numerous follow-up audits were 
performed, and the focus shifted to a problem-solving approach, 
rather than merely highlighting critical areas. 
In the third phase (2004-2010), further steps to increase 
transparency were made, and final audit results are now made 
available to all contracting States, giving widespread and 
accessible information on the critical points emerging in the 
application of ICAO standards in a given State. 
Recent developments involve the setting up of a 
“continuous monitoring approach”, with a continuous data 
exchange between contracting States and ICAO, regarding 
implementation of safety-related SARPs and findings of audits. 
Such a system does not per se increase the binding strength 
of SARPs, but eases their implementation 113 , by highlighting 
                                                           
110 ICAO, Assembly Resolution, A32-11. Establishment of an ICAO Universal 
Safety Oversight Audit Programme. 
111 ICAO, Assembly Resolution, A32-11 refers to “mandatory … audits, to be 
carried out by ICAO”. The circumstance that almost every Member state 
signed, with ICAO, a bilateral memorandum of understanding, giving consent 
to the audit in their country, does not exclude the importance of the expression. 
As J. Huang, Aviation Safety through the Rule of Law cit. at 21, 75 notes, “the 
ICAO audit practice has customarily developed into a mandatory safety regime 
in the true legal sense of the word”. 
112 See ICAO Annual Report, 2012; ICAO, Safety Report, 2014. 
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critical points in each national legal system and putting pressure 
on any State for non compliance by exposing it publicly. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks. A new balance between technical 
power and political authority 
SARPs are the most important tool for the regulation of 
safety in air transportation. The development and widespread use 
of standards has several implications. 
First of all, national law appears to be an inadequate tool to 
regulate such a complex sector as aviation safety for two main 
reasons. It is difficult to keep up with situations that need to be 
regulated, because in this sector technological development is 
continuous, and has a great influence on safety: the law is not able 
to sustain this pace, and something else (namely, standards) must 
take its place. National laws also lack another crucial factor: 
uniformity. If uniformity is perceived as a value that can promote 
safety, the space for special rules is decreasing. Instead standards 
seem a better way to fulfill the need for a ‘common framework’ of 
technical rules. 
This leads to a significant change in the role of the Nation-
state, and alters the importance of national public actors in the 
global arena. Traditionally, the body that expressed the 
supremacy of national States was the Parliament, probably the 
clearest example of exercise of sovereign power. But just as 
legislative action is losing importance, so are parliaments. A 
central role is gained by administration, both at national and 
supra-national level. This role is gained on the basis of an initial 
transfer of powers. Institutions, however, are inclined to ‘expand’ 
the scope of their delegation, in the name of effectiveness, 
especially if appointed with regulatory functions. National 
sovereignty, in its parliamentary expression, is losing relevance, 
while political authority is giving place to bureaucratic power. 
This is happening not only at global level, but also in more 
developed systems such as the European Union. In a recent case, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union was called to evaluate 
                                                                                                                                              
113 See, for data regarding the effective implementation by States, the ICAO 
Safety Report 2014, 6. 
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the legitimacy of a provision introduced by an EC Regulation114, 
which, recurring certain requirements, assigns the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) the power to prohibit or 
impose conditions on short sale or similar financial transactions, 
therefore giving ESMA the right to take individual measures 
directed at natural or legal persons. The United Kingdom 
contested this delegation of power, arguing that it was lacking a 
legal basis in EU Treaties. The Court considered, among other 
reasons, that the delegation of power to ESMA was legitimate, 
because “the EU legislature, in its choice of method of 
harmonisation and, taking account of the discretion it enjoys with 
regard to the measures provided for under Article 114 TFEU, may 
delegate to a Union body, office or agency powers for the 
implementation of the harmonisation sought. That is the case in 
particular where the measures to be adopted are dependent on 
specific professional and technical expertise and the ability of such 
a body to respond swiftly and appropriately” 115 . There are 
significant differences between the EU legal system and global 
regulatory regimes, but this functional and technical approach, 
relevant in this case, is often followed at global level116. What is 
not formally ‘binding’ seeks implementation through 
effectiveness, which can be achieved by encouraging participation 
in the phase of defining standards 117 , and the reference to a 
dimension beyond States, which needs uniformity or at least a 
shared solution through specific professional and technical 
expertise. This argument is pivotal: this “dimension” 118  of 
international law and institutions that operate within it make it 
necessary to reconsider interests protected (in this case, aviation 
                                                           
114 Article 28 of Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit 
default swaps. 
115  Court of Justice of the European Union, JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
(Grand Chamber), 22 January 2014, C-270/12, “United Kingdom v. European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union”. 
116 J.G.S. Koppell, World rule. Accountability, legitimacy, and the design of global 
governance (2010), 7, refers to “the triumph of functional global governance”. 
117  See, regarding the regulation of the financial sector, M. Moschella – S. 
Pellizzari, International Financial Standards: Assessing Effectiveness from the Private 
Sector Perspective, 1 Pòlemos, 41-50 (2009). 
118  See B. Kingsbury - L. Casini, Global Administrative Law Dimensions of 
International Organizations, 6 Int’l Org. L. Rev. 319-358 (2009). 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL.8  ISSUE 1/2016 
 
231 
 
safety), which are no longer clearly referable to single States. They 
instead merge together, leading to the concept of “disaggregated 
sovereignty”119 , which emphasizes the relational dimension of 
public institutions, rather than the affirmation of their supremacy. 
In fact, the global legal order does not overlap, as another layer, 
national legal system, but instead the two are inextricably linked, 
because neither the national nor the supra-national level of 
government are able to maintain a monopoly of relations with the 
parties that compose it120. 
To some extent, States are an essential component for the 
genesis of the organization, through the adherence to a treaty or 
international convention, in this case the ICAO. Delegation by 
national States is in fact one of the most important ways of 
establishing an international organization, which brings benefits 
to States who have established it 121. 
But once a global regulatory regime is instituted, it 
establishes its identity and exercises its powers per se, providing 
answers to the challenges of uniformity regulation that lie beyond 
the national level, challenges that are global by their own nature. 
As a consequence, the role of States shifts from the law-making 
process to the implementation phase, due to the ‘domestic’ 
monopoly of coercive power. But as well as the function, the 
actors also change, widening powers of national administrative 
bodies through the reference to the global legal order. 
                                                           
119 A.M. Slaughter, A New World Order (2004), 266. 
120 S. Cassese, Oltre lo Stato (2006), 10. 
121  D.G. Hawkins, D.A. Lake, D.L. Nielson, M.J. Tierney, Delegation under 
anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory, in D.G. 
Hawkins, D.A. Lake, D.L. Nielson, M.J. Tierney (eds.) Delegation and Agency in 
International Organizations (2006), 13-23 enlighten specialization, policy 
externalities, collective decision-making, dispute resolution and credibility. 
